Homicide
Anantalf
(Querist) 13 April 2011
This query is : Resolved
Homicide- is and what?
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
The killing of a human being by another human being is Homcide which may be either lawful (by Magistrate/ Judges/ Police/ Army etc) or unlawful (Persons other than classes authorised to do).
Naresh Kudal
(Expert) 13 April 2011
nice definition in simple words by Mr. Gulshan
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Absence of premeditation—Sudden quarrel between the accused persons and deceased—Firearm injury caused by co-accused person resulting in death—Gunshot fired by accused injured others, one of whom died on way to hospital—Conviction, modified to Section 304 Pt. I.
Sital Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 CrLJ 1042 : 1983 AIR (SC) 652 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 221 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 612 : 1983 CAR 291 : 1983(1) Crimes 1011
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Accidental firing—Proper care and caution—Firing from close range without any care for the identity of the target—The exception cannot be invoked.
The primordial requirement of the said exception is that the act which killed the other person should have been done "with proper care and caution". The very fact that accused shot his own colleague at close range without knowing the identity of his target smacks of utter dearth of any care and caution. It appears to us that appellant did not even remotely entertain the idea of putting forward a plea that his act of killing the deceased was done by accident or misfortune, leave apart the other ingredients necessary to form the right under the said exception.
Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat, 1998 CrLJ 57 : AIR 1997 SC 3790 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 668 : 1998 (2) Guj LR 1693 : 1997 (3) Raj LW 455 : 1998 (1) BLJ 596
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Accused aged about 76 years at the time of disposal of appeal—No premeditated or preplanned fight which resulted in death—Conviction modified from murder to homicide.
It is not in dispute that there was a dispute as to the turn by which the water pump should be operated between the parties. It was not a premeditated or preplanned fight. The prosecution has not established by evidence that it was the turn to draw water by the complainant. Nor is there clear evidence that it was the turn of the appellant. Each was asserting that it was his turn and not of the other. In this circumstance, it would not be wrong to assume that the appellant in the exercise of his right got enraged and tried to prevent the mischief by the deceased. It seems to us that the action of the accused could reasonably be brought under Section 304, Part I, IPC.
Sunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 CrLJ 122 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2136 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 905 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 774 : 1988 (1) Rec CrR 617
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Bride burning—Conduct of accused in attempting to save the deceased—No presence of kerosene at the scene of occurrence or its smell on the clothes of accused person—Absence of motive for one of the accused person—Acquittal affirmed.
We find absolutely no motive for accused No. 1 to cause the death of the deceased. According to the prosecution, accused No. 1's younger brother was having illicit intimacy with accused No. 2 with the connivance of accused No. 1 and the deceased was objecting to the same. In such a situation it is rather opposed to human nature to suggest that accused No. 1 would think of causing the death of the deceased. According to the witnesses, particularly P.W. 2, the deceased was found under a mattress and accused No. 1 was pressing the same on her and in the process he also got burns. The High Court has rightly observed that the culprits who had decided to put an end to the life of the deceased would never go the extent of extinguish the fire after throwing a mattress on her, and in this view, according to the High Court, the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that this was a case of homicide and not suicide.
Panchnama of the scene of occurrence does not make any mention about kerosene in the bathroom but kerosene was found outside the bathroom. The clothes of accused No. 2, who was holding the deceased when accused No.1 poured kerosene did not show any smell of kerosene. Therefore, it becomes doubtful whether accused No. 2 held the deceased in the manner alleged. The High Court has adverted to number of these details and doubted the prosecution case. The High Court has rightly held that these features would not lend any corroboration to the dying declaration but, on the other hand, cause suspicion. There is no other corroboration coming forth. The conduct of the accused in throwing the mattress over the burning woman is an important circumstance which creates a doubt about the prosecution version.
State of Gujarat v. Mohan Bhai Raghbhai Patel, 1990 CrLJ 1462 : 1990 AIR (SC) 1379 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 313 : 1990(2) Crimes 691
Homicide—Bride burning—Incident occurring after 10 months after the marriage—Defence of accidental death—Burnt injuries suffered by deceased and presence of kerosene on the clothes could not have been possible in case of accident nor any justification for suicide—Conviction, affirmed.
If indeed Chander Kanta had sustained the burns in one of the suggested modes it is incomprehensible she would have accused her husband of having set fire to her after pouring kerosene over her. Moreover she was found to have sustained burn injuries on the face, neck, trunk and left lower and upper limbs. Her clothes were found by the Chemical Examiner to contain kerosene oil. Such extensive injuries and presence of kerosene in the clothes would not have been found if the stove had burst and Chander Kanta had sustained the injuries accidentally. As regards the theory of suicide there is no evidence that there was any proximate cause for her to attempt to end her life on that morning.
The recovery of the stove with its lid removed and burnt match sticks from the kitchen of the appellant's house clearly goes to show that the kerosene in the stove had been poured over Chander Kanta and then lighted match sticks had been applied to her.
The dying declaration clearly sets out that the appellant was in the habit of ill-treating her and that on the morning in question he had abused her and beat her and on top of everything he had also poured kerosene over her and set fire to her.
Surinder Kumar v. State (Delhi Administration), 1987 CrLJ 537 : 1987 AIR (SC) 692 : 1987 CAR 360 : 1987 SCC (Cr) 181 : 1987(1) Crimes 250 : 1987 (2) Guj LH 284 : 1987 CrLR (SC) 567
Homicide—Bride burning—Possibility of accident—Probability of defence—Use of kerosene stove instead of gas stove—Highly improbable in the surrounding circumstances—Defence of accident cannot be accepted.
When Subhash returned to the house a few minutes before 9 at night, Sudha wanted to warm up the cooked food for being served to him. At that point of time, the child of Subhash (the other had gone with the mother) cried for milk, Shakuntala wanted the milk to be heated up for the child and asked Sudha to give the milk first for the crying child and then attend to Subhash. It is at that point of time that Sudha wanted to light the kerosene stove. The kerosene stove was in the open space. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that around 9 p.m. of December it would be unbearably cold outside the house in Delhi. To work the kerosene stove would take sometime and if milk for the crying child was immediately necessary, the kerosene stove would not be the proper heating medium. On the other hand, the gas stove would have served the purpose better. Not much of gas was likely to be consumed for heating the milk, nor even for heating up the food for Subhash. We have to take note of the position that Sudha did not have any warm clothings on her person and as the evidence shows, she had only a nylon saree. Being a pregnant lady at an advanced stage she was expected to keep properly robed to avert getting ill from exposure to cold. It is, therefore, not likely that she would have ventured going out to operate the kerosene stove. There is another feature which also must be taken note of. She being in an advanced stage of pregnancy would have found it very difficult to squat on the floor for operating the kerosene stove which was on the floor itself. It is the defence version that the gunny bag was being used for sitting purposes for operating the stove. That is a conjecture accepted by the High Court. There is no evidence worth the name to explain why the gas stove was not used. In the absence of an explanation as to why the gas stove was not being operated for this purpose and in the setting of events which we have indicated it would be natural human conduct for Sudha to have gone to the gas stove in preference to the kerosene stove. In these circumstances we agree with counsel for the appellants that the defence version explaining the manner in which Sudha's saree caught fire is not acceptable. Once the explanation advanced by the defence that Sudha's saree caught fire from the kerosene stove is discarded, on the premises that the same had not been lighted, the prosecution story that fire was set to her saree is the only other way in which she must have been burnt.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar and others, 1986 CrLJ 155 : 1986 AIR (SC) 250 : 1986 SCC (Cr) 2 : 1985 CrLR (SC) 501 : 1985 CAR 304 : 1986 (1) Rec CrR 184 : 1986 Mad LJ (Cr) 86
Homicide—Bride burning—Suicide totally ruled out—Accused named in dying declaration—Conviction affirmed.
