Maintenance - 50% right or 100% criminal?

50% good.50% bad.

But how to detect?

@ Saurabh

hmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

I liked your first article which I read some time back. 


This article is not what one shall expect from your knowledge bank after long absence in family forum discussions.


The opening para itself is historically too faulty.


I do not deny that s*xism exists, but what is being perpetuated by our government, our media, by few ld. brothers from Bar, by time pass writers here and everywhere else is that women are perpetually victimized and they are in need of constant assistance and help from cradle to grave. Not only is this a blatant falsehood foisted upon an ignorant and fearful populace but it is degrading to class of self-respecting Indian women too. How does one become empowered and have the confidence to believe you are just as capable as anybody else - and yet be told you are constantly a victim!. 


C'mn folks you have your mother and sister at home do you even see them to be victims in hands of your father !!! Or is it only that a wife you see as victim !!! None of the women and children legislation passed under Art. 15 (3) COI has ever been tested if they pass strict test of Class Legislation in India.

This recent article from you could have been better by bringing out corollary of Art. 15 (3) COI for empowering Indian women at great cost to exchequer itself. However appreciate your efforts/views.


I will come back here soon with my views for readers review till then one can always afford to listen to Judiciary (Kolavari) Di [copy paste below You Tube link into your browser and now press Enter]


https://youtu.be/9fpHsIH-iQg 

Life is passage of time from cradle to grave. Very amusing to note some people don't pass time.

 Saurabhji,

An excellent effort. Thanks for taking time to get this wonderful piece.

A few points:

1) This will be an excellent article in national dailies. This can also be made talking points in various media available now-TV,cable and even twitter/facebook. The wider the audience the better. People need to understand the issues involved and needs to understand how it affects them and the society at large.

2) Feminists are having a field day today and have money and the ear of the government and corridors of law makers. Circulating through media and making this issue the talking point is a less expensive and good alternative to money power that these feminists seem to enjoy.

However a small but very significant note would be-I agree with Tajobsji, is the one on weaker s*x. Hindu scripttures, with exception of some (such as Manu smrithi) have regarded women as Shakti. Shakti signifies power and not weakness! The idea that women are weaker s*x is alien concept spread by invaders, which this country has seen enough!

Great job,Thanks!

@ Saurabh V. + Bhima Balla


Here in LCI I talked on occasions about Class Legislation and via class legislation special protection provided to Indian Women under Art. 15 (3) COI and special Laws enacted for women and children. In number of these special Laws Legislatures overlooked if such new Laws / Amendments can stand test of Class Legislation if challenged.


Even in most advanced country like USA Class Legislation i.e. laws favouring women and children are banned!  But in India our women are having field day.

The pertinent question that you raised answer lies in below Judgment and the Frankenstein monsters of DV Act, S. 125 CrPC, S. 18/20 HAMA, S. 24 HMA and about to deliver on silver plate Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Bill 2010 based on which from last fortnight in LCI many women are asking about property share inspite of getting a share from her father https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/forum/What-is-woman-s-share-in-husband-s-ancestoral-property-58399.asp are result of no check and no balance of such laws and public resentment by way of your posts and various women querries of today and past week are egs. before us.
  

Here is one such illustration on class legislation straight from Supreme Court in USA
 

The US Supreme Court Landmark Judgment of ORR Vs ORR

Important excerpt from Judgment:

“Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the “proper place” of women and their need for special protection .. . Thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. Where, as here, the State’s compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of s*xual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of s*x.”

U.S. Supreme Court

ORR v. ORR, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)

440 U.S. 268

ORR v. ORR

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF ALABAMA

No. 77-1119.

