Who is legal heirs/ representatives

Yes petitioner legal heirs represent the deceased.

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Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gujarat State Transport Corporation's case, (cited supra) and taking note of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, which states that when a male Hindu dies intestate, his property has to be devolved, according to the provision ofSection 8: i.e., (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule; and (b) secondly, if there is no heir of Class I then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, held that the claimants, viz., brothers and sisters, who fall under Class-II heirs, as per Hindu Succession Act, would be entitled to maintain a claim.

(h)In New India Assurance Co. Ltd., v. Ashwin Vrajlal Rajgor reported in 2005 ACJ 1618, a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court considered the entitlement of the brother's son and brother's wife (sister- in-law) of the deceased for compensation. After considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn., v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhaireported in 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), and another Division of the Gujarat High Court in Ashwin Vrajlal Rajgor's case, (stated supra), the Court held that in the absence of Class-I legal representatives to represent the estate of the deceased, a brother's son, a Class-II heir and the brother's wife are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. The Hon'ble Division Bench has also taken note of the line of succession, as provided for under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and held that the appellants therein, were entitled to compensation.

(i)In A.Manavalagan v. A.Krishnamurthy reported in I (2005) ACC 304 (DB), a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court considered a case, where, the husband claimed compensation for the death of his wife under the Motor Vehicles Act. He was not dependent on his wife. While considering the issue as to whether a legal representative, not dependent on the income of the deceased, would be entitled to claim loss of dependency, the Hon'ble Division Bench, at Paragraph 16 and 19(i) and (ii), held as follows:

"16. But, what would be the position if the claimant, though a legal heir is not a dependant of the deceased? Obviously, the question of awarding any amount under the head of loss of dependency would not arise, as there was no financial dependency. In fact in this case, the deceased was not even managing the 'house hold' as is normally done by a housewife as the husband and wife were living in different places due to exigencies of service and the couple had no children. In such a case, the main head of compensation will be loss to estate under Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The claim petition becomes one on behalf of the estate of the deceased and the compensation received becomes part of the assets of the estate. Consequently what is to be awarded under the head of loss of dependency under Section 1A would be nil, as there is no real pecuniary loss to the members of the family.

19. We may summarise the principles enunciated, thus:

(i) The law contemplates two categories of damages on the death of a person. The first is the pecuniary loss sustained by the dependant members of his family as a result of such death. The second is the loss caused to the estate of the deceased as a result of such death. In the first category, the action is brought by the legal representatives, as trustees for the dependants beneficially entitled. In the second category, the action is brought by the legal representatives, on behalf of the estate of the deceased and the compensation, when recovered, forms part of the assets of the estate. In the first category of cases, the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 168 of the Act, can specify the persons to whom compensation should be paid and also specify how it should be distributed (Note: for example, if the dependants of a deceased Hindu are a widow aged 35 years and mother aged 75 years, irrespective of the fact that they succeed equally under Hindu Succession Act, the Tribunal may award a larger share to the widow and a smaller share to the mother, as the widow is likely to live longer). But in the second category of cases, no such adjustments or alternation of shares is permissible and the entire amount has to be awarded to the benefit of the estate. Even if the Tribunal wants to specify the sharing of the compensation amount, it may have to divide the amount strictly in accordance with the personal law governing succession, as the amount awarded and recovered forms part of the estate of the deceased.

(ii) Where the claim is by the dependants, the basis for award of compensation is the loss of dependency, that is loss of what was contributed by the deceased to such claimants. A conventional amount is awarded towards loss of expectation of life, under the head of loss to estate."

(j)In Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd., v. M.Shanthi reported in 2010 CIJ 374 Mad (2), the objection of the Transport Corporation that a married brother/sister cannot maintain a claim petition has been rejected, following the same decisions stated supra. At Paragraph 22, this Court held as follows:

?22. Insofar as the contention that the claimants are not dependents of the deceased, this Court is of the considered view of this Court that when a claim petition is made by a married son or daughter, or in the absence of any other Class-I heir and if the claimants adduce evidence that they are the legal representatives and that the deceased during his lifetime, had contributed a portion of his income to them and if the said contention is disputed, it is the burden of the objector to lead strong rebuttal evidence to dislodge the claim of dependency. If the contention of contribution by the deceased to the legal representatives is not rebutted by any acceptable evidence, the inevitable conclusion of the Tribunal should be in favour of the claimants. In view of the judgments and for the reasons stated supra, the award made in favour of the married sisters and others, cannot be said to be without any legal principles and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal."

