What happened on April 6 at Dantewada was the most daring and the biggest single-strike massacre by naxalites during the past 50 years. In October 2006, Jaswinder Singh, DIG, Anti-Naxal Operations, Orissa, was killed in a blast caused by naxalites. Immediately the state government nominated a successor, who equally promptly reported sick. The next nominee too evaded the posting and so on.
In fact, comfort-loving IPS officers routinely refuse postings to naxalite-infested areas. Hence, the leadership passes to support-cadre officers of the state armed police. On February 15 this year, naxalites hit an Eastern Frontier Rifle (EFR) camp at Silda, West Bengal, killed 24 of the 51 jawans there and decamped with all the weapons and ammunition. A senior EFR officer "explained" that the jawans were taken completely by surprise, being busy in the langar or "whiling away their time". These incidents highlight the glaring deficiencies in the police leadership and professionalism. While the naxalites have demonstrated their ability to increase hit and run strikes and attack company-strength targets, the police has displayed inexplicable incapacity to learn from blood-soaked experience.
Feeding on alienation caused by socio-economic deprivation and police atrocities, naxalism afflicts some 230 of our 610 districts. Despite Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram stating that "we do not make war on our own people", the ground reality is vastly different with the police brutalising the hapless tribal people. Therefore, any successful counter-naxalite strategy needs to address the root cause of the problem.
Naxalism was launched as a movement by Majumdar and Sanyal in Kolkata in 1967. Rejecting the communists' embrace of parliamentary democracy, naxalism holds that communist goals can only be attained through a violent class struggle, as is believed by the adherents of classic Marxism-Leninism. After a brief success among radical Kolkata students, they were driven from the city into rural Naxalbari. However, soon the violent movement splintered into 30-odd groups. The Nagi-Reddy group established a strong base in the jungles of Andhra Pradesh and Satyanarayan Singh set up another powerful base in Bihar.
As these groups jostled for dominance, the administrations of the affected states became somnolent. However, since the late 1990s the police intelligence network has been warning of impending unity among the naxalites, resulting in their gaining greater strength. These were taken seriously only when in 2000 they brazenly annihilated several police posts and seized large booties of arms and ammunition. By the time the governments of Bihar and MP woke up to the emerging ugly reality, the factions had already united.
Then in 2001, these states were reorganised, leading to the formation of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The new states were the most naxal-afflicted areas whereas the parent states retained all the anti-naxal information. This took the anti-naxal drive back by a decade, leaving the insurgents firmly in control of a forest corridor, spanning North AP, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and W. Bengal. Later, some areas were seized by them in Bihar and UP, connecting the red sickle with Maoist-dominated Nepal and linking it with Bangladesh. This ensured increased foreign support for the naxalites.
What enabled the naxalites to achieve such success? The truth is ruthless exploitation of tribal populations by rapacious forest contractors and mining mafias, abetted by a corrupt politician-babu nexus. Inept, desk-bound district administrations and brutal police repression complete the picture. Helpless tribals, thus exploited by human hyenas, have no basic amenities. They are deprived of all that is required for leading a dignified life even by rural India's extremely standards.
The naxalite masterminds exploit the administration's unhelpful attitude towards the tribal people to fan their anger and use them to launch attacks against what they call state-oppressors. They replace an indifferent administration with ruthless governance, savage justice and enforced compliance. The tribals, caught thus in a cleft stick, prefer to side with the naxalites as a lesser evil compared to the khaki-clad symbols of non-governance.
Here is a five-fold strategy to successfully countering the naxalite menace:
One, there is need for a comprehensive police reform, specially concerning the training and motivation of the state police personnel and the central paramilitary forces. This must include civilising the police dealings with hapless citizens instead of remaining the lathi-wielding henchmen of unscrupulous politicians.
The Centre should provide incentives to the states to implement the September 2006 Supreme Court judgement on police reforms. The forces engaged in counter-naxalism operations must get the latest weapons, equipment and communication gadgets. Lateral induction of Army officers and JCOs at various command levels can bolster the morale of those assigned the task of fighting the naxalites. If air power is envisaged, we must ensure that the naxalites have no idea of it.
Two, carve out and then defend the "island sanctuaries" comprising a cluster of villages and hamlets within the naxalite-held areas. Using these as bases, we should launch operations to disrupt their logistics and transit corridors. Operations should include penetrating "abuj marh", the deep-jungle sanctuary where naxalites train and manufacture their weapons.
A Chinese think-tank has advocated dismembering India by stoking internal fires. Thus, the naxalites may be getting material support from Chinese surrogates in Nepal and Bangladesh even as their tie-up with the LTTE has withered. Such linkages must be exposed, using covert means, if need be.
Three, the secured "islands" must immediately become the focus of purposeful development to win back the populace. File-pushing, office-bound approaches cannot work. It is vital to have fearless administrators who will verify the facts and the progress made at the ground level, and provide people-centric administrations. In addition to basic health-care and education, tribals must be unshackled from exploitation, provided avenues to earn their livelihood, taught skills for value-addition of the traditional produce and, above all, have their dignity restored.
Motivated NGOs may be coopted to boost the states' efforts. Concurrently, establishing responsive justice mechanisms is vital. Subsequent phases should seek to expand these "islands" until a pro-administration wave of goodwill is generated, ending the naxalites' influence in the affected districts.
Four, creation of a joint intelligence set-up among the affected states is vital. This should aim at revamping HUMINT and facilitate operations to penetrate and decapitate naxalite organisations. Central intelligence agencies should supplement these efforts while also focusing on cutting off foreign support through overt and covert means. Additionally, intelligence agencies must anticipate the naxalites' next escalation move in semi-urban and urban areas.
Five, the naxalites can easily undo any success achieved by taking hostages, as they did in the case of IPS officer Attindranath Datta, who was exchanged for 22 arrested naxalites. We are an emotionally-charged people and our "leaders" are all too susceptible to media-driven emotional frenzy, which precipitates such swaps. Therefore, a stringent law is needed to prohibit capitulating to terrorists' demands. Such actions should be declared anti-national, attracting heavy penalties, including disqualification from contesting elections.
The naxalite menace be successfully defeated only when the nation is prepared to take tough measures.
