Previous judgement can be set aside on the ground of fraud in exceptional cases
"In order that fraud may be a ground for vacating a judgment, it must be a fraud that is extrinsic or collateral to everything that has been adjudicated upon but not one that has been or must be deemed to have been dealt with by the Court."
The learned Judges were not prepared to accept the view of Boddam and Moore, JJ. in (1906) ILR 29 Mad 179 that deliberate perjury was a ground to set aside an earlier judgment. ILR 38 Mad 203 at 208 = (AIR 1916 Mad 364 at p. 366) explained by illustration what it meant by extrinsic fraud in the context:
"If, for instance, a party be prevented by his opponent from conducting his case properly by tricks or misrepresentation, that would amount to fraud. There may also be fraud upon the Court if, in a proceeding in which a party is entitled to get an order without notice to the other side, he procures it by suppressing facts which the law makes it his duty to disclose to the Court. But where two parties fight at arm's length, it is the duty of each to question the allegations made by the other and to adduce all available evidence regarding the truth or falsehood of it. Neither of them can neglect his duty and afterwards claim to show that the allegation of his opponent was false."
The learned Judge noticed the classical observations of Lord Justice James in Flower v. Llyod, 1879-10 Ch D 327 at p. 333 which are well worth reproduction:--
"Assuming all the alleged falsehood and fraud to have been substantiated is such a suit as the present sustainable? That question would require very grave consideration indeed, before it is answered in the affirmative. Where is litigation to end if a judgment obtained in an action fought out adversely between two litigants sui juris and at
