REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1923 OF 2008
Kootha Perumal ..Appellant
VERSUS
State Tr. Inspector of
Police, Vigilance & Anti Corruption ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
Madras High Court, Madurai Bench dated 7
th
March, 2007 in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.821 of
1999 by which the High Court affirmed the
conviction and sentence recorded by the learned
Special Judge-cum-Additional District Judge-cumChief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai in
Spl.C.C.No.1 of 1994. By the aforesaid judgment,
the Special Judge convicted the appellant for
1offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (in short ‘the Act’) and
sentenced him to undergo one year rigorous
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in
default of payment to undergo three months
rigorous imprisonment and convicted him for the
offence under Section 7 of the Act and sentenced
him to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Rs.300/-, in default of payment
to undergo one month rigorous imprisonment.
2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows :
The prosecution case as narrated by PW2, the
complainant, has been extensively noticed by the trial
court as also by the High Court. For the purposes of this
appeal, we may very briefly touch upon on the relevant
facts. The complainant PW2, Nayinar Mohammed, is a
resident of Pudukottai. His father is the owner of house
property at door No.36, Mamundi Madam, Adappan
2Vayal, Pudukottai. Since his father was seriously ill, he
needed Rs.75,000/- for his treatment. He approached a
financial institution for a loan. The institution asked him
to furnish property certificate and Municipality Tax
Extract of the house owned by his father. He gave a
petition through his friend Noorul Ameen on 17
th
August,
1993, with the requisite Rs.15/- court stamp affixed on
the same (Ex.P3). His friend paid Rs.15/- to the
Municipality and obtained a challan Ex.P4. PW4, who
was the writer in the record room, knew the accused and
made the necessary entry in the ledger at page No.40
on 19
th
August, 1994. The application of the complainant
was given as No.C.A.2650 of 1993. Similar entry was
made with regard to payment of Rs.15/- on 17
th
August,
1993 by the cashier of Pudukottai Municipality (PW6).
The payment was made through challan No.6789 (Ex.P4).
Govindrajan, PW5, was a Junior Assistant in the
Municipality compared the copy of the tax extract
No.2650 with the original and found the same to be
correct and put his signature. Ex.P7 is the signature of
3the aforesaid Junior Assistant.
3. When the complainant enquired about the progress
of the petition, the appellant informed him that the file
will only come to him on 23
rd
August, 1993. He
demanded a sum of Rs.50/- as a bribe from the
complainant for delivery of the tax extract which,
according to him, was ready for delivery. On that date,
the complainant did not have any money. In any event,
he was not inclined to give any bribe to the appellant.
He, therefore, made a written complaint to the Inspector
(PW8) Anti Corruption, Rajagopalapuram. The complaint
is Ex.P5. A case was duly registered by PW8 as Crime
No.4 of 1993 under Section 7 of the Act. The First
Information Report (Ex.P10) was duly signed by the
complainant. Thereafter, another Inspector in Anti
Corruption, Pudukottai recorded the statements
of PW2 and PW3 on 24
th
August, 1993. Similarly the
statements of PWs.4, 5, 6 and 7 were also recorded.
Information about the registration of the FIR was duly
sent to the higher officials.
44. Subsequently, a trap was arranged, wherein one
Sridhar (PW4) who was working as a Junior Assistant in
Pudukottai Public Works Department and one
Balakrishnan, Junior Assistant from Water Supply and
Drainage Board were engaged as trap witnesses. The FIR
was got duly verified from the witnesses. Thereafter, the
complainant produced five ten rupees notes totaling
Rs.50/- (M.O.1). The notes were duly treated with
Phenolphthalein Power. A demonstration was also given
to the complainant as to how the hands of anybody who
receives the aforesaid currency when washed in water
would turn red. Thereafter, PW8, the Inspector,
instructed the complainant to go to the office of the
appellant and hand over the amount.
5. On directions of the police, the complainant along
with the trap witnesses went to the office of the appellant
on 23
rd
August, 1993. He was directed to hand over the
money to the appellant and to give a signal by folding his
shirt. At about 3.15 to 3.30 p.m., the complainant and
5PW4 Sridhar went to the Municipality by cycle, they were
followed by other jeep.
6. At about 4 p.m. PWs.2 and 3 entered into the office
of the appellant and met him. The appellant received the
amount and put it in his pocket. At 1610 hrs., the
witness came out from the office and gave the necessary
signal by folding his shirt, as directed by PW8.
7. On receipt of the signal, PW8 along with the other
witnesses and police party went inside the office of the
appellant. They introduced themselves. The appellant
was found to be nervous and sweating. PW9 prepared the
Sodium Carbonate mixture in two glass tumblers and
asked the appellant to dip his two fingers separately into
the mixture. The mixture turned light red. The mixture
was poured into a bottle and duly labeled ‘R’ (M.O.3).
Another sample was similarly prepared with label ‘N’ and
marked (M.O.2).
68. He thereafter asked the appellant about the money
he has received from PW2 and the appellant took the
currency notes M.O.1 from his pocket and presented it
before PW8. On comparison, the numbers in the said
currency notes recovered from the appellant tallied with
the numbers mentioned in the mahazar Ex.P7. The
appellant was thereafter asked to remove his shirt
(M.O.5). The pocket of the shirt was also subjected to
Sodium Carbonate mixture test, and the solution turned
into light red colour. The solution was duly sealed in a
separate bottle as M.O.4 and given the label ‘S’. The
bottle was duly signed by PW8.
