Dowry versus streedhan

• If wife and her parents say it is stridhan it is stridhan and if they say it is dowry it is dowry. that is all. There is no record of either. However, Rules framed under DP ACt clearly requires preparation of presents list at the earliest and signed by both the parties. This is never done. 
  
  Dowry consists of all articles which are given to the side of the groom by the brides side in consideration of the marriage either before or after the marriage. Whereas stridhan involves all articles given only to the girl by both the groom as well as the brides side either before or after the marriage. Hence all the items given to the girl on roka, sagai and even on muhdikhai form a part of the stridhan. Misappropriation (ie retention) of these items constitute an offence u/s 406. Now having said that , it means all the items like watch, ring, chain even given to the groom also constitute part of dowry, but recent supreme court ruling has cleared the air on this, it says that all items which are gifted or presented out of custom and tradition doesnot constitute as dowry.

Thanks for reply however I am still in a confused state. In a FIR as well as other legal papers submitted at Session Court by my bitter half it is clearly stated that girl’s family gave us “X” tolas of gold as a streedhan, did huge expenses of Rs. “X” on marriage ceremony and also gave all necessary living goods to newly married couple as per demand from a groom and his family. So I am not sure if it attract DPA Sec. 3 or not against bride and her family.

Dear Querist

you should read section 7 (3) of DPA

7. Cognisance of offences.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of 1974),-

 

no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act;

no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon –

(i) its own knowledge or a police report of the facts which constitute such offence, or

(ii) a complaint by the person aggrieved by offence or a parent or other relative of such person, or by any recognized welfare institution or organization:

it shall be lawful for a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorized by this Act on any person convicted of any offence under this Act.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, "recognised welfare institution or organization" means a social welfare institution or organization recognized in this behalf by the Central or State Government.

(2) Nothing in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of 1974), shall apply to any offence punishable under this Act.)

(3)Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this Act.

