498a fir lodged twice

Second FIR would be quashed.

Regards,

Shonee Kapoor

harassed.by.498a@gmail.com

hi ashu 

 Fir launched against you in UP is under 498a and a complaint can be filed  under women Cell that is under domestic voilence Act  both are different.

@ Author

1. It is not clear from query if 2 FIR's for same complaints made out or they are two different nature of complaints (one that is under S. 498a and another a simple complaint under DV Act)


2. However two FIR's for same offence permissible: Supreme Court. While on one hand the manner of recording of First Information Report (FIR) and the commission of offences revealing from FIR are take with caution and circumspection, the Supreme Court in a recent decision (Re.: Babubhai v. State of Gujarat) has approved the recording of more than one FIR in respect of same acts committed on the ground that the police is required to register the FIR on the basis of the information provided and that "where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible".

Making a reference to the earlier decisions of the Court on the issue, the Bench declared the position of law and have a look at the decision in annexed PDF file which to my opinion is the most recent one and may bring clarity to raised query.

However do clarify on para 1 for all of us clarity and better guidance.

No.You can't file hundreds of cases against husbands and wives.Courts [Apex  Courts] do not take kindly to such nonsense. What will higher courts do? Quash all cases and direct husband and wife to hit a marriage counsellor and if  either of the two has a genuine  grievance then matters can still be sorted out unless there are visible evidence of cruelty ,injury or death and the like.Thats whats done by good benches.

@ Author

On logical re-thinking on my earlier take on your questions before us allow me to pull back my earlier placement of a SC Judgment on permissibility of two fir's when possible guidelines. It was a generic thought which came to my mind upon bare reading your query.

Coming back to context; S. 498a IPC I am placing in public domain two wisdoms of Hon'ble SC with explanation notes stressing S. 498a IPC is not a continuing offence and one can find it out by reading down two FIR's whose special knowledge only you have.

However the "quashing" as rightly hinted by Shonee and now I agree to his short take are placed below;

Scenario I - Suppose the 498-A FIR is lodged in city X (where you and your 498a wife stayed) and your parents live in city Y, then the court in city X lacks the jurisdiction to try any offense committed by your parents.

The FIR would say that you tortured your wife in city X while you and your parents together tortured your wife in city Y. If offense under IPC 498-A was a continuing offense, then the courts in city X as well as city Y would have territorial jurisdiction.

CASE NO.: Appeal (Crl.) 904 of 2004

Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors.

V/s

Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/08/2004

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (Crl.)No. 4573/2003)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

Leave granted.

Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court whereby the appellants’ prayer for quashing proceedings in CC 3532 of 2001 on the file of the Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet, Chennai, by exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’) was rejected. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows :

Respondent no.2 as complainant filed complaint in the Court of the concerned magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 ( in short the ‘Dowry Act’). The magistrate directed the police to investigate and after investigation charge-sheet was filed by the police. When the matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court alleging that the concerned magistrate has no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if the allegations contained therein are accepted in toto. According to them, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.4.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to Chennai and was staying there. All the allegations which are per se without any basis took place according to the complainant at Nagercoil, and therefore, the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was further submitted that earlier a complaint was lodged by the complainant before the concerned police officials having jurisdiction; but after inquiry no action was deemed necessary.

In response, learned counsel submitted that some of the offences were continuing offences. The appellant no.1 had initiated proceedings for judicial separation, the notice for which was received by her at Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action existed.

The High Court unfortunately did not consider rival stands and even did not record any finding on the question of law raised regarding lack of jurisdiction. It felt that legal parameters were to be considered after a thorough trial after due opportunity to the parties and, therefore, the factual points raised by parties were not to be adjudicated under Section 484 of the Code.

In support of the appeal Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel, submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. A bare reading of the complaint would go to show that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court where the complaint was filed. Therefore, the entire proceedings had no foundation.