(k)In United India Insurance Company v. Kasiammal reported in 1997 (III) CTC 346, one of the contentions raised therein, challenging the award, was that a married son, living separately and not a dependant, is not entitled to claim compensation. At Paragraph 6 of the judgment, the short question framed by this Court was whether the claimants, married sons and married daughters, entitled for compensation? While addressing the abovesaid question, a learned Judge considered two decisions relied on by the appellant-Insurance Company therein in Revanben v. Kantibhai Narottamehai Gohil reported in 1995 ACJ 548 and U.P.State Road Transport Corporation v. Tara Devi reported in 1995 ACJ 1220 and also the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwatidin v. Gheesalal reported in 1980 ACJ 116, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 and Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, and at Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, held as follows:

?15. As pointed out earlier, the compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does no mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. Wherever the deceased is an earning member, naturally his savings is an accumulation for the estate which can be divided by the legal representatives after the death of the deceased. As the legal representatives had been put to loss of the earning of the deceased, the legal representatives are also entitled for the compensation.

16. Further in this case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the married sons are living separately. When they are residing with the mother, naturally the married sons had lost not only the assistance of the deceased mother but also lost her valuable advice in family matters. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. More over, the aged parents in many a house are the watch dogs for the entire house, servants and the grand children except a few exceptional cases. When the claimants had lost such valuable services of their mother they are entitle for compensation. The loss cannot be substituted by any other confident or responsible person either in the family or by appointing a servant. If the contention of the counsel for the appellant is accepted, I do not surprise that in future the appellant may plead that generally the aged ones are only a liability in the family and since due to the accident the aged one died, the family is get rid of the same and the driver should be suitably rewarded by the legal representatives instead of claiming any compensation for the death of the deceased.

17. Further if the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the claimants are entitled only for the no fault amount is accepted, then a person who sustained some grievous injuries will be paid more than the amount that would be paid to the legal representatives i.e., married sons and daughters of the deceased and in that case it would be cheaper to kill than maim. If the claimants are to be paid the no fault amount, that may mean that the claimants are being paid some ex gratia payment out of sympathy and not for the loss of life of their ancestor. Hence the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced and there is absolutely no merit in the appeal and is dismissed."

(l)It is worthwhile to reproduce the judgments in Pushpam's case (cited supra) and Bhagwatidin's case, which are as follows:

?10. In fact in judgment reported in Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, the question considered is whether in a petition claiming compensation for injuries sustained by the claimant, after his death whether the sister can come on record as the legal representative. Venkataswami, J/has held, that the sister of the deceased claimant can be brought on record as the legal representative, in the following terms:-

"In more or less identical circumstances, V. Ramaswami, J, a he then was, in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra), after noticing a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.P.Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 1974 ACJ 3 held that by introducing Section 110-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, Parliament intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone. In the case of claims arising out of motor accidents, Clause (b) provides that the cause of action would survive to the legal representative where death has resulted from the accident. This was an exception to the general principle actio personalis moritor cum persona. It is true there is a distinction between case of death resulting from the accident and a case of other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, i.e., the party dying subsequently during the pendency of the proceedings not due to the accident. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are no statutory rights. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." The learned Judge further distinguished the Division Bench case (1974 ACJ 362) on facts. The learned Judge ultimately held as reasonable question of recovering the actual expenses incurred by the deceased, I have no doubt that the claim will survive since that amount if had not been spent might have been available as the estate of the deceased to be succeeded by his legal representatives." In 1987 II ACJ 561 (supra) the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110-A of the Act. After noticing the divergent views of the various High Courts, the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

"In the light of the principles laid down in the above two judgments, I am of the view that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent, namely reported in Videowala v. Union of India, 1986 (II) MLJ 345 and reported in Kandaswamyv. Mariappa Stores, 86 L.W. 667, cannot be pressed into service. I am further of the view that the question of bringing on record or coming on record as legal representatives and the further question whether they are entitled to compensation on the facts and circumstances of the case are two different issues. Merely because they are brought on record, that does not automatically entitled them to get compensation. In the light of the wider meaning given to the expression 'legal representative' by the Supreme Court, though in a case of death in a motor accident, the order of the Court below cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings and it is for the court below to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation at all, and if so, how much in the light of the principles laid down in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra) and other cases."