It is difficult to believe that on mere temperamental differences, as admitted by the deceased, she had led herself towards ending her life that fateful afternoon when the immediate cause of it is not evident either from the dying declaration or any other material on the record. Her marriage being hardly a year old was in the course of the usual "wear and tear". There is circumstantial evidence that the occurrence did take place at about 3 p.m. on the fateful day, when she was lying on the cot on which she had spread a mattress and a bed sheet. Those were found by the Investigation Officer to be soiled with kerosene. At that napping moment, the deceased was an easy victim to be poured over kerosene oil, instantly drenching her clothes and putting her on fire. Nor much time would be required to accomplish such an act and having achieved his purpose the appellant leisurely could walk away from that place.
Dharam Pal v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 3149 : 1992 AIR (SC) 1852 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 517
Homicide—Bride burning—Witness—Partisan witness—No possibility of any person other than neighbour being around at the time of occurrence—Conduct of witnesses not supporting the allegation of animosity—Their evidence cannot be discarded.
Both the trial Judge as also the High Court have accepted the fact that P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 rushed to the spot on hearing Sudha's cry for help If relationship between these witnesses on one side and members of the family of the accused on the other had been strained as alleged, the spontaneous response which came from these witnesses would not have been found. We cannot lose sight of the fact that one of the curses of modern living, particularly in highly urbanised areas is to have a life cut-off from the community so as even not to know the neighbours. Indifference to what happens around is the way of life. That being the ordinary behaviour of persons living in the city, if added to it there was animosity, these witnesses would certainly not have behaved in the manner they have.
These witnesses not only rushed to the spot but took a leading part in putting out the fire from Sudha's person and ensured her despatch for medical assistance at the shortest interval. As expected of a good neighbour, information was given to police, blanket was made available, a taxi was called and human sympathy and assistance to the extent possible was extended. If the accusation of animosity and ill-feeling is not accepted, these witnesses must be taken to be not only competent being present at the post, but also acceptable in respect of what they say as being truthful witnesses.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar and others, 1986 CrLJ 155 : 1986 AIR (SC) 250 : 1986 SCC (Cr) 2 : 1985 CrLR (SC) 501 : 1985 CAR 304 : 1986 (1) Rec CrR 184 : 1986 Mad LJ (Cr) 86
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
aHomicide—Cause of death—Victim chased by accused persons who jumped in the well hitting his head on the wall and losing consciousness—Cause of death opined to be asphyxia—Death not caused by any act of accused with the intention or knowledge of likelihood of death—Conviction set aside.
Joginder Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1979 CrLJ 1406 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1876 : 1980 SCC (Cr) 255 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 611
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Cause of death—Victim chased by accused persons who jumped in the well hitting his head on the wall and losing consciousness—Cause of death opined to be asphyxia—Death not caused by any act of accused with the intention or knowledge of likelihood of death—Conviction set aside.
Joginder Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1979 CrLJ 1406: 1979 AIR (SC) 1876: 1980 SCC (Cr) 255 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 611
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Circumstantial evidence—Murder of wife—Possibility of suicide by the wife—No reason for husband to attempt to screen the evidence by packing the body in a box and attempt to dispose of at a far off place—Conviction affirmed.
It is plain logic that if she had committed suicide, there was no reason for her husband to pack her dead body in a box and throw that box from a running train into a river. Dr. Saxena travelled with that box from Hardoi to Lucknow by the Sialdah Express, took another train from Lucknow to Kanpur and threw the box on way. It is also impossible to understand how, when Dr. Saxena was himself present in the house. Sudha could hang herself by a rope in that very house, with a two-year old child near her. No rope was found in the house and the medical evidence does not show that Sudha hanged herself. The conduct of Dr. Saxena in buying a box, packing the dead body of his wife into that box and throwing it from a running train leaves no doubt that he committed her murder. There is the clearest evidence of motive on the record of the case. Dr. Saxena had an illicit affair with the Nurse due to which he used to harass, pressurise, threaten and assault Sudha. Not only did he tell Sudha's father and his own father falsely that Sudha had run away but he lodged false and misleading reports that she had run away. Little did he realise that the Ganges had refused to accept the box, which contained tell-tale evidence of the dastardly murder of a defenceless woman.
Dr. V.K. Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1983 CrLJ 1731: 1984 AIR (SC) 49: 1983 SCC (Cr) 869: 1983 CrLR (SC) 461
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Conviction—Solitary eye witness—If a witness is truthful, his sole testimony can be relied for conviction.
The evidence of the eye-witness, if accepted, is sufficient to warrant conviction though in appropriate cases the Court may as a measure of caution seek some confirming circumstances from other sources. But ordinarily, the evidence of a truthful eye- witness is sufficient without anything more, to warrant a conviction and cannot, for instance, be made to depend for its acceptance on the truthfulness of other items of evidence such as recovery of weapons etc. at the instance of the accused by the police. The Judges of the High Court were wrong in treating the evidence of eye-witness as `one of three legs of a tripod' which must collapse if any of the other legs collapses.
Shrishail Nageshi Pare v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 CrLJ 1173 : 1985 AIR (SC) 866 : 1985 SCC (Cr) 235 : 1985 CAR 156 : 1985 CrLR (SC) 198 : 87 Bom LR 269 : 1985 (2) Rec CrR 56
Homicide—Conviction—The case must be shown to have fallen within one of the exception—Section 300 to result in conviction.
Santosh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 CrLJ 602: 1975 AIR (SC) 654: 1975(3) SCR 463: 1975 CAR 92: 1975 Mad LW (Cr) 78
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Custody death—Arrest of deceased on false charge of dacoity to settle score with him on account of complaint made by him against a constable for making demand of bribe—The accused persons are guilty as the conduct of accused persons fell in clause Secondly under Section 300.
The distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder is often lost sight of, resulting in undue liberality in favour of undeserving culprits like the respondent- police officers. Except in cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned in Section 300 of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or if the act falls within any of the three clauses of Section 300, namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. In this case, the injuries suffered by Brijlal would appear to fall under the clause `2ndly' of Section 300, since the act by which his death was caused was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the respondents knew to be likely to cause his death.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and others, 1986 CrLJ 836 : 1985 AIR (SC) 416 : 1985 SCC (Cr) 552 : 1985 CrLR (SC) 73 : 1985(1) Crimes 344 : 1985(1) Rec CrR 600
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Death due to septicaemia—Injuries sufficient to cause death—Death taking place 17 days after the incident—No intention can be attributed to accused to cause death—Knowledge of causing grievous hurt alone can be attributed to the accused—Conviction modified from Sections 302 to 307 & 326 of IPC.