In response, learned counsel for respondent no.2-complainant submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178(c) of the Code, and therefore The Court had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, and reads as follows:

“Section 177 : ORDINARY PLACE OF INQUIRY AND TRIAL:

Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.”

Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows:

“Section 178 PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”

“All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1961 SC 1589), L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC 1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand.

As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed.

A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30). There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.

The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases.

It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise.

The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”.

The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts.

The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In “Words and Phrases” (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows:

“Cause of action” has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. “Cause of action” has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action”.

When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, the concerned magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed.

The complaint be returned to respondent No.2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Scenario II:- Suppose the 498-A FIR is lodged in city X (where you and your 498a wife stayed) and your parents live in city Y, then the court in city X lacks the jurisdiction to try any offense committed by your parents.

The FIR would say that you tortured your wife in city X while you and your parents together tortured your wife in city Y. If offense under IPC 498-A was a continuing offense, then the courts in city X as well as city Y would have territorial jurisdiction.

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 210 of 2000

Manish Ratan & Ors.

V/s

State of M.P. & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2006

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

S.B. SINHA, J :

Application of Sections 177 and 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 1.09.1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Crl. Revision No. 98 of 1998.

Appellant No. 1 was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh. They were living at their matrimonial home at Jabalpur. Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant No. 1 with the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal case was registered. In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur.

The period during which the incident took place was said to be before November, 1995 till 25.08.1997. It was alleged:

“7. That during the time of Dusshera the complainant’s husband Manish, Father in law S.S.

Rattan, Mother in law Smt. Kiran and sister in law Menaka (Minni) illtreated her so much that she left her house and saved her life by some means and reached in her Mama’s house at Bhopal and from there she reached her house and since then she has been staying with her father.” A criminal revision was filed by the appellants questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said criminal revision application has been dismissed opining that the offence being a continuing one, Datia Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.

The High Court did not consider the question on the touchstone of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code. It is interesting to note that while arriving at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997) 5 SCC 30], stating:

“The High Court held that excepting against the husband, the complaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh and as such, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the appellant was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur but it was maintainable so far as the husband of the appellant was concerned. On these facts, the Apex Court took the view that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of the mal-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused  respondents, and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. It was, therefore, held that in view of clause (c) of Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court was not right. The order passed by the High Court was set aside and the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the case. The facts of the present case are different.

There is nothing in the complaint to show that any mal-treatment was given to the complainant at Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the mal-treatment was given within a specific period at Jabalpur. There is nothing to show that any mal-treatment was given by any of the petitioners at Datia and under these circumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee does not help the learned counsel for the complainant in this case.” By a curious process of reasoning, however, it was held:

“They demanded a sum of Rs. 7.00 lakhs and forced her to write a letter to her parents in that regard. She was beaten and kept starving.

Somehow she managed to escape and went to her Mama’s place at Bhopal and from there she went to father’s place and was living there. Thus these facts go to show that she was forced to go to her father’s place on account of the fact that she was mal-treated; as demand of Rs. 7.00 lakhs was not fulfilled. As laid down in the aforesaid decision of this Court, the word ‘cruelty’ is not only the physical cruelty, the lady was forced to live at her father’s place on account of the torture of the inlaws and as such it can safely be said that there was also a mental cruelty. The cruelty and the terror of the in-laws continued even at the place of the father where she was living. In this view of the matter, it can safely be said that the harassment continued at the place where she was residing with her father. In view of the provision of Section 178 Cr.P.C., the offence may be inquired into and tried by a Court where the physical harassment, marpeet had taken place i.e. the in-laws’ place and also where the harassment continued i.e. the place where she was residing. Thus in view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid authority with which I respectfully agree, the Court at Datia had also jurisdiction to try the case.” It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

Interpretation of the term “ordinarily” will have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which reads as under:

“178. Place of inquiry or trial.(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant case.

Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question.

In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.

