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Delhi Riots Conspiracy Case: Umar Khalid Denied Bail!

  • A Delhi (Karkardooma) Court has, in State vs. Umar  Khalid, denied bail to Umar Khalid, a student of JNU and accused of involvement in a larger conspiracy case in connection with the Delhi riots of 2020, involving charges under IPC as well as under UAPA. 
  • The bail application was filed on 6-09-2021 under section 437 of CrPC read with section 43-D(5) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 
  • The Counsel for the State had vehemently argued that the Delhi riots of 2020 were a large-scale and deep rooted conspiracy hatched after the Cabinet Committee passed a resolution to present CAB in both houses of Parliament. It was also argued that 23 protest sites were created in Muslim majority areas close to mosques/majaar and close to main roads. 
  • The learned Counsel also described the entire chain of events and referred to the statements of witnesses that were recorded both under section 161 and 164 of CrPC and other documents and chats on whatsapp groups to prove the existence and execution of the conspiracy. It was also argued that the individual role of the conspirators is not to be seen, rather a holistic view is to be taken while looking at the prima facie involvement of the conspirators in the conspiracy. 
  • The Counsel also stressed that the entire process was not natural or organic but was executed under a planned conspiracy and given the appearance of an organic protest. The role of Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, the formation of JACT, DPSG, JCC were also brought to the notice of the Court. 
  • The Counsel for the applicant Umar Khalid, on the other hand, vehemently argued that the prosecution had failed miserably at establishing any incriminating link between the accused and the other conspirators, whether by physical presence or by remote communication. 
  • It was also argued that no prima facie case was made out against the accused, he is not visible in any CCTV recordings or any video footage, nor has the public or the police made any statement that establishes his presence at the scene of the violence. It was also alleged that the prosecution had tried to fill up the lacunae in their case by calling him as a ‘remote supervisor’ or ‘master mind’, among others. 
  • At the outset, the Court referred to the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of National Investigating Agency vs Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watalli and observed that an elaborate examination of the evidence is not supposed to be done at the stage of consideration of bail. The Court has to merely record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence. Also, as held in the case of Thwaha Fasal vs Union of India (2021) it was held that this opinion has to be reached not only by referring to the chargesheet but also the case diary and other materials gathered by the investigating agency. 
  • Among various other observations, the Court said that the CAA/NRC protests happened all over India but the riots happened only in Delhi. And the fact that the riots occurred on the same day on which President Donald Trump came to Delhi, and the world media was there to cover it does not appear to be a mere coincidence. The mention of this visit was specifically made by the accused Umar Khalid at his Amravati speech, as was mentioned the need to show these riots all over the world.
  • The Court also observed that the contention that Umar Khalid is a researcher and that his frame of mind can be assessed from his doctoral thesis on Welfare aspects of Adivasis of Jharkhand is not a relevant consideration, as any thesis written by an accused cannot be a ground for assessing mens rea. 
  • Thus, after perusing the chargesheet and other accompanying documents, the Court was of the opinion that the allegations against the accused, Umar Kahlid were prima facie true, and the bail application was hence, rejected. 

Court Cannot Order Arrest Of The Accused While Dismissing An Anticipatory Bail Application: SC

  • In the case of S. Senthil Kumar vs State of Tamil Nadu the Apex Court had held that the Court while dismissing an application for anticipatory bail, cannot issue a mandatory direction for the arrest of the accused, and it is upto the investigating agency to take further steps in the matter.
  • An SLP was filed in the Supreme Court against the order of the HC wherein it was alleged that after rejecting an application for pre-arrest bail, the HC had issued an order for the arrest of the accused. The petitioner had relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of MC Abraham vs State of Maharashtra and ors (2003) SCC.
  • It is important to note that in the case of MC Abraham vs State of Maharashtra the Apex Court had observed that there may be instances where the application for anticipatory bail is denied, and ultimately the said person may not be put to trial because no material is disclosed against him during the course of the investigation. The HC had, in this case, proceeded on the assumption that since the petition for anticipatory bail had been rejected, there was no option open to the State but to arrest the accused persons. The Apex Court observed that this presumption is erroneous, and that the person whose application for anticipatory bail is rejected may or may not be arrested by the investigating officer depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 
  • However, in the present case, the Apex Court noted that the HC, after rejecting the application for pre-arrest bail, had not made any order for the mandatory arrest of the offender, and hence, the question of quashing any order or the application of the ratio of MC Abraham case does not arise.
  • Hence, the special leave petition was rejected. 