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1999 CrLJ 20 : 1999 AIR (SC) 75 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 120 : 1998 CrLR (SC) 758 : 1998(38) All CrC 12
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Defence of trespass—Deceased a wrestler entering/trespassing into the house of accused persons and picking up a quarrel—No clear evidence as to how occurrence originated—Medical opinion not clearing indicating depth of all injuries—Accused liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The deceased had tresspassed into the house of the respondents, received the injuries, then came to the road with bleeding injuries and fell down. As to how the occurrence originated there is not clear evidence. But we have to infer from the circumstances that the deceased had not received all the injuries while he was on the road as spoken to by PWs 1, 2 and 6 but even earlier to the arrival of the witnesses to the scene when the deceased tresspassed into the house of the respondents and picked up quarrel with them. Hence, we are in full agreement with the view expressed by the High Court that there is suppression of genesis and origin of the occurrence. There is no clear evidence as to what was the justifiable cause for the deceased who was a well- known wrestler, to enter the house of the respondents, and to pick a quarrel. As we have pointed out earlier, the irresistible inference is that the deceased should have fallen victim at the hands of the respondents only after he entered the house of the respondents.
The Medical Officer has not given the depth of all the injuries except injury No. 5 in the post-mortem certificate. None of the injuries seems to have been deep cut injuries. In the absence of evidence in regard to the depth of the injuries and of the opinion of the Medical Officer with regard to the nature of the injuries except injury No. 5, we have to infer that the injuries Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 11 were not serious in nature. Evidently, the High Court taking into consideration the peculiar facts and the exceptional and special circumstances of the case coupled with the nature of the injuries, as could be inferred from the post-mortem certificate, has concluded that the offence is not one of murder but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
State of Karnataka v. Siddappa Basanagouda Patil and another, 1990 CrLJ 1116 : 1990 AIR (SC) 1047 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 698 : 1990 CAR 141 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 235 : 1990(2) Crimes 233
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Distinction with murder—Accused in possession of loaded fire arms but according to prosecution witnesses injuries were caused only by kicks and fist blows—Established circumstances show that case does not fall within any four clauses of Section 300 IPC—Offence committed by accused is culpable homicide not amounting to murder as per 3rd clause of Section 299 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 Part II read with 34 IPC.
The accused were in possession of a loaded fire arm also. According to the medical evidence of Dr. T.P. Sahi, PW 12 and the post mortem report, no injury had been caused to the deceased either with the lathi or with a knife or with the pistol. The respondent, therefore, did not used any of the weapons with which they were armed. Cause of death, according to the medical evidence, was shock and haemorrhage associated with strangulation as a result of the injury on the chest and the neck. According to the prosecution witnesses, who have been believed by both the courts below, injuries were caused to the deceased only by kicks and fist blows. Keeping in view the ocular testimony and the medical evidence, we find it difficult to hold that the accused respondents had intended to cause the injuries on the deceased which were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause his death. Had the acccused shared the common intention to cause the death of the deceased, nothing prevented them from using the pistol. The courts have to take into consideration all the attendant circumstances while considering the question of offence. The fact that neither the knife nor the lathi nor the pistol was used, even though the deceased was lonesome and was attacked by four young persons would go to show that in all probabilities the respondents did not intend to cause death of the deceased and that they wanted to severely assault him only. The facts proved by the prosecution and the established circumstances on the record go to show that the case does not fall within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of murder contained in Section 300, IPC. However, in causing the injuries as have been noticed in the post-mortem report, the respondents must be attributed the knowledge that by their acts they were likely to cause the death of the deceased, though without any intention to cause his death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause his death. The offence, in this case would, therefore, be `culpable homicide not amounting to murder' as per the third clause of Section 299, IPC punishable under Section 304/Part II/34, IPC.
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, 1993 CrLJ 3137 : 1993 AIR (SC) 2317 : 1993 CrLR (SC) 504 : 1993 (2) Crimes 1191 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 116
Homicide—Distinction with murder—Sub-classification of culpable homicide in the scheme of the Code—Method of interpretation and application of various provisions relating to homicide.
In the scheme of the Penal Code, `culpable homicide' is genus and `murder' its specie. All `murder' is `culpable homicide' but not vice versa. Speaking generally `culpable homicide' sans `special characteristics of murder' is `culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, `culpable homicide of the first degree.' This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as `murder'. The second may be termed as `culpable homicide of the second degree.' This is punishable under the 1st part of Section 304. Then, there is `culpable homicide of the third degree.' This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second Part of Section 304.
The academic distinction between `murder' and `culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.
Whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is `murder' or `culpable homicide not amounting to murder' on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such casual connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of `murder' contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be `culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be `culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the First Part of Section 304, Penal Code.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, 1977 CrLJ 1 : 1977 AIR (SC) 45 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 485 : 1976 CAR 320 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 659 : 1977 Chad LR 65
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Dowry death—Absence of witnesses—Two dying declarations recorded by Doctor and Assistant Sub-Inspector respectively not found to be clearly implicating the accused person—Order of acquittal, affirmed.
Hanumant Dass v. Vinay Kumar and others, 1982 CrLJ 977 : 1982 AIR (SC) 1052 : 1982 CAR 138 : 1982 CrLR (SC) 267 : 1982 SCC (Cr) 379(2)
Homicide—Dowry death—Appreciation of circumstances surrounding the death to distinguish a case of suicide from a case of murder.
It is true that sometimes a case of suicide is presented as a case of homicide specially when the death is due to burn injuries. But it need not be pointed out that whenever the victim of torture commits suicide she leaves behind some evidence—may be circumstantial in nature to indicate that it is not a case of homicide but of suicide. It is the duty of the Court, in a case of death because of torture and demand for dowry, to examine the circumstances of each case and evidence adduced on behalf of the parties, for recording a finding on the question as to how the death has taken place. While judging the evidence and the circumstances of the case, the Court has to be conscious of the fact that a death connected with dowry takes place inside the house, where outsiders who can be said to be independent witnesses in the traditional sense, are not expected to be present. The finding of guilt on the charge of murder has to be recorded on the basis of circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced before the Court. In the instant case, the occurrence took place in the open courtyard during the day-time which is not consistent with the theory of suicide. Apart from that, as already stated above, the Dying Declaration of the victim along with the evidence of PWs 6, 7 and 8, which we find no reason to discard, fully establishes the charges levelled against the appellants.
Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 3935 : 1993 AIR (SC) 138 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 848 : 1992 CAR 273 : 1992 Cr LR (SC) 639 : 1992 (3) Crimes 581
Homicide—Dowry death—Defence of accidental death—Smell of kerosene from the body as well as burnt hair rule out of possibility of accidental death.
Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 CrLJ 2276 : 1990 AIR (SC) 2134 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 126 : 1990 CAR 355 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 633 : 1991(1) Crimes 116
Homicide—Dowry death—Dying declaration recorded by Investigating Officer—Investigation commenced on the basis of the statement of deceased recorded by him—No one present in the room except the Doctor at the time of recording—Statement corroborated by the motive of dowry established by evidence of brother of deceased—Conviction affirmed.
State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh, 1989 CrLJ 95 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2013 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 58, 1988 CAR 241 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 722 : 1988 (3) Crimes 295
Homicide—Dowry death—Social reform—Social osterisation is required to curtail the malady of bride burning.
Dowry killing is a crime of its own kind where elimination of daughter-in-law becomes immediate necessity if she or her parents are no more able to satiate the greed and avarice of her husband and their family members, to make the boy available, once again in the marriage market. Eliminate it and much may stand resolved automatically. Social reformist and legal jurists may evolve a machinery for debarring such a boy from remarriage irrespective of the member of family who committed the crime and in violation penalise the whole family including those who participate in it. That is social ostracisation is needed to curtail increasing malady of bride burning.
Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 CrLJ 2276 : 1990 AIR (SC) 2134 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 126 : 1990 CAR 355 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 633 : 1991(1) Crimes 116
Homicide—Dowry death—Unnatural death—Suicide ruled out by medical evidence—Circumstantial evidence of incriminating circumstances—Defence not truthful—Conviction affirmed.
As there was no direct evidence to prove who caused the death of Neelam, the prosecution led evidence to show that there was a demand for more dowry; and that she was tortured and even beaten on some occasions; that she was administered something few days prior to the date of the incident as a result of which she was required to be taken to a private hospital. The prosecution also led evidence to prove that the accused had thrown the dead body of Neelam on the pavement and after few minutes had taken it in a car to the hospital. It also relied upon the circumstance that no blood was found at the place where the dead body was seen lying. Relying upon these circumstances and the medical evidence which proved that all the injuries found on the body of Neelam could not have been used by a fall from 11th floor of a house and were more consistent with her being given blows and her being killed in that manner, the trial Court came to the conclusion that it was not a case of suicide as contended by the accused but it was a case of homicide. The trial Court also held that the circumstances established by the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the 3 accused had caused the death of Neelam in furtherance of their common intention. The involvement of Rabindra was believed relying upon the circumstances that he had along with the other two accused taken her to the hospital in a private car. The defence of the accused was that Neelam had committed suicide by jumping from the terrace on the 11th floor. The trial Court gave good reasons for not accepting this defence and also the writing alleged to have been written by Neelam indicating that she was committing suicide as she was unhappy because of harassment and ill-treatment by her in-laws. The trial Court convicted all the three accused under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34, IPC.
Both the Courts below have believed the witnessed and on reappreciation, we find that the evidence led by the prosecution, was reliable and sufficient to establish all the circumstances which have been relied upon. The medical evidence very clearly establishes that it was not a case of suicide and death of Neelam was homicidal. We also agree with the High Court that death of Neelam was caused in furtherance of the common intention of the husband and the mother-in-law. We see no good reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court.
Santosh Rani Jain and another v. State of West Bengal, 1998 CrLJ 4023 : 1998 AIR (SC) 2633 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 1466 : 1998(3) Rec.CrR 797 : 1998(37) All CrC 388
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Exceeding right of private defence of property—Brick batting by the striking employees on the property of employer who retaliated with gun fire—No reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt could be formed by the accused—Right of private defence exceeded—Accused is liable for guilty of murder.
mischief was caused to his property but it was not caused under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension in his mind that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence if such right of private defence was not exercised. A mere claim of such apprehension is not enough. The Court on objective test and on the facts and circumstances of each case must arrive at the conclusion that the situation was such as was likely to reasonably cause such apprehension. The right of private defence of property also, therefore, in the appellant's case extended to causing of any harm other than the death. Undoubtedly the appellant did exceed this right of private defence and apparently the murder which he committed within the meaning of clause `4thly' of Section 300 squarely fell within Exception 2 thereof. He exceeded the power given to him by law and caused the death of Sant Ram against whom he was exercising such right of defence. He did so without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of such defence. He thought that by indulging in this imminently dangerous act he would be able to scare away the labourers and stop them from continuing their unjustified agitation, the raising of the slogans and the throwing of the brickbats. But then, although the intention was not to kill or cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, yet he must have committed the act knowing that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death of the worker or workers standing on the other side of the boundary wall.
If the accused commits an act while exceeding the right of private defence by which the earth is caused either with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death then he would be guilty under Part I. On the other hand if before the application of any of the Exceptions of Section 300 it is found that he was guilty of murder within the meaning of clause `4thly', then no question of such intention arises and only the knowledge is to be fastened on him that he did indulge in an act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death but without any intention to cause it or without any intention to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. There does not seem to be any escape from the position, therefore, that the appellant could be convicted only under Part II of Section 304 and not Part I.
Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab, 1979 CrLJ 584 : 1979 AIR (SC) 577 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 635 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 105 : 1979 CAR 97
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Fatal injury—Accused causing gun-shot injuries—Injured died one and a half months later—Right arm of the deceased amputed—Doctor opined that second haemorrhage resulting in death—Death was not the result of injuries caused to deceased during occurrence—Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside—Accused convicted under Section 326 IPC.
The death was not direct result of the injuries caused to the deceased during the occurrence and it is possible that the secondary haemorrhage could have taken place between 7 to 14 days. Further in this case it is to be noted that the occurrence took place on 2-10-1979 and the injured died on 19-11-1979, i.e. nearly one and a half months later. In between he was operated and for the purpose of surgeries several incised wounds were made and the doctor opined that the second haemorrhage, which resulted in shock and haemorrhage resulting in death, took place on the day when the right arm of the deceased was amputated. Under these circumstances we find it difficult to convict the appellant under Section 302 simpliciter as the death cannot be said to be a direct result of the injuries caused particularly having regard to the intervening cause mentioned above. Under these circumstances the offence committed by him would be one of grievous hurt. In the result we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life. Instead we convict him under Section 326, IPC.
Dev Raj v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 1292 : 1992 AIR (SC) 950 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 519 : 1992 CAR 364 : 1992 Cr LR (SC) 321 : 1992(1) Crimes 980
Homicide—Fatal injury—All the accused persons armed with lathies—Doctor conducting post mortem noticed 5 incise wounds—No witness come forward as to which of the accused caused which injury—Conviction under Section 302/149 IPC altered to conviction under Sections 304 Part II r/w 149 IPC.
