Landmark Judgements On Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Domestic violence is not a new topic in society. It refers to physical, verbal, sexual, and financial abuse between intimate partners. According to the World Health Organization, one out of every three women has been subjected to physical or sexual violence at some point in their lives, and 30% of women have been subjected to physical or sexual abuse by their relationships. Women are subjected to male violence, which has a negative impact on their mental and physical health. Women in India fear for their safety in the married house. It's because patriarchal culture doesn't provide women with enough chances. They are threatened with violence by their husbands, in-laws, or others. Because of traditional society and traditions, the majority of domestic abuse cases are not reported by the women.

According to IPC Section 498A, whoever, as the husband or a relative of the husband of a woman, submits such woman to cruelty shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of up to three years, as well as a fine. The violation of Section 498A is a cognizable, non-compoundable, and non-bailable offence.

Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code has made a significant change to protect women's rights and empowerment, making it illegal to extort property from a woman by subjecting her to cruelty. Domestic violence or cruelty towards women is linked to dowry in around 80% of cases.

As a result, certain rules and revisions were required to prevent women from being harmed, and this provision is one of India's most important anti-dowry laws.

01. Arvind Singh v. the State of Bihar.(2001)

The court held that Section 498A of I.P.C. does not specifically talk about the diverse forms of violence like sexual, verbal, or psychological. Hence, it defines ‘cruelty’ in a broad term, giving discretionary powers to the Courts who have then interpreted cruelty to the disadvantage of women, such as in one case, court held – “cruelty denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another,” which is neither inclusive nor lucid in its interpretation.

02. Satish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja(2020)

In the instant case, the Court haddealt with several questions of laws relating to the DV Act which were already decided by the Supreme Court hitherto. The petitioner had filed the suit for the removal of his daughter-in-law from the suit premises after her divorce from his son. He had relied on the case of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 where the Supreme Court had ruled that under DV act the property of husband’s property which was not a joint family property did not come within the meaning of shared household.

The landmark judgement overruled the judgement of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra case and held that the definition provided for the shared household in Section 2(s) of the DV Act was exhaustive in nature. It was held that the following needs to be established for the determination of whether a suit property was shared household or not:

a. The aggrieved person under the said Act resided or was residing in the premise during the period when the domestic relationship existed.

b. The property was required to belong to the joint family of which the aggrieved person is a part.

03. Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum NarottamdasHarsora

The High Court based its decision on the Supreme Court's decision in the case where the Supreme Court struck down a portion of Section 2 (a) of the Act (defining "aggrieved person") on the grounds that it violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, and the phrase "adult male" as found in Section 2(q) of the Act was deleted.

• In light of the aforementioned of the Apex Court judgement, the High Court concluded that if the said sub-section is read without the word 'adult male,' it appears that any person, male or female, who is aggrieved and alleges a breach of the Act's provisions could use the Act's provisions. In that light, the petitioner's suit could not have been dismissed on the grounds that the Act does not provide for men and that it is solely applicable to women.
• However, Justice Anand Byrareddy later withdrew the aforementioned High Court verdict after an Advocate objected to it, claiming that the Supreme Court's verdict in the HiralHarsora case had been overturned since it had been wrongly interpreted by the Judge.

04. Meenavati vs. Senthamarai Selvi(2008)

• The proviso to Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act explicitly specifies that no order under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Act can be issued against a woman.
• It was held in this matter that women members of the family cannot be commanded to be removed from the shared household under the pretence of granting an order under Section 19 (1) (b) of the Domestic Violence Act.

05. V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot(2010)

• In this case, the Supreme Court maintained the Delhi High Court's decision that "even a wife who shared a household before the Domestic Violence Act came into existence would be entitled to the Domestic Violence Act's protection."
• As a result, the Domestic Violence Act allows an aggrieved party to make an application under the Act for acts that occurred prior to the Act's inception.