Argued November 27, 1978

Decided March 5, 1979

Following a stipulation between appellant husband and appellee wife, in which appellant agreed to pay appellee alimony, an Alabama court, acting pursuant to state alimony statutes under which husbands but not wives may be required to pay alimony upon divorce, ordered appellant to make monthly alimony payments. Some two years thereafter appellee filed a petition seeking to have appellant adjudged in contempt for failing to maintain the alimony payments. At the hearing on the petition appellant, though not claiming that he was entitled to an alimony award from appellee, made the contention (advanced for the first time in that proceeding) that the Alabama statutes, by virtue of their reliance on a gender-based classification, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court, ruling adversely to appellant on that issue, entered judgment against him, which was affirmed on appeal:


Held:

(a) Appellant's failure to ask for alimony for himself does not deprive him of standing to attack the constitutionality of the Alabama statutes for under inclusiveness. That attack holds the only promise of relief from the burden deriving from the challenged statutes, and appellant has therefore "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which th[is] court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 . Pp. 271-273.


(b) Had the courts below refused to entertain appellant's constitutional contention on the ground that it was not timely made under applicable state procedures this Court might have lacked jurisdiction to consider the contention; but no timeliness point was raised or considered below and the constitutional issue was decided on the merits. Under these circumstances it is irrelevant whether the decision below could have been based upon an adequate and independent state ground. Pp. 274-275.

(c) No point was raised or considered below that appellant by virtue of the stipulation was obliged to make the alimony payments under state contract law. "Where the state court does not decide [440 U.S. 268, 269] against [an] appellant upon an independent state ground, but deeming the federal question to be before it, actually . . . decides that question adversely to the federal right asserted, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment if, as here, it is . . . final . . . ." Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 . Pp. 275-278.

2. The Alabama statutory scheme of imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 278-283.

(a) "To withstand scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause, "`classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to  achievement of those objectives.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 -317. Pp. 278-279.

(b) The statutes cannot be validated on the basis of the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role. "No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 -15. Pp. 279-280.

(c) Though it could be argued that the Alabama statutory scheme is designed to provide help for needy spouses, using s*x as a proxy for need, and to compensate women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce, these considerations would not justify that scheme because under the Alabama statutes individualized hearings at which the parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur. Since such hearings can determine which spouses are needy as well as which wives were in fact discriminated against, there is no reason to operate by generalization. "Thus, the gender-based distinction is gratuitous . . . ." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 . Pp. 280-282.

(d) Use of a gender classification, moreover, actually produces perverse results in this case because only a financially secure wife whose husband is in need derives an advantage from the Alabama scheme as compared to a gender-neutral one. Pp. 282-283.


3. The question remains open on remand whether appellant's stipulated agreement to pay alimony, or other grounds of gender-neutral state law, bind him to continue his alimony payments. Pp. 283-284.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.

BLACKMUN, [440 U.S. 268, 270]

J., post, p. 284, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 284, filed concurring opinions. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 285. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 290.

John L. Capell III argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.

W. F. Horsley argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. *

[Footnote *] Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Margaret Moses Young filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which provide that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce.

1

On February 26, 1974, a final decree of divorce was entered, dissolving the marriage of William and Lillian Orr. That decree directed appellant, Mr. Orr, to pay appellee, Mrs. Orr, $1,240 per month in alimony. On July 28, 1976, Mrs. Orr [440 U.S. 268, 271] initiated a contempt proceeding in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Ala., alleging that Mr. Orr was in arrears in his alimony payments. On August 19, 1976, at the hearing on Mrs. Orr's petition, Mr. Orr submitted in his defense a motion requesting that Alabama's alimony statutes be declared unconstitutional because they authorize courts to place an obligation of alimony upon husbands but never upon wives. The Circuit Court denied Mr. Orr's motion and entered judgment against him for $5,524, covering back alimony and attorney fees. Relying solely upon his federal constitutional claim, Mr. Orr appealed the judgment. On March 16, 1977, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama sustained the constitutionality of the Alabama statutes, 351 So.2d 904. On May 24, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Mr. Orr's petition for a writ of certiorari, but on November 10, without court opinion, quashed the writ as improvidently granted. 351 So.2d 906. We noted probable jurisdiction, 436 U.S. 924 (1978). We now hold the challenged Alabama statutes unconstitutional and reverse.