The doctor, P.W. 19 who conducted post mortem noticed 17 Injuries. Out of them injuries Nos. 1, 3, 10, 11 and 14 were described as incise wounds. Though they resulted in bleeding but no other damage was noticed. It is only injury No. 15 which resulted in a depressed fracture of peristal bone and ultimately proved in membrane puncture. Though the doctor in a general way stated cause of death was due to multiple injuries but he has specifically stated that on injury No. 15 he noticed a depressed fracture of paristal bone which individually was sufficient to cause death of the deceased. In these circumstances question that arises is whether all the other accused also responsible for the death of the deceased, the prosecution has not explained as to how the deceased received incise wounds though they are simple. The prosecution case in general is that all of them were found with lathies. Nobody has stated that which of them caused the injury No. 15 which unfortunately resulted in the death of the deceased. If anyone of the appellants had exceeded the common object and acted on his own, it would be his individual act. In this case unfortunately no witness has come forward as to which of the accused has caused which injury. In these circumstances we find it difficult to award punishment under Section 302/140, IPC. Accordingly we set aside the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/140, IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life and instead convict them under Section 304 II/149, IPC and sentence them to seven years imprisonment.
Sarman v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 CrLJ 63 : 1993 AIR (SC) 400 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 356
Homicide—Fatal injury—Identification of—Failure of Doctor to opine the exact injury which caused laceration of lungs resulting in death—Conviction of accused for murder is not proper.
On internal examination the right clavicle was found fractured so also the third, fourth and fifth ribs. Laceration on the right lung in the lateral side was also found. This laceration of the lung was the cause of the death of Kalu and in the opinion of the Doctor it was by itself sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. But the Doctor did not say further whether the fracture of the right clavicle and all the ribs on the right side was as a result of injury No. 3, the author of which according to the prosecution evidence was respondent Sheoram. He had not caused injury No. 6. This was caused, probably, by respondent Sohan. In our opinion it may well be that the fracture of the ribs or at least of some of them was caused as a result of injury No. 6. In such a situation the laceration on the right lung could not be connected positively with injury No. 3 alone. It might have been caused by injury No. 6. Respondent Sheoram, therefore, on the facts of this case could not be and cannot be convicted under Section 302, I.P.C.
State of Haryana v. Prabhu and others, 1979 CrLJ 892 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1019 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 949 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 90
Homicide—Fatal injury—Identification of—Trivial nature of original dispute—Inconsistent evidence of witnesses about who caused which injury—Conviction modified for causing grievous hurt.
Hammu and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1979 CrLJ 1329 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1755 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 1025 : 1980 CAR 304 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 581
Homicide—Fatal injury—Lack of determination—Death of deceased was caused due to sock and haemorrhage resulting from both the injuries No. 1 & 2 collectively—Only injury No. 1 attributed to accused and No. 2 to other accused since acquitted—Offence of accused scaled down from one under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304 Part II IPC—Sentence reduced to period already undergone.
The deceased Kaka Singh was seen by the appellant coming and the later along with three others, since acquitted, surrounded him. Firstly, the deceased was felled down and then two blows with sharp pointed and cutting weapons were inflicted on him. One was on the chest and abdomen and the other was on the back of the deceased near the first lumber vertebrae closed to the mid line. The first injury was attributed to the appellant and the second one to Dev Singh accused since acquitted.
The opinion of Dr. S.K. Singal P.W. 3 who conducted the autopsy of the deceased was that the death of the deceased was caused due to shock and haemorrhage resulting both from injuries No. 1 and 2 collectively. It would thus be difficult to attribute to the appellant alone the blame of both the injuries caused to the deceased which cumulatively led to his death or any intention in that respect reflective from a single blow. Having regard to these circumstances and more so on the medical opinion, we are inclined to scale down the offence of the appellant from one under Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304, Part-II, IPC. This would require imposition of some sentence and since we are told that the appellant has undergone a little over 3 years rigorous imprisonment and was released on bail under orders of this Court dated 22-11-1982, the ends of justice would be met by reducing it to the period already undergone.
Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 CrLJ 49 : 1993 AIR (SC) 292 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 754
Homicide—Fatal injury—Murder—Gap of two days between the time of infliction of injury and the date of death—Conclusively it could not be opined that injury was sufficient to cause death—Conviction under Section 302 IPC modified to conviction under Section 304 Part II of IPC.
We have seen the nature of the injuries and also the time gap between the time of infliction of the injury till the date of death which was two days after the injury was inflicted. We have no sufficient material as to the nature of the treatment given to the deceased during those two days. Under these circumstances, though the injury had resulted in the death of the deceased, we cannot conclusively say that it was sufficient to cause his death. Accordingly, the offence would be one falling under Section 304, Part II of IPC. In the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302, IPC.
Harish Kumar v. State (Delhi Administration), 1993 CrLJ 411 : 1993 AIR (SC) 973 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 462
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Fire arm injury—Injured witnesses though relatives of deceased proving that injury caused by accused—Conviction affirmed.
Gurnek Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1989 CrLJ 299 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2249 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 70 : 1988 CAR 263 : 1989 CrLR (SC) 254 : 1988(3) Crimes 630
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Free fight—Accused sustained a stab wound on the right shoulder—Prosecution has not given any explanation—Accused liable to be punished under Section 304 Part I IPC—Conviction under Section 302 read with 34 set aside.
It is shown that Bachan Singh had sustained a stab wound on the right shoulder. The prosecution has not given any explanation, much less convincing explanation as to by whom and under what circumstances that stab wound on the right side shoulder of the first appellant Bachan Singh was caused. Under these circumstances, we hold that though Bachan Singh has caused the injury in the right of private defence, he has exceeded the right of private defence and, therefore, he is liable to be punished under Section 304, Part I, IPC. In the result, we set aside the conviction of the second and the third appellants under Section 302 read with 34, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment and the fine imposed therefor.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 CrLJ 66 : 1993 AIR (SC) 305 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 490
Homicide—Free fight—Free fight between the parties—It cannot be said that accused caused injuries intentionally—It was a single blow and not repeated—Deceased died after six days—Accused held guilty of 304 Part II IPC—Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside.
In so far as Darshan Singh, appellant, is concerned, who has been held responsible for causing the sole fatal injury to Bhag Singh deceased, we are of the view that he cannot be held guilty for offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. The dimension of injury and the situs thereof cannot, in the facts and the circumstances, be called to be calculated or targeted while being caused by the assailant. In a free-fight there is movement of body of the victim and the assailants who are themselves participants or expected participants in the cross assault on the other side. In such a situation, it cannot conclusively be held that Darshan Singh caused the injury intentionally to achieve that objective. It was a single blow and was not repeated. Furthermore, Bhag Singh died six days later because of complications of coma and asphyxia, resulting on account of the injury, despite the medical attention. We would thus in the circumstances, hold him guilty for offence under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C., setting aside his conviction under Section 302, I.P.C.
Balaur Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1995 CrLJ 3611 : 1995 AIR (SC) 1956
Homicide—Free fight—Murder or Culpable homicide—As per eye-witnesses there was fight between two families—Quarrel was a result of misbehaviour of sister-in- law of accused—Accused alleged to have dealt a blow with blunt side of axe on the head of the deceased—It is difficult to hold that clause I or II of Section 300 is attracted—Conviction of accused under Section 302 IPC simpliciter altered to one under Section 304, Part II IPC.