Mere Filing of a Criminal Case Is Not Cruelty and Residing Separately Doesn’t Amount to Desertion: Karnataka HC

  • The Honourable Karnataka High Court in the case of S.Shyamala @ Kathyayani v. B.N. Mallikarjunaiah [Miscellaneous First Appeal No.3352/2016] has set aside the decision of the Family Court which granted divorce to the Parties on grounds of desertion, Cruelty and breakdown of marriage. The Learned Judge relied on various Judgements of the Apex Court in this regard and the stand of the Supreme Court on divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown was also reiterated.
  • The present first appeal was filed under Family Courts Act, 1984 by the wife (appellant) challenging the judgment & decree passed by the Family court, allowing the petition by the husband (respondent) under Section 13(1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. [divorce on ground of cruelty & desertion] .
  • The respondent had contended that the appellant was demanding for setting up a separate house immediately after the marriage. Later, she left the matrimonial home and did not return. The respondent issued a legal notice but the appellant issued an untenable reply to the same. Subsequently, she lodged a criminal complaint against him and his relatives for various offences under IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The respondent was acquitted in the said case.
  • His case was that the wife had no intention to live with him and perform her matrimonial obligation. There were no possibilities of reconciliation. The learned Judge while adjudicating on the basis of facts of the matter had allowed the petition filed by the respondent.
  • Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Family Court had proceeded to allow the petition mainly for the reason that the wife had filed a criminal case against the husband and his relatives. Mere filing of a criminal case itself did not amount to cruelty unless it is proved that the wife was in the habit of filing false cases.
  • It was contended that the wife had a valid reason to stay away from her husband and it cannot be said that she had deserted the husband. The husband had forced the wife to leave and no attempt was made by him to bring her back and he issued a legal notice seeking divorce.
  • Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the marriage had irretrievably failed and there was no point in continuing such a marriage. He submitted that the grounds of cruelty as well as desertion had been proved by the husband before the Family Court and therefore, there was no scope for interference by this court.
  • It was further submitted that the appellant filed false complaints against the respondent and his relatives only with an intention to harass and coerce them.
  • The Court observed that the Learned Magistrate, who adjudicated upon the criminal case filed by the appellant, had observed that there was no such break of relationship between the two. The Magistrate had acquitted the accused on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. So, it could not be inferred that the wife had lodged a false complaint against the husband and his family members.
  • The Court relied on the judgements of the Apex Court in Raj Talreja v. Kavita Talreja, wherein it was held that filing of complaints did not amount to cruelty, if there were justifiable reasons to file the complaints. Merely because no action is taken on the complaint or the accused was acquitted may not form a ground to treat such accusations of the wife as cruelty.
  • It was the specific defence of the husband in the criminal case that after filing of the criminal complaint, his wife had been sending him messages conveying her willingness to join him. In that event, it could not be inferred that the wife had deserted the husband to put an end to the cohabitation & marital relations.
  • The term desertion would not imply only a separate residence or living. It is necessary that there must be a firm decision to put an end to cohabitation & marital relations.
  • The Learned Judge of the Family Court had also observed that the marriage had been irretrievably broken down and the parties were living apart for more than 9 years and found it proper to grant divorce. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable failure of the marriage can be granted only by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
  • Hence the impugned order and decree were liable to be set aside and the view of the family court was held as not tenable.
     
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