(m)In yet another case reported in Bhagwatidin v. Gheesalal, 1980 ACJ 116, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held, that the brother of the deceased can claim compensation, and the same is extracted hereunder:-

"There is another, aspect, which requires consideration. The provisions of Sections 110-A to 110-Fof the Motor Vehicles Act, were inserted to provide cheap and speedy remedy to the persons, who had suffered loss on account of the accident. The provisions, being benevolent, call for liberal and broad interpretation so that the real purpose of enacting Sections 100-A to 100-F is achieved. It is well settled that if the provisions of a welfare legislation are capable of two interpretations, the interpretation, which furthers the policy of the act and is more beneficial to the persons for whose interest the law has been made, should be preferred. Therefore, if the Parliament has thought it fit not to use the word 'representative', as was used in Fatal Accidents Act, but has used, the word 'legal representative' in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, full effect has to be given to the legislative intent. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the category of persons, who are entitled to claim compensation on account of the death of the deceased person, cannot be restricted to the relations specified in Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and I agree with the view taken by the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat High Courts in the decisions referred to above that all the legal representatives of a deceased as defined by Section 2(ii) of C.P.C. are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, if they have suffered any loss on account of the death of the deceased. In the present case, it is common ground that the appellant being the brother of the deceased was not survived by any other nearer heir. The appellant, therefore, is entitled to claim compensation on account of the death of the deceased from the respondents."

(n)In a decision of this Court in Sarayu v. Surendra Vithal Nazare reported in 2011 (2) MLJ 1, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, considered the question as to whether compensation can be denied to the wife of the deceased, who re-married another person. Though the facts may not be squarely applicable to the case on hand, the Division Bench judgment can be looked at from a different angle for the reason that the wife, who was earlier a dependent of the deceased and a legal representative, was held to maintain a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, to represent the estate of the deceased person, even after re-marriage. What has been considered and decided in the above reported judgment by the Division Bench is that the words, "Legal Representatives" in Section 2(11) of the CPC, means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. While reiterating the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation's case (cited supra), the Division Bench, at Paragraph 15, held that, the Tribunal has committed a serious illegality in holding that the wife of the deceased, as not entitled to any compensation for the reason, that after the death of the deceased, she remarried her husband's brother.

(o)On the aspect, as to how a provision has to be interpreted, this Court deems it fit to consider some of the decisions. In Smt.Hira Devi and others Vs. District Board, Shahjahanpur, reported in AIR 1952 SC 362, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 14, held that, "No doubt, it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act."

(p)In Nalinakhya Bysack Vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar and others, reported in AIR 1953 SC 148, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "It is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. The Court must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. Even where there is casus omissus, it is for others than the Courts to remedy the defect."

(q)In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi and others Vs. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1959 SC 459, (v 46 C 57), a Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 38 of the judgment held that, "If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom some sense which may be said to carry out the supposed intentions of the legislature. The intention of the Legislature is to be gathered only from the words used by it and no such liberties can be taken by the Courts for effectuating a supposed intentions of the Legislature."

(r)In G.Narayanaswami Vs. G.Pannerselvam and others, reported in 1972 (3) SCC 717, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while interpreting a provision, the Court should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the document which contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principles of its Government. However, the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation, which is "the primary rule" could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document. The object of interpretation and of "construction" (which may be broader than "interpretation") is to discover the intention of the law-makers in every case. This object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. This is an elementary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction processes which, from the point of view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down. The Supreme Court at paragraph 18 of the said judgment further held that "Plain meaning" or "Literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case of which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible. Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity.

(s)In Union of India Vs Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 193, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 54, held as follows:-