The evidence of the eye-witnesses would show that there was a fight between the two families and in those circumstances the High court rightly held that the common object of the unlawful assembly was not to commit the murder and convicted the appellant only for his individual act. Now the question is whether the offence committed by the appellant is one punishable under Section 302 simpliciter. The quarrel, which took place between the two families was according to the prosecution, a result of misbehaviour of Raghubir Singh with Rajbala wife of Prabhati, the brother of Hanuman. The quarrel took a serious turn and both sides indulged in fighting armed with weapons. It is during such a situation the appellant is alleged to have dealt a blow with blunt side of the axe on the head of the deceased. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that either Clause I or III of Section 300 is attracted. However, the appellant must be attributed knowledge that by inflicting such a blow he was likely to cause the death of the deceased. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C., and the imprisonment for life awarded therein. In the special circumstances of the case that the appellant also received number of injuries, we convict the appellant under Section 304, Part II and sentence him to undergo R.I. for five years.
Hanuman v. State of Haryana, 1994 CrLJ 2090 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1302 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 146
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Grave and sudden provocation—Deceased found to be in compromising position with the wife of accused—Deceased entering into the tussle with the accused on being caught—Accused also suffered injuries some which serious in nature—Attack on deceased with a chopper resulted in instant death—Accused is entitled to self defence—Conviction set aside.
Raghavan Achari alias Njoonjappan v. State of Kerala, 1992 CrLJ 3857: 1993 AIR (SC) 203: Cr LR (SC) 736: 1992(3) Crimes 619: 1992 (3) CCR 385
Homicide—Grave and sudden provocation—Defence more probable than prosecution—Accused is entitled of the benefit of exception 1 to Section 300, IPC—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I, IPC.
The appellant on being gravely and suddenly provoked by the deceased attacked him with the knife which was lying nearby. In support of his defence, the appellant examined DWs 1 to 3. After carefully examining the evidence, we are left with an impression that the defence is more probable than that of the prosecution. In our opinion, the appellant had been deprived of his self- control by the grave and sudden provocation on the indifferent and impertinent reply as well as of the gross indecent words uttered by the deceased against the appellant in a piquant situation when his brother was lying dead on account of the consumption of liquor administered by the deceased.
Dayal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 CrLJ 10 : 1994 AIR (SC) 30
Homicide—Grave and sudden provocation—Medical evidence shows that most of the injuries found on the hips—Possibility of having received injuries by deceased during grappling cannot be ruled out—Conviction under Section 302 IPC altered to conviction under Section 304 Part I I.P.C.
This Exception is no doubt subject to certain limitations. In the instant case, the provocation is not sought or provoked by the accused. The medical evidence also shows that most of the injuries were found on the hips and the possibility of having received injuries by the deceased during grappling cannot be ruled out. In such cases, it cannot be said that the accused caused the injuries by way of an excuse for killing the deceased. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and imprisonment for life awarded thereunder and, instead, we convict him under Section 304, Part I, Indian Penal Code and sentence him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years.
Sri Murli alias Denny v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 CrLJ 1114 : 1994 AIR (SC) 610 : 1995 SCC (Cr) 57
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Grave provocation—Accused confronted by a mob asked to explain his conduct—Accused escaping to his house came out with gun—Firing from gun resulting in death of one person—Circumstances neither justify conviction for murder nor sentence of death.
The circumstances in which the incident had taken place did not, according to the High Court, justify the sentence of death. It seems to us that the circumstances as found by the High Court are not merely a valid ground for commuting the sentence of death to one for imprisonment for life but also bear upon the nature of the offence. In the situation described in the judgment of the High Court it would seem that the appellant brought the gun from his house to protect himself having seen the `aggressive posture' of the students and then, faced with the fury of the students, he lost nerve and fired from the gun. On the findings of the High Court we hold that the case comes under the first part of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and not Section 302. Taking all the relevant circumstances into consideration including the fact that the appellant had been under the sentence of death for ab out a year we think a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years would meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly .
Jagat Singh v. State of Haryana, 1976 CrLJ 2002 : 1976 AIR (SC) 2619 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 525 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 95
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Grievous hurt—Accused delivered severe blows on the chest of the deceased who died in hospital several days after the incident on account of pus in the brain—Death not direct result of injuries—Conviction rightly modified to causing grievous hurt.
Bhagwan Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1998 CrLJ 93 : 1998 AIR (SC) 119 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 252 : 1998(1) Raj LW 56 : 1998 CrLR (SC) 202 : 1998(1) BLJR 31
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Gun shot—Accidental firing—Injury suffered by deceased at her back—This itself rules out any scuffle between the accused and the deceased resulting in accidental firing—Acquittal, set aside.
The position of the injury was at the back and was by itself sufficient to exclude any possibility of accidental firing during the course of a scuffle. It is difficult for us to appreciate what exactly is meant by saying that if the accused wanted to kill his wife, it was not likely that he would have caused the injury on the arm near the axilla. The report of De. S.L. Sharma (P.W. 14) shows that the gun shot caused apertures on the posterior fold of the left axilla and fractured two ribs on the left side on the back. The High court therefore misread the evidence in holding that the injury was caused on the arm near the axilla. What the medical officer had stated was that he found charring on the left arm, and not that the injury was located there. Moreover, the High court did not appreciate that even a gun shot injury on the arm or the axila would have been sufficient to cause death and that, as it happened, the injury on the back did prove fatal.
The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Digvijay Singh, 1981 CrLJ 1278 : 1981 AIR (SC) 1740 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 717
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Identification of accused—Lighting at the place of occurrence not proved—Witness could not have opportunity to identify the accused—This inherent infirmity rightly led the Court to disbelieve the case of prosecution.
In the absence of cogent evidence that P.Ws. 1 and 2 by reason of the visibility of the light at the place of occurrence and proximity to the assailants had a clear vision of the action of each one of the accused persons in order that their features could get impressed in their mind to enable them to recollect the same and identify the assailants even after a long lapse of time, it would be hazardous to draw the inference that the appellants are the real assailants. There is no whisper in Ex. P1 that there was some source of light at the scene. The omission cannot be ignored as insignificant.
When no natural light was available and the street light was at a distance it is unlikely that the eye-witnesses by momentary glance of the assailants who surrounded the victim had a lasting impression and the chance of identifying the assailants without mistake. The credibility of the evidence relating to the identification depends largely on the opportunity the witness had to observe the assailants when the crime was committed and memorize the impression.
Bollavaram Pedda Narsi Reddy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1991 CrLJ 1833 : 1991 AIR (SC) 1468 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 586 : 1991 CAR 256 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 494
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Inference of—Recovery of dead body in decomposed state—Cause of death could not be ascertained by Doctor—Death cannot be held to be homicidal.
The State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and others, 1975 CrLJ 282 : 1975 AIR (SC) 258 : 1975(4) SCC 472 : 1975(1) SCR 747
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Ingredients of—Probability of death—Determination of.
Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general—as distinguished from a particular person or persons—being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, 1977 CrLJ 1 : 1977 AIR (SC) 45 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 485 : 1976 CAR 320 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 659 : 1977 Chad LR 65
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Injury on accused—Non explanation no evidence of inflicting any injury after deceased fallen down—Death of deceased due to head injury—One of the accused had head injury—Conviction for murder modified to homicide.
The finding of the trial judge that there was no evidence of inflicting any injury after the deceased had fallen down was not set aside by the High Court. The death of the deceased was caused due to head injury. Even one of the accused had head injury. The learned counsel urged that in those circumstances the accused could utmost have been convicted under Section 304-II of IPC. The incident is of 1972. The appellant had been acquitted by the trial Judge in October, 1972. The High Court allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant in January 1980. The appeal was admitted in this Court on 8th April, 1980 and appellants were granted bail.
In these circumstances we modify the order of the High Court and convict the appellants under Section 304-II read with Section 34 IPC and sentence them to the period already undergone. The appellants are further directed to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/-each. The amount shall be deposited within six months. In case of default the appellants shall serve out the entire period of sentence imposed by the High Court. On deposit of fine the bail bonds shall stand discharged.
Chanda Lal and others v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 CrLJ 523 : 1992 AIR (SC) 597 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 295 : 1992 CAR 15 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 902 : 1991(3) Crimes 809
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention of accused—Grievous injury caused in the abdomen of victim with sharp edged weapon—Accused trying to give second blow also but missed—Intention to cause bodily injuries proved—Conviction under Section 304 Pt. I, affirmed.
The doctor PW-7 who examined the injured Deshmukh immediately after the occurrence and who thought it necessary to undertake an emergency operation clearly indicated in his evidence that the patient had stab wound over the abdomen and probably omentum was also seen in the wound. He further stated that he was of the view that the operation was immediately necessary and the patient would have died if the operation had not been undertaken. He also stated looking at the injury of the deceased, that the instrument of stabbing must have moved inside the intestines and such injury could be inflicted with sharp object like knife and the injuries can be called dangerous. He also opined that the injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death in ordinary circumstances. From the evidence of Sanjay it is crystal clear that not only the accused gave the stabbing blow on the abdomen of the deceased but even tried to give a second blow which missed and it is on that point of time Sanjay intervened and he was also ultimately injured. Looking at the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased and the circumstances an enumerated above the conclusion is irresistible that the death was caused by the acts of the accused done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and therefore the offence would squarely come within the Ist part of Section 304 IPC. The guilty intention of the accused to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death is apparent from the fact that he did attempt a second blow though did not succeed in the same and it somehow missed. In that view of the matter we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part I IPC.
Kasam Abdulla Hafiz, etc. v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 CrLJ 1422 : 1998 AIR (SC) 1451 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 427 : 1997(4) Crimes 371 : 1998 CAR 5 : 1998(1) Rec CrR 135
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention of accused—Grievous injury caused in the abdomen of victim with sharp edged weapon—Accused trying to give second blow also but missed—Intention to cause bodily injuries proved—Conviction under Section 304 Pt. I, affirmed.
The doctor PW-7 who examined the injured Deshmukh immediately after the occurrence and who thought it necessary to undertake an emergency operation clearly indicated in his evidence that the patient had stab wound over the abdomen and probably omentum was also seen in the wound. He further stated that he was of the view that the operation was immediately necessary and the patient would have died if the operation had not been undertaken. He also stated looking at the injury of the deceased, that the instrument of stabbing must have moved inside the intestines and such injury could be inflicted with sharp object like knife and the injuries can be called dangerous. He also opined that the injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death in ordinary circumstances. From the evidence of Sanjay it is crystal clear that not only the accused gave the stabbing blow on the abdomen of the deceased but even tried to give a second blow which missed and it is on that point of time Sanjay intervened and he was also ultimately injured. Looking at the nature of injuries sustained by the deceased and the circumstances an enumerated above the conclusion is irresistible that the death was caused by the acts of the accused done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and therefore the offence would squarely come within the Ist part of Section 304 IPC. The guilty intention of the accused to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death is apparent from the fact that he did attempt a second blow though did not succeed in the same and it somehow missed. In that view of the matter we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part I IPC.
Kasam Abdulla Hafiz, etc. v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 CrLJ 1422 : 1998 AIR (SC) 1451 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 427 : 1997(4) Crimes 371 : 1998 CAR 5 : 1998(1) Rec CrR 135
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Absence of intention—Knowledge about nature of injury—Several accused persons—Intention to cause death not proved against accused No. 1—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC—None of the other accused persons caused any injury on the vital parts—Their intention was to chastise deceased—Convicted under Section 326/34 IPC.
In peculiar facts and circumstances of this case accused No. 1, i.e., Jaswant Singh having had no intention to cause death of Kesar Singh he could be attributed only with the knowledge that the injury caused by him was likely to cause death. Therefore, on the ratio laid down by this Court in Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759 : 1984 Cri LJ 478, it appears appropriate to convict him under Section 304, Part II.
Gurdeep Singh v. Jaswant Singh and others, 1992 CrLJ 1283 : 1992 AIR (SC) 987 : 1992 CAR 99 : 1992 Cr LR (SC) 318 : 1992(1) CCR 1019
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Accused alongwith deceased persons on a hunting spree got drunk and in inebriated condition shot from the gun killed the deceased—No intention to kill—Exception I & IV applicable—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I of IPC.
The circumstances make it clear that the appellant would not have intentionally shot Darya with a view to kill him or even with a view to cause an injury which would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. For nearly three days the appellant was moving closely with Darya and if he had wanted to kill him he would have done so on the night of the 5th or 6th of December in a lonely place in the forest area. Furthermore, there is evidence that the appellant, Amar Singh and Darya were engaged in some heated argument when they passed the land of P.W. 2 a few minutes before the occurrence. It is also in evidence that the appellant and Amar Singh were found to have consumed liquor when they were apprehended. They had confessed to P.W. 2 and others that in their inebriated condition they did not know what had happened. No doubt they tried to run away from the scene but it must be more on account of fear than on account of any guilty mind. We, therefore, feel that the circumstances warrant the conclusion that the appellant must have shot Darya either on account of some grave and sudden provocation or in the course of a sudden quarrel attracting Exception 1 or Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C.
We, therefore, modify the conviction of the appellant from Section 302, I.P.C. to Section 304 Part I I.P.C. and award, for the said conviction a sentence of 8 years' R.I.
