Adv. Aditya (Litigator GROSON ADVISORS) 07 June 2018
Has there been FIR yet?
Balkishan Advocate 07 June 2018
Balkishan Advocate 07 June 2018
Kumar Doab (FIN) 08 June 2018
If possible close the mater amicably.
GO thru; IPC;95,319,323,334, 350, 351,353,
Kumar Doab (FIN) 08 June 2018
The implications may be understood from various perspectives since you have not posted the details and implications that you apprehend..
Small incidents of pushing, jostling or slapping are converted into alleged .
….
Delhi High Court
Ms. Nidhi Kaushik vs Union Of India & Ors. on 26 May, 2014
Author: J.R. Midha
29. Looking through the prism of case law pertaining to when can the door be shown to a government servant and by doing reverse engineering we can safely say that what is good for the door to be shown, is good for prohibiting entry through the door, and thus while denying public employment with respect to the offence committed by a person, it can be said, and we say so, that it may be a serious violation of the constitutional right of a citizen to be fairly treated in the matter of public employment if trivial offences committed by the citizen would justify the State shutting its eyes and denying employment.
30. Having answered the question posed in para 1 above, and the answer being in favour of the citizen, we need to answer the further question as to which offences or brush therewith, would justify non entry into public service.
40. All these offences are non-cognizable and needless to state are bailable. No moral turpitude, as generically understood, is involved. The acts do not shock the moral conscious of the society and with reference to the motive do not evidence a person with depraved character. The offences are not of the kind which would justify dismissal or removal from service, if the respondent had committed the same if in service.
41. Thus, being charged with the said offences, of which the respondent has ultimately been acquitted, would not be a bar and cannot be treated as a bar to seek public employment and on being successful at the entrance exam, to be denied the same."
26. Conclusion 26.1. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 4 th September, 2013 is set aside. The order of cancellation of the offer of appointment of the appellant and the letter dated 5th December, 2012 dismissing the appellant's appeal are hereby quashed. The provisional offer of appointment of the appellant dated 3rd September, 2012 is restored. The respondent BHEL shall complete all the formalities and issue the final offer of appointment to the appellant within five days and the appellant shall report for joining the respondent on 2nd June, 2014 at 10:00 am. The respondents shall pay a costs of Rs.50,000/- to the appellant.s
28. The Executive Director (HR & CC) of BHEL, who has filed the affidavits containing false and misleading statements shall remain personally present in Court on 30 th May, 2014 to show cause why action be not taken against him. He shall also disclose the names of other officers responsible for the lapses.
Kumar Doab (FIN) 08 June 2018
HC acquitted BUT Apex Court did not agree..
Supreme Court of India
Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan And Anr on 31 March, 1966
Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 1773, 1966 SCR 123
Author: S C.
Bench: Shah, J.C.
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1879362/
HEADNOTE:
In the course of an altercation between neighbours the first
respondent slapped the appellant's servant and threw a file
of papers at the appellant's husband which missed him but
hit the appellant on the elbow, causing a scratch. On a
prosecution being launched the Presidency Magistrate
convicted the first respondent under s. 323 of the Indian
Penal Code. The High Court however held that the offending
act came within the General Exception in s. 95 of the Indian
Penal Code as it was trivial. In appeal to this Court the
appellant contended that: (1) Section 95 applies only when
the act of the accused is accidental and not deliberate; (2)
the section cannot be invoked if the harm caused consists of
physical injury.
HELD:(i) It cannot be said that harm caused by doing an act
with intent to cause harm or with the knowledge that harm
may be caused thereby will not fall within the terms of s.
95. The section applies if the act causes harm or is
intended to cause harm or is known to be likely to cause
harm, provided the harm is so slight that no person of
ordinary sense or temper would complain of such harm. [125
F]
(ii) There is nothing in s. 95 to justify the contention
that the word 'harm' as used in that section does not
include physical injury. Section 95 is a general exception
and that word has in many other sections dealing with
general exceptions a wide connotation inclusive of physical
injury. There is no reason to suppose that the Legislature
intended to use the expression 'harm' in s. 95 in a
restricted sense. [126 A-B]
(iii)Whether, an offence is trivial must depend on the
nature of the injury, the position of the parties, the
knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done,
and other related matters.[126 CD]
Rest your own counsel must have alresady advised you.