54. Now, it is undoubtedly true that where the language of an enactment is plain and clear upon its face and by itself susceptible to only one meaning, then ordinarily that meaning would have to be given by the Court. In such a case the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. But language at best is an imperfect medium of expression and a variety of significations may often lie in a word or expression. It has, therefore, been said that the words of a statute must be understood in the sense which the legislature has in view and their meaning must be found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor in its popular use, as in the subject or the occasion on which they are used and the object to be attained. It was said by Mr Justice Holmes in felicitous language in Town v. Eisner that ?a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used?. The words used in a statute cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. And when I use the word ?context?, I mean it in its widest sense ?as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which ? the statute was intended to remedy?. The context is of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the words used in a statute. ?It is quite true?, pointed out Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory ?that as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create?. Again, it must be remembered that though the words used are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing, be it a statute, or contract, or anything else, it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, but to remember that a statute always has some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery, is the surest guide to its meaning. The literal construction should not obsess the Court, because it has only prima facie preference, the real object of interpretation being to find out the true intent of the law maker and that can be done only by reading the statute as an organic whole, with each part throwing light on the other and bearing in mind the rule in Heydon case which requires four things to be ?discerned and considered? in arriving at the real meaning: (1) what was the law before the Act was passed; (2) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) the reason of the remedy. There is also another rule of interpretation which is equally well settled and which seems to follow as a necessary corollary, namely, where the words, according to their literal meaning ?produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification?, the Court would be justified in ?putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear?. Vide River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson. It is in the light of these principles of interpretation that I must proceed to consider what is the true meaning and effect of clause (1) of Article 222:whether it permits transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another, irrespective of his consent."

(t)In P.K.Unni Vs. Nirmala Industries and others, reported in 1990 (2) SCC 378, a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the Legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. "No case can be found to authorise any Court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus." Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, the Court can, of course, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. In doing so a "judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases."

10.There is a distinction between being a dependent on the income and receiving a contribution from the deceased, either monetarily or through the services rendered by the deceased to the members of the family, legal representatives, which is also a decisive factor, in computing the compensation. Though the provision under Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, defines, who are all the dependents entitled to claim compensation under the Workmen'sCompensation Act, there is a clear distinction under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which states that all the legal representatives are entitled to claim compensation.

11.Section 2(1)(d) does not confer any statutory right to a married daughter to seek for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The said Act has come into force in 1923. Whereas, Motor Vehicles Act was enacted in the year 1939. Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, does not restrict the entitlement of a married daughter to prefer any claim along with others.Both Acts are beneficial legislations. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction insofar as the language employed under the Acts. When Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, speaks about dependency, Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, speak about the right of the legal representatives to succeed to the estate of the deceased. There is a specific inclusion of all legal representatives to claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle's Act. Therefore, merely because a married daughter has joined the other claimants/legal representatives, or makes a separate claim, such claim cannot be said to be against the statutory provision, and therefore, to be rejected in limini.

12.If the intention of the framers of the subsequent enactment, viz., Motor Vehicles Act, was also to restrict the payment of compensation only to the dependants, the word ?dependant? as defined in Section 2(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act would have been incorporated in Motor Vehicles Act also. In the case of claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee dies, arising out of and during the course of employment, whereas, in the case of a Motor Accident, even the other legal heirs, travelling in the same vehicle may also be victims of the accident. Say for example, a rider and a pillion, in a two wheeler, or the occupants in a car, or passengers in a bus, and so on and so forth. Judicial notice can be taken, that in some cases, the entire family members die in an accident, leaving behind a married daughter or a married sister or a married son.

13.The quantum of compensation or loss of contribution is not determined on the basis of monetary loss alone. It is also determined on the basis of invaluable and gratuitous services rendered by the mother or the wife, as the case may be. The legal representative particularly, a married daughter, may not be totally dependent on the income of the deceased mother for her survival or living, but still, there can be a monetary assistance, during the life time of the deceased.

14.Even in the case of married daughters, a father or mother or brother, can still monetarily help a married daughter, depending upon the need or out of love and affection. A mother can continuously render her valuable service to her daughter, even if the daughter is married. Similarly, a married daughter would still continue to assist her mother, or father, in the case of need. Contribution by means of service or income, both can be taken into account to determine the quantum of compensation. A married daughter is a legal representative, as per the law of succession and that she is entitled to make a claim and it is for the Claims Tribunal or Court, to apportion the amount, between the claimants, depending upon the loss of contribution suffered by the married daughter.

15.Exclusion of a married daughter/sister/brother from the claim petition, altogether would be opposed to the object of the Act and it would be amounting to adding words to the legislation, which the Court is not supposed to do. As held by the Apex Court, even if there is casus omissus, it is not for the Court to add words to the legislation. The construction and interpretation of the words, ?legal representatives? in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the context and nature of legislation, being beneficial, should be interpreted in such a way not to take away their rights. Merely because a married daughter/sister is living with her husband, in a separate house, that by itself would not disentitle her from claiming compensation, as a legal representative, to represent, the estate of the deceased.