06.Chanmuniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and Anrs (2010)

In 2008, the Maharashtra government proposed to expand the definition of "wife" under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code to cover women in long-term non-marital relationships. The Malimath committee also advised that the law recognise women in such "live-in" relationships so that males do not exploit and take advantage of them, which could lead to circumstances where the guy absolves himself of his responsibilities to his partner without incurring legal consequences. The courts should take into account the changing society structure, in which people are increasingly engaging in 'live-in' partnerships. It was contended, based on the decisions of J. GS Singhvi and J. AK Ganguly, that a couple who had been living together for a long period should be recognised as married. This legal sanction would be effective in safeguarding and defending the rights of women who are subjected to abuse and violence in these types of relationships. As a result, under section 2(f) of the Act, live-in relationships must be included under the term "relationship in the nature of marriage."

07. Sandhya Wankhede vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhede (2011)

The term "respondent" is defined under Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act as any adult man who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any remedies under this Act:

• Provided, however, that an aggrieved wife or female in a marriage-like relationship may file a complaint against a relative of the husband or male partner.
• Since the term respondent is defined to include an adult male person, the judiciary has been faced with the argument that an aggrieved person can only file a complaint under the Domestic Violence Act only applies to adult males, not to female relatives of the spouse, such as the mother-in-law or sister-in-law.
• The Supreme Court, on the other hand, concluded that the proviso to Section 2(q) did not exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the scope of a complaint that might be made under the Domestic Violence Act in the aforementioned case. As a result, complaints can be filed not just against an adult male but also against a female related to that adult male.

08. Lalita Toppo vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2013)

In this case, the Supreme Court has categorically held that maintenance can be claimed under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Domestic Violence Act) even if the claimant is not a legally married wife and so, is eligible for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court explained that the requirements of Section 3(a) of the Domestic Violence Act of 2005, which defines "domestic violence," include "economic abuse" as a form of domestic violence. The Court went on to say that under the Domestic Violence Act, the victim, such as an estranged wife or a live-in partner, would be entitled to more relief than what is provided under Section 125 of the CrPC, such as a shared household.

09. Indra Sarma v. V.K. V. Sarma (2013) and D. Veluswamy vs D.Patchaiammal

Section 2(f) of the Act defines ‘domestic relationships.’ The Supreme Court laid down tests to determine what constituted ‘relationship in the nature of marriage.’ In the matter of Veluswamy, the Court concluded that live-in partnerships in which a man financially supports a woman for primarily sexual purposes as a keep or a servant are not deemed domestic relationships under the Act. As a result of the Supreme Court's judgement, courts must now consider a variety of factors related to the parties' relationship. The Court would have to deconstruct and scrutinise the origins of their relationship, giving judges broad discretion in deciding the nature of the relationship and, as a result, allowing subjectivity and personal prejudice to play a large role in the final decision. While seeking to strike a balance between the rights of women and public policy considerations, the two judgments unjustly restricted the scope of beneficiaries of the Act. The judges appear to view women in live-in relationships in an unfavourable light and frown upon them, believing that they contribute to infidelity, as seen by both verdicts.

10. Sabita Mark Burges vs. Mark Lionel Burges (2013)

Section 19 (1) (b) of the Domestic Violence Act allows for an order to be granted directing the Respondent to leave the joint residence. As a result, the Magistrate has the power to issue an order compelling the respondent to vacate the shared residence.

The Bombay High Court ruled in this case that even though a man is the sole owner of a house, he has no right to be aggressive against his wife or the lady he lives with, and if the Court notices any violence, he must be barred from visiting the residence, primarily to protect his wife and children from additional violence and similar disagreements. The goal of enacting Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act —

• The Bombay High Court put it succinctly: "It is general observation that applications for grant of injunction in respect of the respondent's residence and possession is essentially considered by Courts as a violation of the parties' proprietary rights."
• Because most wives do not own marriage residences, they are statutorily granted rights that would not have been granted by courts under common law principles, such as the right to peaceful enjoyment of their matrimonial home. In the first place, Section 19 of the Domestic Abuse Act was adopted, guaranteeing essentially the woman’s peace against domestic violence in their homes, regardless of their title. The lofty idea of human rights prevailing over proprietary rights underpins this statutory gift. It is worth repeating that unless one of them is violent, they are both equally entitled to the said flat.