In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Another [(1972) 2 SCC 890], it was stated:

“A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobediance or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had assaulted the appellant therein. It was in the aforementioned fact situation, this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:

“At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that it will be evident from the complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence, the criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable against the respondent husband against whom some overt act at Raipur was alleged. But such case was not maintainable against the other respondents.” This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein held:

“We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with the criminal case” Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where noticing the interpretation of the expression “cause of action”, it was held that the expression “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. In that case the complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and went to Chennai and was staying there. Thus, having regard to the fact that all allegations according to the complainant took place at Nagercoil, it was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was held:

“This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.” Yet again in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507], Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:

“In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy.

Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13- 10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.

Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.” The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so.

Although the complainant has filed an application before us for impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We, therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her. Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

Thank you all but she has applied the following section on me and my family which is already coverd DV in UP then how come they can move the application in Delhi again under WC :

Sections are: 498A, 323, 324, 307, 315, 316, 504, 506, IPC 3/4 D act.

Please advice.

@TAjobsIndia

Please note the same sections are also applicable on my parents in UP state then it should be only in UP why in Delhi, as Court doesnt have time n money to spend on same case at two places.

Regards

Read Article 20 of Indian Constitution but except for Gajendra garkar's judgment there are hardly any case laws on it.. Two cases with the same section[as a whole or in parts] cannot be pursued in two courts or one court and even if worded differently with twisted cause title is debarred.But I am asking too much by comparing it with 5th Amendment ofUS  Bill of Rights.Do what Indian lawyers say,they know the processes here better.

My gosh.....

You are talking here of fag end of 60's when Ven. Gajendra Garkar was CJI !

However there are several interesting interpretation by subsequent Hon'ble Bench.

Would love to see those interpretations but I perused pages after pages of AIR,SCC et al but nothing.

Wht's your opinion on Nandini Satpathy Vs. Dani (P.L.) And Anr. 1978 AIR 1025, 1978 SCR (3) 608

Dear Tajob,

Here in the Court itself has violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution and allowed the police to violate 20(3) and that too after examining US case laws,Indian case laws, 5th Amendment,Miranda Warnings. Court has allowed the cops to disallow police to DISALLOW THE ACCUSED THE RIGHT TO KEEP SILENT and engage a lawyer and the Court through its Convulated Politically influenced Judgment indulged in Self Incrimination itself. Writing in brackets[Not self incriminatory interrogation is legally incorrect and a mockery of the due process of law]. US Supreme Court would have struck down this Judment and heldf judges responsible for Ruling on Miranda Warnings and utter violation of the 5th Amendment. Sorry I don't think this judment is fair and JUST.

The appellant, through her counsel, undertakes to abide by the above directions to answer all police interrogations relevant but not self-incriminatory (as explained earlier). The police Officer shall not summon her to the police station but examine her in terms of the proviso to section 160(1) of the Cr.P.Code. The appellant shall, Within ten days from today, file a written undertaking on the lines directed above, although, regardless thereof her counsel's undertaking will bind her. Indeed, we direct her to answer in accordance with the law we have just clarified. The prosecution proceedings in complaint case No. 2(c) 388 of 1977 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate Sadar, Cuttack, are hereby quashed and the appeals allowed. S.R. Appeals allowed.

Dear Tajob,

Here in the Court itself has violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution and allowed the police to violate 20(3) and that too after examining US case laws,Indian case laws, 5th Amendment,Miranda Warnings. Court has allowed the cops to DISALLOW THE ACCUSED THE RIGHT TO KEEP SILENT and engage a lawyer and the Court through its Convulated Politically influenced Judgment indulged in Self Incrimination itself. Writing in brackets[Not self incriminatory interrogation is legally incorrect and a mockery of the due process of law]. US Supreme Court would have struck down this Judgment and heldf judges responsible for Ruling on Miranda Warnings and utter violation of the 5th Amendment. Sorry I don't think this judment is fair and JUST.