16.If a married daughter/sister/brother has to be excluded from the expression, ?legal representative?, employed in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, then it would virtually amounting to substituting the words ?legal representatives? with ?dependants?, as used inSection 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. No doubt, one who is gainfully employed cannot be called as a dependent. At the same time, not all married daughters/sisters can be said to be gainfully employed. The word ?dependant? has a different meaning in different connotation. Some may be dependent in terms of money and others may be dependent in terms of service.

17.In a given case, when the parents live with a married daughter and if the mother dies, it cannot be said that the married daughter was dependent on the mother, monetarily all the time, but still would have been dependent on her service. If the married daughter is employed, she leaves her children in the care and custody of her mother, when she is away in her office and in such cases, it cannot be said that married daughter did not lose her valuable services, which can be still be a decisive factor, for awarding quantum of compensation.

18.'Legal Representative' ordinarily includes heirs as well as persons, who represent the estate of the deceased person or a person, on whom, the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Right to claim for compensation by any or all legal representatives under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a legal right. It is an assertable right enforceable before Courts and administrative agencies, in its wider sense and therefore, a legal right has to be understood, as any advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law; and having regard to the manner, in which, a provision has to be interpreted, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions stated supra, this Court is of the view that the definition of ?legal representatives? cannot be restricted to exclude married daughters/sisters, from making any claim under section 166 of the Act and consequently, restrict their claim, only under Section 140 of the Act, which has been engrafted in the statute, with a specific object of compensating all the legal representative, whether there is negligence, on the part of the deceased or not. It is a "No Fault Liability" clause.

19.Courts have consistently held that what has been specifically excluded by a legislation in a provision cannot be imported into the section by the decisions of Court. By engrafting Section 166of the Motor Vehicles Act, enabling all the legal representatives to make a claim, in contra distinction to, Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which enables only the persons enumerated in the said section to claim compensation under section 3 of the Workmen'sCompensation Act, the intention of the legislature is clear and the definition, "legal representative" cannot be narrowed down to mean only "dependents", excluding married daughters/sisters.

20.There could still be a case where there is contribution of a portion of the income of the deceased to a legal representative, who had preferred a claim and he/she would not be wholly dependant on the income of the deceased. A likelihood of loss of contribution from the deceased would give rise to a claim for compensation by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, though he may not be a wholly dependent, as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen'sCompensation Act.

21.It is a well recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used in the statute, should ordinarily be understood, in which, they harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the objection of the legislature and the Court should adopt an object oriented approach, keeping in mind the language employed in the statute. When the legislature has used the words, ?Legal Representatives? in Section 166 of the Act, and having regard to the duty of the Court to act upon the true intention of the legislature, ?Mens or Sententia Legis?, this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions of the Insurance Company, intrepret and circumscribe the meaning of the words, ?Legal Representatives? to mean only ?dependents?. Just because a brother or sister is married, the right to represent the estate of the deceased is not taken away and such an interpretation, would make the provisions of law of succession, ineffective.

24.As the statute is very clear that all the legal representatives can maintain a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, depending upon the loss of monetary benefit or the gratuitous and invaluable services, measured in terms of money, that the legal representative, might have received and the likelihood of loss in the event of death, brother or sister can maintain a claim, the words "Legal Representatives", cannot be narrowed down to mean only, dependents

In case of claims the question that comes up is:

Whether the claim is heritable?

Who is to be paid; dependent or legal heir of deceased, Legal representative?

In case of claim under Employee Compensation Act; it is clear that; dependent is eligible and if dependent has deceased legal heirs of dependent shall be eligible, and NOT the legal heirs of deceased.

If the deceased was Hindu and did not leave alive; Mother, wife, sons and daughters then NO ClassI legal heirs is present hence ClassII legal heirs shall come into picture.

Class II relations are;

Father,Brother/Sister,Son’s daughter’s son/daughter,Daughter’s son’s son/daughter,Daughter’s daughter’s son/daughter,Sibling son/daughter,Father’s Parents,Brother’s widow,Father’s sibling,Mother’s parents,Mother’s sibling

Nephew is ; Sibling son/daughter

Legal heir certificate for Class II relations is also given by Tehsildar.

You may go thru:

https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/experts/Employees-compensation-act-1923-598516.asp

In citations posted by Mr. Suri.Sravan Kumar also, various aspects have been discussed.