9. On completion of certain other formalities, the
appellant was arrested and released from bail
at 1930 hrs. On completion of the entire investigation,
the appellant was duly put on trial.
10. The trial court convicted the appellant and
sentenced him as noticed above. Aggrieved by the
7judgment of the trial court, the appellant challenged the
same before the High Court in appeal. The High Court
upon a detailed consideration of the evidence affirmed
the findings recorded by the trial court. Consequently,
the conviction and the sentence were confirmed. Hence
the present appeal.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the entire proceedings were vitiated, as previous sanction
to prosecute the appellant was not legally obtained as
required under Section 19 of the Act. The second issue
raised by the appellant is that there was no demand of
bribe made by the appellant. Thus the conviction
recorded by the courts below is perverse and deserves to
be set aside.
13. We may first consider the issue as to whether
sanction was duly obtained prior to the prosecution of
8the appellant. It is the case of the appellant that the
order for sanction of the prosecution produced in this
case is signed by the Municipal Commissioner of
Pudukottai. According to him, a perusal of the same
would show that it suffers from non application of mind.
According to the learned counsel, the sanction order
must disclose that the sanctioning authority has duly
applied its mind and the same must be stated in the
sanction order. In support of this submission, learned
counsel has relied on a judgment of this Court in the
case of Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab
1
.
Undoubtedly, in the aforesaid judgment, this court
observed as follows :-
“The sanction under the Act is not intended to be nor
is an automatic formality and it is essential that the
provisions in regard to sanction should be observed
with complete strictness; Basdeo Agarwala v. King
Emperor (1945) F.C.R. 93. The object of the provision
for sanctions is that the authority giving the sanction
should be able to consider for itself the evidence before
it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the
circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden. In
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King (1948)
L.R. 75 I.A. 30 the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council also took a similar view when it observed :
1
[AIR 1958 SC 124]
9"In their Lordships' view, to comply with
the provisions of clause 23 it must be
proved that the sanction was given in
respect of the facts constituting the
offence charged. It is plainly desirable that
the facts should be referred to on the face
of the sanction, but this is not essential,
since clause 23 does not require the
sanction to be in any particular form, nor
even to be in writing. But if the facts
constituting the offence charged are not
shown on the face of the sanction, the
prosecution must prove by extraneous
evidence that those facts were plakhed
before the sanctioning authority. The
sanction to prosecute is an important
matter; it constitutes a condition
precedent to the institution of the
prosecution and the Government have an
absolute discretion to grant or withhold
their sanction."
It should be clear from the form of the sanction that
the sanctioning authority considered the evidence
before it and after a consideration of all the
circumstances of the case sanctioned the prosecution,
and therefore unless the matter can be proved by
other evidence, in the sanction itself the facts should
be referred to indicate that the sanctioning authority
had applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of
the case. In Yusofalli Mulla Noorbhoy v. The King
(1949) L.R. 76 I.A. 158 it was held that a valid
sanction on separate charges of hoarding and
profiteering was essential to give the Court jurisdiction
to try the charge. Without such sanction the
prosecution would be a nullity and the trial without
jurisdiction.”
14. Keeping in view the aforesaid statement of law, it
would not be possible to conclude that the sanction order
10in the present case was not valid. Ex.P2 with the present
appeal is the copy of the sanction order. A perusal of the
same would show that the sanctioning authority has
adverted to all the necessary facts which have been
actually proved by the prosecution in the trial. Upon
examination of the material facts, the sanctioning
authority has certified that it is the authority competent
to remove the appellant from the office. It is specifically
stated that the statements of the witnesses have been
duly examined. Sanction order also states that the other
materials such as copy of the FIR as well as other official
documents such as the different mahazars were carefully
examined. Upon examination of the statements of the
witnesses as also the material on record, the sanctioning
authority has duly recorded its satisfaction that the
appellant should be prosecuted for the offences, as
noticed above. We, therefore, find no merit in the
submissions of the learned counsel that the sanctioning
order to prosecute the appellant was not legal.
1115. We may also notice here that although the issue
with regard to the illegality attaching to the order of
sanction was raised before the trial court, it was not
raised before the High Court. The trial court, on
examination of the issue, also negated the submission of
the appellant about any illegality attaching to the
sanction order. Even though we do not have the benefit
of the opinion of the High Court as the appellant has not
raised issue with regard to the illegality of the sanction
order before the High Court, we are satisfied that the
sanction order has been issued in according with law.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant secondly
submitted that the judgment recorded by both the courts
below is contrary to the evidence on record. We have
examined the entire issue. We are of the considered
opinion that the trial court as well as the High Court
have analyzed the entire evidence and clearly held that a
demand was definitely made by the appellant for delivery
of the tax certificate. The trial court as well as the High
12Court have made a reference to the evidence given by
PWs.2 and 3 who have categorically stated that the
demand was made by the appellant. No other point was
urged before us.
17. We may notice that the entire trap have been
meticulously orchestrated by the prosecution authority.
We are unable to discern any arbitrariness or
inconsistencies in the concurrent findings recorded by
the courts below. We find no merit in this appeal. The
appeal is dismissed.
……………………………..J.
[B.Sudershan Reddy]
……………………………..J.
[Surinder Singh Nijjar]
New Delhi;
December 15, 2010.
13