11.Kusum Sharma vs. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (2015)

The Delhi High court had stated that: the affidavit of assets, income and expenditure of both the parties are necessary to determine the rights of the parties and hence, both parties must file sworn affidavits with the court in order for the court to make monetary relief orders.

12. Mohd. Zakir vs. Shabana & Ors. (2018)

In this fascinating case, the High Court of Karnataka ruled that a petition filed by the husband or an adult male under the Domestic Violence Act can be heard.

Anand Byrareddy, J. had allowed a criminal petition submitted by a Muslim man, ruling that he was entitled to utilise the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005. (DV Act).

The petitioner, a male, filed the case under Section 482 CrPC. The petitioner, who was aggrieved by his wife's and her family's actions, claimed the DV Act's provisions. The case brought on behalf of the petitioner did not impress the learned City Civil and Sessions Judge because, in his opinion, the Act is disproportionately weighted in favour of women and does not foresee any male member being harmed by domestic violence. The petitioner went to the High Court because he felt he had been wronged.

However, if the term 'Adult Male' is omitted from the provision, it appears that anyone, regardless of gender, can be the respondent. The judge reversed his decision, and it was determined that only a woman can file a petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

After considering the aforementioned reasons and incidents, it can be concluded that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act of 2005 entirely eliminates the prospect of a man being the victim of domestic violence and abuse by his wife. The Act is discriminatory against men since it only protects women, meaning that men are always the culprits and women are always the victims.

The Act is allegedly discriminatory against men since it only protects women, implying that males are always the culprits and women are always the victims. This mindset leads to women abusing the Act's provisions against their husband and his family. Even after many incidents of women exploiting Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against men to torture them and her in-laws, the assumption that women will always use the Act to fight injustice does not qualify as fair, rational, or reasonable.

13. Indira Sarma vs VKV Sarma(2018)

The Supreme Court ruled in this decision that not all live-in partnerships are marriage-like relationships.

Guidelines for testing the concept of live-in-relationship-

• Duration of relationship,
• Shared household
• Pooling of resources and financial arrangements,
• Domestic arrangements,
• Sexual relationship
• Children,
• Socialization in public,
• Intention and conduct of the parties.

14. Kamlesh Devi vs Jaipal & Or (2019)

The Supreme Court held that mere vague allegation that respondents are family members will not be sufficient to maintain the complaint. In this instance, a panel of Justice Banerjee and Justice Shah ruled that a vague claim is insufficient to pursue the case under the Domestic Violence Act. The Supreme Court is in favour of the High court order and hence dismissed the petition for special leave.

15. Binita Dass v. Uttam Kumar(2019)

The Supreme Court held that Domestic Violence and Section 125 CrPC both are proceeded independently. The magistrate indirectly ordered maintenance at a rate of Rs. 2,000 per month to the respondent until the proceedings under section 125 Crpc are not concluded, according to the Supreme Court of India. Because the order lacks authority, it is completely unreasonable and unsustainable. In this case, an order was issued by Justice Sachdeva's bench. The Delhi High Court has ruled that a Magistrate cannot refuse to pay interim support to a wife only because she has earning capacity or is a qualified person, and that qualification and earning capacity cannot be used as a reason to deny interim maintenance to a wife.

16. Smt. Haimanti Mal vs The State of West Bengal (2019)

The Calcutta High Court took the view that determination of compensation has to be rational and it should not be an outcome of guesses. The High Court allowed the wife Rs.1,00,000 as compensation. In this instance, Justice Mitra issued an order. The wife was given Rs.1,00,000/- by the Calcutta High Court as compensation for the mental anguish she had endured as a result of her husband's actions. However, the award of compensation cannot be justified in the absence of any proof or materials on file. The Protection of Women from Domestic Abuse Act of 2005, Section 22, provides for compensation and damages for injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the respondent's acts of domestic violence.