I

We first address three preliminary questions not raised by the parties or the Alabama courts below, but which nevertheless may be jurisdictional and therefore are considered of our own motion.


The first concerns the standing of Mr. Orr to assert in his defense the unconstitutionality of the Alabama statutes. It appears that Mr. Orr made no claim that he was entitled to an award of alimony from Mrs. Orr, but only that he should not be required to pay alimony if similarly situated wives could not be ordered to pay. 2 It is therefore possible that his [440 U.S. 268, 272] success here will not ultimately bring him relief from the judgment outstanding against him, as the State could respond to a reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights to needy husbands as well as wives. In that event, Mr. Orr would remain obligated to his wife. It is thus argued that the only "proper plaintiff" would be a husband who requested alimony for himself, and not one who merely objected to paying alimony. This argument quite clearly proves too much. In every equal protection attack upon a statute challenged as under inclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution's commands either by extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to both parties (e. g., by repealing the statute as a whole). In this case, if held unconstitutional, the Alabama divorce statutes could be validated by, inter alia, amendments which either (1) permit awards to husbands as well as wives, or (2) deny alimony to both parties. It is true that under the first disposition Mr. Orr might gain nothing from his success in this Court, although the hypothetical "requesting" plaintiff would. However, if instead the State takes the second course and denies alimony to both spouses, it is Mr. Orr and not the hypothetical plaintiff who would benefit. Because we have no way of knowing how the State will in fact respond, unless we are to hold that underinclusive statutes can never be challenged because any plaintiff's success can theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held to have standing here. We have on several occasions considered this inherent problem of challenges to underinclusive statutes, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n. 24 (1976), and have not denied a plaintiff standing on this ground. [440 U.S. 268, 273]

There is no question but that Mr. Orr bears a burden he would not bear were he female. The issue is highlighted, although not altered, by transposing it to the sphere of race. There is no doubt that a state law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but not whites could be challenged by a black who was required to pay. The burden alone is sufficient to establish standing. Our resolution of a statute's constitutionality often does "not finally resolve the controversy as between th[e] appellant and th[e] appellee," Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S., at 17 . We do not deny standing simply because the "appellant, although prevailing here on the federal constitutional issue, may or may not ultimately win [his] lawsuit." Id., at 18. The holdings of the Alabama courts stand as a total bar to appellant's relief; his constitutional attack holds the only promise of escape from the burden that derives from the challenged statutes. He has therefore "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which th[is] court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions," Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Indeed, on indistinguishable facts, this Court has stated that a party's standing will be sustained. In Linda R. S. v. Richard D., supra, at 619 n. 5 (MARSHALL, J.), we stated that the parent of a legitimate child who must by statute pay child support has standing to challenge the statute on the ground that the parent of an illegitimate child is not equally burdened. 3 [440 U.S. 268, 274]

A second preliminary question concerns the timeliness of appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes. No constitutional challenge was made at the time of the original divorce decree; Mr. Orr did not interpose the Constitution until his ex-wife sought a contempt judgment against him for his failure to abide by the terms of the decree. This unexcused tardiness might well have constituted a procedural default under state law, and if Alabama had refused to hear Mr. Orr's constitutional objection on that ground, we might have been without jurisdiction to consider it here. See C. Wright, Federal Courts 541-542 (3d ed. 1976).


But in this case neither Mrs. Orr nor the Alabama courts at any time objected to the timeliness of the presentation of the constitutional issue. Instead, the Alabama Circuit and Civil Appeals Courts both considered the issue to be properly presented and decided it on the merits. See 351 So.2d, at 905; App. to Juris. Statement 22a. In such circumstances, the objection that Mr. Orr's complaint "`comes too late' . . . is clearly untenable. . . . [S]ince the state court deemed the federal constitutional question to be before it, we could not treat the decision below as resting upon an adequate and independent state ground even if we were to conclude that the state court might properly have relied upon such a ground to avoid deciding the federal question." Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n. 3 (1967). This is merely an application of the "elementary rule that it is irrelevant to inquire . . . when a Federal question was raised in a court [440 U.S. 268, 275] below when it appears that such question was actually considered and decided." Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U.S. 123, 134 (1914). Accord, Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459 (1979); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436 (1959). See C. Wright, supra, at 542. 4

