legal maxim

The Latin maxim “Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius” literally means “to express one is the exclusion of another”. It basically means to say that whenever there is a clear mention of particular things, the presumption is that all other things which have not been mentioned are excluded. This maxim is used in the interpretation of statutes by the judiciary in order to understand the intent of the legislature so as to give justice where it is due. This rule is only applied in cases where the expressly mentioned words are not followed by the words such as “etc”, “others” or “as the authority may deem fit”. For example, Section 375 of the Indian Penal Act (IPC), defines certain parameters which when committed is said to constitute rape. Other than these, there are no condition which would amount to rape and here the use of this maxim can be seen. While in Section 373, IPC defines punishment for prostitution and uses the phrase “any such purpose” which implies that, if a person commits the expressed acts or any other acts apart from the ones mentioned, which comes into the category shall be punished for the offence of prostitution. Here, the maxim Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius finds no use and cannot be referred to.

R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department

In this case, the Court excluded the father of an illegitimate child from the rights under Immigration Law because the definition in the act had only mentioned the mother of the child.

R. v. Inhabitants of Sedgley

In this case, the Court held that the Poor Relief Act, 1601 would only be levied on the dwellers of “lands, houses and coal mines” and said that it will not be levied on the owners of any other types of mines. The reason behind it was that the Poor Relief Act, 1601 expressly mentioned “coal mines” and the phrase was not followed by any general word, which would indicate that other mines can be included in the case.

Tempest v. Kilner

In this case, the Court held that there was no need for any evidence in writing for the sale of stocks and shares even if they were above the specified value, since the Statute of Frauds, 1677 expressed only “goods, wares and merchandise” and according to the Court stocks and shares did not among them.