17. Manju Sharma vs Vipin (2019)

With an annual turnover of Rs. 1 crore, the husband was pleading his income as Rs.10,000/-, Delhi HC did not agree and enhanced the maintenance awarded to the wife. When it was discovered that the husband was not revealing his actual income, with an annual turnover of Rs.1 crore, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva issued an order in this case, increasing the amount of maintenance to be paid to the wife. The interim support was increased from Rs.10,000 to Rs.30,000 per month to accommodate the petitioner's and her daughter's needs.

18. Kuldeep Singh Vs. Rekha (2019)

Case against parents-in-law cannot be filed if the wife is living separately.

Justice Awasthi has passed the order in the case and the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that if the wife and husband leave the shared households to establish their own household, the domestic relationship comes to an end in respect of parents and therefore complaints under Domestic Violence Act cannot be maintained against them. The first requirement of the Domestic Violence Act is that the applicant be an aggrieved person, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act. To invoke the Domestic Violence Act, the aggrieved individual and respondent must have a domestic relationship.

19. Ajay Kumar v. Lata (2019)

The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved wife may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner, as the case may be. The case was decided by Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice Hemant Gupta. An aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the form of marriage may file a complaint against the husband's or male partner's relative, as the case may be, under the proviso to section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

20. Vikas Bhutani v. State (2019)

The wife was entitled to maintenance under both sections, subject to modification, according to the Delhi High Court. In this case, Justice Sachdev issued an order. The woman is entitled to maintenance for domestic abuse even if maintenance under Section 125 CrPC was granted, according to the Delhi High Court, however there may be an adjustment qua former maintenance. The purpose of a maintenance award is to provide a subsistence stipend to a wife who is unable to support herself.The petitioner was ordered to pay Rs. 40,000 per month beginning on the date of filing the plea.

21. Megha Khandelwal v. Rajat Khandelwal (2019)

The Supreme Court held that the husband has to pay maintenance even if the wife is well educated. Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Rastogi have passed the order in this case. Despite the fact that the woman was well educated, the Supreme Court significantly increased interim maintenance for her in a domestic abuse case. The Court decided that the interim maintenance should be increased to Rs. 25,000 per month and provided to the petitioner.

22. Sadhana vs Hemant (2019)

A divorcee is not entitled to the benefits of the Domestic Violence Act, according to this judgement of Bombay High Court.

Justice Giratkar passed the order in case and held that if at the time of filing of petition, the wife has already been divorced, there cannot be any domestic relationship. As a result, a divorced wife cannot be protected under the Domestic Violence Act.

23. Vijayanand Dattaram Naik v. Vishranti Vijayanand Naik (2019)

Order of maintenance under DV Act set aside by HC in absence of any act of Domestic Violence committed by husband. Justice C.V. Bhadang of the Bombay High Court's Goa bench ruled the case, allowing the husband's plea and quashing the trial court's judgement partially allowing the wife's application filed under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The wife was given the option of pursuing any other legal remedies accessible to her. For a period of six months, the spouse was ordered to pay a monthly fee of Rs 5,000.

24. Prem Singh vs State of Haryana (1988)

In this case, the deceased Sumitra who married to Prem Singh died under suspicious circumstances within 7 years from her marriage. There was a continuous demand for dowry during her marriage which was assumed to have stopped after she gave birth to her son and when her parents gifted a buffalo to her in-laws. However this assumption of her parents didn’t turn out to be true as the deceased was found dead due to burn injuries.

The Supreme Court while hearing this appeal highlighted that the mother in law who was also an accused lived separately and that there was no evidence produced to show that the other accused acted on her instigation. Moreover, she was not expected to have benefitted from the demands of dowry and therefore, she was acquitted by the court. However, the court held all other accused as guilty of offence under section 304B of the I.P.C. as their claim of the victim dying by committing suicide by consuming poison could not be corroborated and taking her to the hospital after the incident does not absolve their liability and thus, their conviction was justified.