Ajita David vs State By on 29 June, 2009 DATE: 29 .6.2009. Coram THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.JEYAPAUL Crl.R.C.No.600 of 2008 and M.P.No.1 of 2008 Ajita David Petitioner vs. 1. State by Inspector of Police, W-7 All Women Police Station, Anna Nagar, Chennai. 2. Xavier Muthappa (R2 impleaded vide order dated 19.6.2008 in M.P.No.2 of 2008) Respondents For petitioner :Mr.B.Kumar, Senior Counsel for Mr.R.Rajarathinam For R1 : Mr.N.Kumanan, Govt. Advocate (Crl. Side) For interevenor :M/s.Gibert G. Penia Criminal Revision case filed under section 397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the order dated 31.3.2008 passed in Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2008 in C.C.No.8649 of 2007 by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. ORDER The revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai in Crl.M.P.No.131 of 2008 in C.C.No.8649 of 2007 dated 31.3.2008 dismissing the petition filed under section 319 read with section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to implead the father of the de facto complainant as accused in a case under Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. The de facto complainant Judy Manoj filed a complaint as against her husband Manoj David, her sister-in-law Ajita David and her brother-in-law Ujwal David alleging harassment demanding dowry. The investigating officer laid final report as against the aforesaid three accused for the offences punishable under sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The father of the de facto complainant has stated during the course of investigation that there was a demand of dowry of 100 sovereigns of gold ornaments by the accused even prior to the marriage. The father of the de facto complainant, having not acceded to such a demand, provided 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments to her daughter, the de facto complainant and 5 sovereigns of gold chain, 3 sovereigns of bracelet and 1-1/2 sovereigns of diamond ring to the first accused as dowry. The said statement of the father of the de facto complainant is also found incorporated in the descripttion of the offence detailed in the final report submitted by the investigating official. 3. At the first instance, the sister of the first accused/ the sister-in-law of the de facto complainant viz., Ajita David filed a petition under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 10.1.2008 praying to array the father of the de facto complainant Xavier Muthappa as fourth accused and thereafter amended petition was filed under section 319 read with 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, having come to the conclusion that no petition under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be filed prior to the commencement of trial dismissed the petition seeking to array the father of the de facto complainant. 5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would vehemently contend that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which proposed to punish not only the receiver of dowry but also the giver of dowry. Referring to section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that though protection is provided from charging a person who is aggrieved by the offence under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the parents of the aggrieved wife do not fall under the category of person aggrieved by the offence. Therefore, the exemption contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not apply to the father of the de facto complainant, who purportedly gave dowry. It is his further submission that even before the case reaches the stage of trial, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the case as per section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is duty bound to array all the persons against whom offences have been made out. Therefore, it is his submission that when the giver of the dowry is also punishable under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, he cannot claim any exemption under section 7(3) of the said Act. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is bound to act under section 190 and take cognizance as against the father of the de facto complainant also, it is contended. 6. There was no representation for the intervenor. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the State would submit that the object of the amendment introduced by Act 43/1986 to exclude the person aggrieved from prosecution under Dowry Prohibition Act will have to be considered by this court before approaching the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Referring to section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, he would further submit that a clear exemption is contemplated from prosecuting a person aggrieved by any offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, he would submit that the petition seeking to array the father of the de facto complainant is totally misconceived, inappropriate and premature. 7. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 would reflect that the Act is enacted to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking dowry. But, while dealing with the salient features of the Act 43/1986 which introduced the amendment, it has been stated that the statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act. 8. In terms of the statement of objects and reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, provision under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted to punish not only the receiver but also the giver of the dowry. Section 7(1)(b)(ii) would read that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person or by any recognised welfare institution or organisation. Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act would provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act. 9. In order to provide more clarity to the provision under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the legislature has thought it fit to clarify that a parent or other relative of such a person also is entitled to lodge a complaint apart from the person aggrieved by the offence. Firstly, it is found that Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not define the person aggrieved by the offence. The aforesaid provision made to provide more clarity cannot be interpreted that the word 'parent' does not fall within the category of an aggrieved person by the offence provided under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The parent of the victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence. By no stretch of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent from the purview of the person aggrieved by the offence while drafting section 7(3) of the Act to exempt from prosecution the person aggrieved by the offence for the statement made by him. At any rate, the phrase "person aggrieved by the offence" employed in sub-section 3 of section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 cannot be construed that it only refers to the victim girl who was deprived of the marital bliss on account of the harassment meted out to her demanding dowry. In the considered opinion of this court, parents and other relatives of the victim girl can safely be classified as person aggrieved by the offence as contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 10. The Supreme Court in SWILL LIMITED v. STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER ((2001) 6 SCC (Cri) 670) has observed as follows:- "In our view, from the facts stated above, it is clear that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, provisions of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable. Section 190 inter alia provides that "the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon a police report of such facts which constitute an offence". As per this provision, the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and not the offender. After taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is empowered to issue process to the accused. At the stage of issuing process, it is for the Magistrate to decide whether process should be issued against particular person/persons named in the charge-sheet and also not named therein. For that purpose, he is required to consider the FIR and the statements recorded by the police officer and other documents tendered along with charge-sheet. Further, upon receipt of police report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused by ignoring the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently applying his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation by taking into account the statement of the witnesses examined by the police. At this stage, there is no question of application of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similar contention was negatived by this Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar by holding thus:(AIR p.1169, para 9) "In our opinion, once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence." " 11. The power of the Judicial Magistrate is to proceed as against any person not originally cited as an accused in case offence is made out as against him also. Taking cognizance as against all the persons who are involved in the offence as provided under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a duty cast upon the Magistrate. The learned Judicial Magistrate need not wait till the evidence is recorded to invoke the provisions under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to arraign a person against whom also an offence is made out. 12. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is subject to section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on account of the non-obstante clause found under the above Act. When the provision under section 7(3) of the Special Act prohibits taking cognizance as against a person aggrieved by the offence for the incriminating statement made by him, the Judicial Magistrate cannot invoke the provision under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and include a person exempted under the Special Act as one of the accused. On account of the introduction of the provision to the Special Act to exclude certain persons from prosecution, the powers of the Judicial Magistrate under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to in the above ratio cannot be exercised. 13. The Delhi High Court in Smt.NEERA SINGH v. THE STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI) AND OTHERS in Crl.M.C.No.7262 of 2006 dated 23.2.2007 observed as follows:- "A perusal of the complaint would show that as per allegations dowry demand was made even before marriage i.e., at the time of engagement and an AC was demanded from her father by her in-laws and her father had assured that AC would be given at the time of marriage. However, she told her father "You have given car and AC at the demand of in laws, what will happen if they demand a flat tomorrow" Despite her this conversation with her father and despite her knowing that dowry demand had already been made, she married in the same family irrespective of the fact that she was well-educated lady and was an engineer and her brother was in police. In fact, these kinds of allegations made after breakdown of the marriage show the mentality of the complainant. I consider where these kinds of allegations are made, the police should simultaneously register a case under Dowry Prohibition Act (in short "the Act") against the parents of the complainant as well, who married their daughter despite demand of dowry. Section 3 of the Act prohibits giving and taking of dowry. If a woman of grown up age and well educated gets married to a person despite dowry demand, she and her family becomes accomplice in the crime under Dowry Prohibition Act." 14. With due respect, I find that the exemption of the persons aggrieved from prosecution provided under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was not brought to the notice of the Delhi High Court while passing such an observation. The penal provision under section 3 of the Act alone was adverted to by the Delhi High Court. Therefore, I respectfully differ from the observation made by the Delhi High Court without special reference to section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 15. This is an atrocious case where the accused, who allegedly committed an offence under sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act comes out with a petition invoking the provision under sections 319 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to harass the parent of the victim inspite of the fact that there is a clear exemption found under the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, the invocation of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is premature inasmuch as evidence was not yet recorded in this case. Therefore, no prosecution under the Dowry Prohibition Act can be launched in view of the exemption provided under section 7(3) of the Act as against the parents and relatives of the victim girl. 16. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the revision fails and it stands dismissed. The connected miscellaneous petition also stands dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on: September 30, 2010 Judgment delivered on: October 20, 2010 +

