Under The Food Safety And Standards Act, A Violator Engaging In Misbranding Is Subject To A Penalty: Sc

CASE TITLE:

Manik Hiru Jhangiani Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

DATE OF ORDER:

13^TH May,2016

BENCH:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL

PARTIES:

Plaintiff: Manik Hiru Jhanghai

Respondent: State of Madhya Pradesh

SUBJECT: The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA) violator will be subject to penalties under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 1954 (FSSA), rather than being punished under the PFA, according to a ruling by the Supreme Court. The ruling was reached in a criminal appeal brought by Bharti Retail Limited, a business that runs "Easy Day" retail locations. The court noted that Section 52 of the FSSA supersedes the PFA's provisions in the event that misbranding occurs. The court further stated that the FSSA's provisions will take precedence over the PFA's in the event of a discrepancy between them.

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS:

5. Section 52 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006
5. Section 89 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006
5. Section 97 (4) The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

OVERVIEW:

5. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 had several provisions that went into effect on various dates. Per sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the FSSA, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was repealed with effect from August 5, 2011.
5. At the relevant time, the appellant held the position of Director at M/s. Bharti Retail Limited, also known as "Bharti." Bharti is a company that operates retail stores nationwide under the Easy Day brand. A PFA-appointed Food Inspector went to a Bharti store in Indore and bought specific biscuit packets from the store. The visit took place on November 29, 2010. The samples were sent to the State Food Laboratory, Bhopal, for testing and analysis after a panchnama was drawn the following day.On January 4, 2011, the Public Analyst's report was received.
5. August 4, 2011 saw the issuance of a notification under subsection (1) of Section 97 of the FSSA, designating August 5, 2011 as the date of the PFA's repeal. Section 97 contains a provision that states that any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in relation to any offenses committed under the PFA shall not be affected by the repeal, specifically in sub-section (1). Additionally, there is a sunset clause in Section 97's sub-section (4), which stipulates that the offenses under the PFA must be recognized within three years starting on August 5, 2011.
5. The Food Inspector was authorized on August 11, 2011, to bring charges against the Bharti Directors in accordance with the PFA's provisions. On August 12, 2011, the Food Inspector filed a charge sheet. The same day, the learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offense and issued a bailable warrant for the appellant. In order to contest the order of cognizance, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (abbreviated "CrPC").
5. The High Court dismissed the petition in accordance with Section 482 of the CrPC by the contested decision. The appellant was accused of misbranding, an offense that occurred before the PFA was repealed, according to the High Court. Thus, in light of subsection (4) of Section 97 of the FSSA, the learned Magistrate was authorized to take cognizance within three years of the repeal date.
5. The current appeal has been chosen because the petitioner feels wronged by the aforementioned High Court ruling.

ISSUES RAISED

5. Whether or not Section 52 of the FSSA, which establishes the penalty for misbranding, went into effect on July 29, 2010, and whether or not Section 3 of the FSSA, which defines "misbranded food" in clause (zf) of sub-section (1), went into effect on May 28, 2008?
5. Whether Section 89 of the FSSA, which was notified on July 29, 2010, is enforceable despite any inconsistent provisions in other laws currently in effect?

          ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER

5. Senior counsel for the appellant made arguments in a misbranding case.
5. He contended that the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) was introduced in 2008 and that on July 29, 2010, Section 52 of the FSSA—which establishes fines for misbranding—went into effect. The attorney further contended that notice of the overriding effect under Section 89 of the FSSA was given on July 29, 2010. He maintained that misbranding would be governed by Section 52 of the FSSA rather than Section PFA, which makes misbranding a crime that carries a fine and jail sentence.
5. Additionally, he maintained that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (PFA) remained in effect up until their repeal. He contended that the allegedly violated Rule 32 of the PFA Rules would no longer be in effect as of July 29, 2010.
5. Additionally, he contended that it was incorrect for the High Court to rely on the sunset clause under Section 97, sub-section (4), since it was not relevant to the case at hand.

            ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

5. First, the respondent-state's learned attorney argued that the alleged offense was committed during a period when the PFA was still in effect even after the FSSA was implemented. On that date, Rule 32 of the PFA was also in effect, which the respondent claims was violated.

5. The FSSA's subsection (4), which allows for the recognition of an offense under the PFA prior to the passage of three years after the FSSA's inception, was cited by the learned counsel. He would argue that the prosecution for breaking the PFA Act and PFA Rules will undoubtedly be able to proceed given the guidelines outlined in Section 97's sub-section (4).
5. He argued that all of the PFA's and the PFA Rules' provisions remained in effect following the FSSA's implementation. He pointed out that even the FSSA Rules were not in effect on the day the offense was committed, drawing our attention to Section 52 of the FSSA. He would thus concur with the High Court's justifications as stated in the contested order. He based his arguments that the punishment to be meted out under the PFA after its repeal and the criminal proceedings started under it prior to its repeal have been safeguarded by Section 97 of the FSSA on a ruling made by this Court in the case of Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh
5. As a result, he would argue that the High Court's position does not warrant intervention.

JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS:

5. The Supreme Court ruled that a person found guilty of misbranding will be subject to a fine under the Food Safety and Standards Act of 1954 (FSSA) rather than being punished under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954 (PFA). The Director of Bharti Retail Limited, a company that operated retail stores under the name "Easy Day" and had locations across the nation, filed a criminal appeal with the court, and the court made this ruling.
5. "In a case where an act of misbranding is committed by anyone, which is an offence punishable under Section 16 of PFA and which attracts penalty under Section 52 of FSSA, Section 52 of the FSSA will override the provisions of PFA," stated the two-judge bench made up of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol. Because of this, the FSSA's provisions take precedence over the PFA in this situation, and the violator who engages in misbranding will be subject to punishment under Section 52 of the FSSA rather than under the PFA.
5. According to the Bench, Section 89 means that in the event of a discrepancy between the FSSA and PFA provisions, the FSSA provisions will take precedence over the PFA provisions.
5. Following a review of the case's facts, the Supreme Court stated, "The allegation was that the appellant's food product's label did not comply with the PFA's requirements and the rules framed thereunder. The offender cannot be punished under the PFA and the FSSA for the same misbranding since doing so would put them in double jeopardy, which is against Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, the question is which statute will take precedence when it comes to penal action under both of them.
5. The Court also pointed out that there is inconsistent language in the enactments regarding the criminal penalties for misbranding, even though the same provisions have been made under both of them.
5. As previously mentioned, one only calls for the imposition of a monetary fine, while the other stipulates a minimum six-month jail sentence. The Court declared that Section 89 of the FSSA will take effect due to the inconsistency, and that the FSSA's provisions will take precedence over the PFA's provisions to the extent that they are inconsistent.
5. The PFA and FSSA contain penal provisions relating to misbranding, and the Court noted that the High Court erred in holding that there is no inconsistency. It further stated that the appellant's prosecution should have been dismissed by the High Court in accordance with Section 16 of the PFA.
5. ‘We are handling a case where the purported misbranding was done at a time when the applicable FSSA provisions, specifically Section 52, were already in effect’. Consequently, we have a situation where misbranding will result in legal consequences under the FSSA as well as the PFA. Therefore, Section 89 of the FSSA enters the picture, which the Court further stated did not apply to the facts of the Hindustan Unilever Limited case.
5. As a result, the Special Judicial Magistrate's proceedings were quashed and the appeal was granted by the Apex Court.

CONCLUSION:

5. Section 52 of the FSSA will take precedence over the PFA provisions in the event that someone commits a misbranding act that is punishable under Section 16 of the PFA and that attracts a penalty under Section 52 of the FSSA. This is because imposing the punishment under the PFA and the penalty under the FSSA on the violator for the same misbranding would amount to double jeopardy, which is prohibited under Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution.
5. Consequently, given the precedential significance of the FSSA's provisions in this context, the PFA does not allow for the punishment of a misbranding violator; instead, the FSSA's Section 52 requires the violator to pay a penalty.