The third preliminary question arises from indications in the record that Mr. Orr's alimony obligation was part of a stipulation entered into by the parties, which was then incorporated into the divorce decree by the Lee County Circuit Court. Thus, it may be that despite the unconstitutionality of the alimony statutes, Mr. Orr may have a continuing obligation to his former wife based upon that agreement - in essence a matter of state contract law. 5 If the Alabama [440 U.S. 268, 276] courts had so held, and had anchored their judgments in this case on that basis, an independent and adequate state ground might exist and we would be without power to hear the constitutional argument. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 -126 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).

And if there were ambiguity as to whether the State's decision was based on federal or state grounds, it would be open to this Court not to determine the federal question, but to remand to the state courts for clarification as to the ground of the decision. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).

But there is no ambiguity here. At no time did Mrs. Orr raise the stipulation as a possible alternative ground in support of her judgment. Indeed, her brief in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals expressly stated that "[t]he appellee agrees that the issue before this Court is whether the Alabama alimony laws are unconstitutional because of the gender based classification made in the statutes." App. to Juris. Statement 25a. The Alabama Circuit and Civil Appeals Courts reached and decided the federal question without considering any state-law issues, the latter specifying that "[t]he sole issue before this court is whether Alabama's alimony statutes are unconstitutional. We find they are not unconstitutional and affirm." 351 So.2d, at 905. While no reason was given by the State Supreme Court's majority for quashing the writ of certiorari, the concurring and dissenting opinions mention only the federal constitutional issue and do not mention the stipulation. See 351 So.2d, at 906-910. And Mrs. Orr did not even raise the point in this Court. On this record, then, our course is clear and dictated by a long line of decisions.


"Where the state court does not decide against a petitioner or appellant upon an independent state ground, but deeming the federal question to be before it, actually [440 U.S. 268, 277] entertains and decides that question adversely to the federal right asserted, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment if, as here, it is a final judgment. We cannot refuse jurisdiction because the state court might have based its decision, consistently with the record, upon an independent and adequate non-federal ground." Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938).


Accord, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 630 -631 (1973); Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 375 -376 (1968); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 197 n. 1 (1944); International Steel & Iron Co. v. National Surety Co., 297 U.S. 657, 666 (1936); Grayson v. Harris, 267 U.S. 352, 358 (1925); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120 (1924); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184, 188 -189 (1916). See C. Wright, Federal Courts, at 544. 6

Our analysis of these three preliminary questions, therefore, indicates that we do have jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge asserted by Mr. Orr. 7 As an Art. III "case or [440 U.S. 268, 278] controversy" has been properly presented to this Court, we now turn to the merits. 8

II

In authorizing the imposition of alimony obligations on husbands, but not on wives, the Alabama statutory scheme "provides that different treatment be accorded . . . on the basis of . . . s*x; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause," Reed v. [440 U.S. 268, 279] Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). The fact that the classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). "To withstand scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause, "`classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 -317 (1977). We shall, therefore, examine the three governmental objectives that might arguably be served by Alabama's statutory scheme.

Appellant views the Alabama alimony statutes as effectively announcing the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role, and as seeking for their objective the reinforcement of that model among the State's citizens. Cf. Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 332 A. 2d 78 (1973). We agree, as he urges, that prior cases settle that this purpose cannot sustain the statutes. 9 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975), held that the "old notio[n]" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility [440 U.S. 268, 280] to provide a home and its essentials," can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. "No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas," id., at 14-15. See also Craig v. Boren, supra, at 198. If the statute is to survive constitutional attack, therefore, it must be validated on some other basis.

The opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals suggests other purposes that the statute may serve. Its opinion states that the Alabama statutes were "designed" for "the wife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance," 351 So.2d, at 905. This may be read as asserting either of two legislative objectives. One is a legislative purpose to provide help for needy spouses, using s*x as a proxy for need. The other is a goal of compensating women for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce. We concede, of course, that assisting needy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective. We have also recognized "[r]education of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women . . . as . . . an important governmental objective," Califano v. Webster, supra, at 317. It only remains, therefore, to determine whether the classification at issue here is "substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Ibid. 10

Ordinarily, we would begin the analysis of the "needy spouse" objective by considering whether s*x is a sufficiently "accurate proxy," Craig v. Boren, supra, at 204, for dependency to establish that the gender classification rests "`upon [440 U.S. 268, 281] some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,'" Reed v. Reed, supra, at 76. Similarly, we would initially approach the "compensation" rationale by asking whether women had in fact been significantly discriminated against in the sphere to which the statute applied a s*x-based classification, leaving the s*xes "not similarly situated with respect to opportunities" in that sphere, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). Compare Califano v. Webster, supra, at 318, and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974), with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). 11


But in this case, even if s*x were a reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage did discriminate against women, these factors still would "not adequately justify the salient features of" Alabama's statutory scheme, Craig v. Boren, supra, at 202-203. Under the statute, individualized hearings at which the parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur. See Russell v. Russell, 247 Ala. 284, 286, 24 So.2d 124, 126 (1945); Ortman v. Ortman, 203 Ala. 167, 82 So. 417 (1919). There is no reason, therefore, to use s*x as a proxy for need. Needy males could be helped along with needy females with little if any additional burden on the State. In such circumstances, not even an administrative-convenience rationale exists to justify operating by generalization or proxy. 12 Similarly, since individualized hearings can [440 U.S. 268, 282] determine which women were in fact discriminated against vis-a-vis their husbands, as well as which family units defied the stereotype and left the husband dependent on the wife, Alabama's alleged compensatory purpose may be effectuated without placing burdens solely on husbands. Progress toward fulfilling such a purpose would not be hampered, and it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men and women equally by making alimony burdens independent of s*x. "Thus, the gender-based distinction is gratuitous; without it, the statutory scheme would only provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated to the women the statute aids," Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 653, and the effort to help those women would not in any way be compromised.

Moreover, use of a gender classification actually produces perverse results in this case. As compared to a gender-neutral law placing alimony obligations on the spouse able to pay, the present Alabama statutes give an advantage only to the financially secure wife whose husband is in need. Although such a wife might have to pay alimony under a gender-neutral statute, the present statutes exempt her from that obligation.  Thus, "[t]he [wives] who benefit from the disparate treatment are those who were . . . nondependent on their husbands," Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 221 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). They are precisely those who are not "needy spouses" and who are "least likely to have been victims of. . . discrimination," ibid., by the institution of marriage. A gender-based classification which, as compared to a [440 U.S. 268, 283] gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny.


Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the "proper place" of women and their need for special protection. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 -174 (1977) (opinion concurring in part). Thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. Where, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of s*xual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of s*x. And this is doubly so where the choice made by the State appears to redound - if only indirectly - to the benefit of those without need for special solicitude.

III

Having found Alabama's alimony statutes unconstitutional, we reverse the judgment below and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. That disposition, of course, leaves the state courts free to decide any questions of substantive state law not yet passed upon in this litigation. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938); C. Wright, Federal Courts, at 544. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 396 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S., at 632 ; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 169 -170 (1970); Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506, 512 (1938); Georgia R. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U.S. 620, 623 -624 (1936).


Therefore, it is open to the Alabama courts on remand to consider whether Mr. Orr's stipulated agreement to [440 U.S. 268, 284] pay alimony, or other grounds of gender-neutral state law, bind him to continue his alimony payments. 13 Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes;

I have omitted due to space crunch otherwise also they are best I have ever read down figuring out gender neutral laws applicability in India environs.  If somebody wants footnotes I can provide them which is not an issue.