W.P.(CRL.) NO. 501/2010 & CRL.M.A. 3921/2010(stay)

POOJA SAXENA ....PETITIONER

Through: Mr.Vijay Aggarwal with Mr.Rakesh Mukhija and Mr.Gurpreet Singh, Advocates.

Versus

STATE & ANOTHER .....RESPONDENTS

Through: Ms. Meera Bhatia, ASC for the State with Mr.Roshan Kumar, Advocate with I.O. S.I. Mr.Prabhanshu, P.S. Roop Nagar. Mr.Abhishek Gupta, Advocate for R.2/Sameer Saxena.

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest ?

AJIT BHARIHOKE, J.

1. Pooja Saxena, the petitioner herein, vide instant writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is seeking direction for quashing of the order of learned W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 1 of 8 ACMM dated 10.03.2010 as well as FIR No.59/2010 dated 22.03.2010 registered at P.S. Roop Nagar pursuant to the aforesaid order of learned ACMM. 2. Briefly put, facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are that the petitioner Pooja Saxena filed a complaint of dowry demand and harassment against her husband (respondent No.2) with CAW Cell and on the basis of the said complaint, after preliminary inquiry and on the recommendation of the senior police officer, an FIR No.232/2009 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC was registered against respondent No.2 Sameer Saxena and others at P.S. Roop Nagar. 3. Petitioner Pooja Saxena in her above referred complaint alleged that at the time of her marriage, her parents had given sufficient amount of cash and valuable articles including jewellery, Swift car, Sony TV, washing machine, double bed and gift items to respondent No.2 and his relatives. It was also alleged in the complaint that at the time of her engagement ceremony on 20.08.2006, father of respondent No.2 raised a demand for a Sony TV besides cash/gifts for the relatives as also gold ornaments, diamond jewellery and clothes etc. for the sister-in-law of the respondent as also her two daughters. Father of the petitioner fulfilled the said demands but the father-in-law of the petitioner was not satisfied and he raised a demand for a car of a prestigious brand or in the alternative asked for a deposit of `5 lakhs as a corpus to enable them to purchase a car. He suggested that the car should be purchased in the name of the petitioner, failing which he would not go on with the marriage which may W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 2 of 8 cause harassment to the parents of the petitioner and create difficulty in finding a match for the marriage of the younger sister of the petitioner. 4. Respondent No.2 Sameer Saxena, as a counterblast to the aforesaid FIR, filed a petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking direction for registration of FIR under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961 against the petitioner and learned ACMM, vide order dated 10.03.2010 directed the SHO, P.S. Roop Nagar to register an FIR on the basis of the allegations made in the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and investigate the matter in accordance with law. 5. Respondent No.2 in his petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. contended that the petitioner in her complaint to CAW Cell, which formed basis for registration of FIR No.232/2009 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC P.S. Roop Nagar, as well as in her petition Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and in her petition under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 made categoric allegations that demand of dowry as a precondition to marriage was made by the husband and in-laws of the petitioner and pursuant to that demand huge dowry was given which, prima facie, amounts to admission of commission of an offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the petitioner and her parents. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that registration of the aforesaid FIR No.59/2010 pursuant to the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by respondent No.2, which obviously is a counterblast to the FIR W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 3 of 8 registered on the complaint of the petitioner, is a gross abuse of process of law. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act and contended that aforesaid provision of the Act provides for the protection from prosecution to the person aggrieved by the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as such the learned ACMM ought not to have directed the registration of the FIR. No.59/2010. Thus, he has strongly urged for the quashing of the FIR No.59/2010 registered pursuant to the impugned order dated 10.03.2010 of the learned ACMM. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, on the other hand, has argued in favour of the impugned order of the learned ACMM dated 10.03.2010 and submitted that learned ACMM has rightly ordered registration of FIR No.59/2010 on the basis of allegations in the petition of the respondent under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for the reason that as per Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, giving of dowry is also prohibited and is a punishable offence. Learned counsel for the respondent, in support of this contention has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Neera Singh Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors, 138 (2007), Delhi Law Times 152. 8. In order to properly appreciate the submissions made by the respective parties, it would be useful to have a look upon Section 3 as well as Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which are reproduced thus: "3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.- (1)] If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 4 of 8 shall not be less than [(Note: Subs. by Act 43 of 1986, Sec.3) five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more:] Provided that the Court may, for a adequate and special reasons to be recorded in he judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of a term of less than [(Note: Subs. by Act 43 of 1986, Sec.3) five years.] (2) [(Note: Ins. by Act 63 of 1984, sec.3) Nothing is sub section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to, - (a) Presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf). (b) Presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf). Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act. Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given." "7. Cognizance of offences - ................... (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this Act." 9. No doubt, as per Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, giving or abetting to give dowry is a punishable offence, but the petitioner does have protection of Section 7(3) of the Act. Section 7(3) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence under the Act shall not subject him to prosecution under this Act. In the instant case, it is obvious that respondent No.2 has filed his petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. only on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner Pooja Saxena in her complaint made to CAW Cell which formed basis for the registration of FIR No.232/2009 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 5 of 8 against respondent No.2 and others as well as in her petition under Hindu Marriage Act and Domestic Violence Act. Thus, it is clear that FIR No.59/2010 registered against the petitioner under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is based upon the statements made by the petitioner in her complaint to CAW Cell and above noted petitions. Therefore, she is entitled to the protection of Section 7(3) of the Act, being the victim of demand of dowry. 10. In the case of Neera Singh (supra) relied upon by the respondent No.2, the order of Additional Sessions Judge upholding the order of discharge of accused persons passed by the Magistrate in a case under Section 498A/406 IPC was under challenge and the petitioner had sought quashing of said order. While deciding said issue, this court, taking note of Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 and the rules framed thereunder made following observations:- "3. A perusal of the complaint would show that as per allegations dowry demand was made even before marriage i.e. at the time of engagement and an AC was demanded from her father by her in-laws and her father had assured that AC would be given at the time of marriage. However, she told her father You have given car and AC at the demand of in laws, what will happen if they demand a flat tomorrow?. Despite her this conversation with her father and despite her knowing that dowry demand had already been made, she married in the same family irrespective of the fact that she was well-educated lady and was an engineer and her brother was in police. In fact, these kinds of allegations made after breakdown of the marriage show the mentality of the complainant. I consider where these kinds of allegations are made, the police should simultaneously register a case under Dowry Prohibition Act (in short the 'Act') against the parents of the complainant as well, who married their daughter despite demand of dowry. Section 3 of the Act prohibits giving and taking of dowry. If a woman of grown up age and well educated gets married to a person W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 6 of 8 despite dowry demand, she and her family becomes accomplice in the crime under Dowry Prohibition Act. ............. 5. The Metropolitan Magistrates should take cognizance of the offence under the Act in respect of the offence of giving dowry whenever allegations are made that dowry was given as a consideration of marriage, after demand. Courts should also insist upon compliance with the rules framed under the Act and if rules are not complied with, an adverse inference should be drawn. If huge cash amounts are alleged to be given at the time of marriage which are not accounted anywhere, such cash transactions should be brought to the notice of the Income Tax Department by the Court so that source of income is verified and the person is brought to law. It is only because the Courts are not insisting upon compliance with the relevant provisions of law while entertaining such complaints and action is taken merely on the statement of the complainant, without any verification that a large number of false complaints are pouring in. 11. The above observation of this Court obviously is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 were not the subject-matter of the dispute before the court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh's case. Moreover, in the aforesaid judgment, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided under Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Thus, in my view the above referred judgment is of no avail to respondent No.2. Further, on perusal of FIR No.232/2009, it transpires that as per the allegations in the complaint made by the petitioner, the demand for dowry was made by the father of respondent No.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner when he allegedly asked the father of the petitioner to concede to W.P.(Crl.) No.501/2010 Page 7 of 8 his demand for dowry, failing which he would call off the marriage. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face the loss of honour of their family in the society, and if under that fear, the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of the circumstances. Given the aforesaid facts, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and in terms of the aforesaid provision, she cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 12. In view of the above, I find it difficult to sustain the impugned order dated 10.03.2010 of learned ACMM vide which he has directed registration of FIR against the petitioner herein ignoring the protection extended to the petitioner under Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Accordingly, the impugned order of learned ACMM and the FIR registered in furtherance of said order are hereby quashed. 13. The petition stands disposed of. (AJIT BHARIHOKE)

At The time of marriage The articles or the ornaments or gifts etc of any cost given to a bride by her parents , friends , relatives , husband , in- laws etc. is her stridhan . but if these things are demanded by the groom or by any his family member then It is dowry demand and comes u/s 4 of DP act, and if demanded articles fulfils by bride sides then It falls u/s 3 of DP act.

which one is recoverable?dowry or streedhan?

and also if FIL shows marriage expenses and engagement expenses in DVC and also in FIR are these recoverable?