Radha Kishan v. State of Haryana, 1987 CrLJ 713 : 1987 AIR (SC) 768 : 1987 CAR 349 : 1987 CrLR (SC) 191 : 1987 SCC (Cr) 413 : 1987(1) Crimes 479
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Accused beating his wife to death—Recovery of blood stains sari which deceased was wearing at the time of occurrence—Dead body hastily disposed of—The accused apprehending that his wife was practising witchcraft—Eye witness deposing that accused continued to beat the deceased till she was silenced—The intention of accused was to cause death—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
The apprehension that Shubhangi was a witch was totally unfounded. No reliable evidence has been led by the defence to show that there was any substantial ground for entertaining this belief. Furthermore when appellant No. 1 started beating his wife continually for one or two hours and left her only when she was silenced the only inference that could be drawn from his act was that he deliberately intended the murder of the deceased. In these circumstances, therefore, we fully agree with the courts below that the prosecution has proved its case of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Ashok Laxman Sohani and another v. The State of Maharashtra, 1977 CrLJ 829 : 1977 AIR (SC) 1319 : 1978 CAR 26 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 158 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 243
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Accused squeezing testicle of victim resulting in cardiac arrest—No knowledge could be attributed that death would result from such an act—The act would not amount to murder.
In the facts and circumstances it cannot be said that the respondent had any intention of causing the death of the deceased when he committed the act in question nor could he be attributed with knowledge that such act was likely to cause his cardiac arrest resulting in his death. We wish to make it clear that it cannot be that in all circumstances such an act would not be covered by clause Thirdly and therefore amount to culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under Section 302 or culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the accused had the requisite intention or knowledge.
The act complained of would not amount to culpable homicide amounting to murder or not amounting to murder punishable under Section 302 or Section 304 Part II.
State of Karnataka v. Shivalingaiah, 1988 CrLJ 394 : 1988 AIR (SC) 115 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 881 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 734
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Acquittal—During struggle accused received injuries at the hands of deceased with a blunt weapon—Apprehending danger to life accused inflicted one injury on the neck of deceased—No intention to cause the particular injury—Accused acted in right of private defence—Acquittal of accused affirmed.
There was a grapple and that during that struggle the accused received injuries at the hands of the deceased with a blunt weapon and apprehending danger to his life, inflicted one injury on the neck of the deceased. The High Court also observed that the accused did not intend to cause that particular injury, which unfortunately was on the neck causing the cut of carotid artery. We do not think that the reasons given by the High Court are erroneous or call for interference.
Smt. Vidya Saran Sharma v. Sudarshan Lal alias Sudarshan Kumar, 1993 CrLJ 3135 : 1993 AIR (SC) 2476
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Attempt to forcible removal of possession—Accused throwing away the child on the ground causing injury in brain resulting in death of child—The outcome of death not intended by accused persons—Accused liable to conviction culpable to homicide not amounting to murder.
Of course, the other side very humorously submitted that while lifting and throwing the boy on the ground accused 1 was not fondling the boy. That is indisputably correct. But that does not mean that every death must be viewed backward so as to charge the one who caused death as a murderer. Such an approach would remove the well recognised line between culpable homicide amounting to murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Primarily in any action taken by the criminal, his state of mind is very relevant. The state of mind may either disclose intention or knowledge and that is a very relevant factor. It is equally true that these are a bit illusory factors to be deduced from surrounding circumstances such as the genesis of the occurrence, the motive, the weapon used, the seat of injury, the ferocity true that every grown up man is presumed to know the natural and probable consequence of his own act. This is undeniable. Therefore, it is necessary to find out whether when accused 1 lifted the boy and threw him on the ground, did he intend to cause any particular injury as envisaged by third part of Section 300? And the second question which stares into face is whether the intended injury was caused and it was shown in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The autopsy Surgeon has taken a shifting stand when he said that death was due to injury to the brain and the only injury he found in the brain was congestion and proceeded to explain that congestion of brain does not necessarily result in death. But it is equally true that soon after the injury, within a few hours the victim died and he had suffered an injury and no other probable cause of death is shown. There must be some correlation presumably between the injury and its outcome. The question is not whether there is such correlation or causal connection but the question is whether the outcome was intended by the act undertaken. If every time a push is given to a boy or an infant is thrown it is not possible to attribute the necessary intention of causing the death. Therefore, both clauses 1stly and 3rdly of Section 300 are out of the way and clauses 2ndly and 4thly were not pressed into service.
When accused lifted Radhey Shyam he must have immediately known that the boy was a very young infant and at that age neither the bones nor the muscles are strong and he was thrown with force on ground, obviously the distinct possibility of death being caused may not be foreign to the mind of the accused 1. He can, therefore, be attributed with the knowledge that by his act he was likely to cause death. His case would squarely fall under Section 299 which defines culpable homicide not amounting to murder and will be punishable under the second part of Section 304, IPC which provides punishment if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the conviction of accused 1 from Section 302, IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life is altered to one under Section 304, Part II, IPC.
Sarabjeet Singh and others v. State of U.P., 1983 CrLJ 961 : 1983 AIR (SC) 529 : 1984 SCC (Cr) 151 : 1983 CAR 1 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 19 : 1983 All LJ 464
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Nature of injuries—Injuries caused by accused were simple and superficial—They did not cause any damage to internal organs—Intention to cause death absent—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The intention is state of mind which has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances particularly the nature of the weapon and how it was used and the injuries inflicted. Clause (3) of Section 300, I.P.C. is not attracted in this case, so far as the appellant is concerned, for the reason that when she was armed with an axe and when her intention was to cause the death, one would expect her to cause at least one grevious injury. Every incised injury was simple and some of them were superficial and they did not cause any damage to the internal organs of the body of the deceased. Further, the appellant did not join her husband in the attack when it started.
Having regard to all the circumstances, we accept the prosecution case that the appellant inflicted some injuries on the deceased. We are, however, unable to come to the conclusion that she committed an offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. In the result, the appellant's conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. and sentence of fine with default clause is set aside. Instead she is convicted under Section 304 Part II, I.P.C. and sentenced to six years' R.I.
Smt. Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 CrLJ 947 : 1994 AIR (SC) 842 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 1699
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Single stab injury lending on the chest of the deceased—Incident occurring on a spur of a moment without pre-meditation—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II.
The occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither Clause I nor Clause III of Section 300, I.P.C. will be attracted.
We hold in the present case that the offence committed by the appellant is the one punishable under Section 304, Part-II, I.P.C. but not under Section 302, I.P.C.
Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Administration), 1990 CrLJ 2665 : 1990 AIR (SC) 2252 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 713 : 1990 CAR 277 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 533 : 1990(3) Crimes 220
Homicide—Intention to cause death—Sudden altercation between neighbours —Accused person going inside his house and bringing out knife causing fatal injury to the deceased—No premeditated intention to cause murder—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I of IPC.
The houses of Bhima and the accused were adjoining and the incident took place infornt of their houses. That PW-2 Satyanarayan, PW-5 Bhoridevi, PW-9 Ram Gopal and PW-11 Phoolchand were injured during the incident, is proved by their evidence and the evidence of the Doctor who had examined them on that very day. The fact that they were injured ensures that they had seen the incident. The have stated that after causing injuries to them with an iron pipe, the accused had entered his house and closed the door. At that time, Kesar Lal had come there and started complaining as to why the accused was quarrelling like that in the morning. The accused came out with a knife and inflicted a blow on the abdomen of Kesar Lal. However, it appears from the FIR filed by PW 2 that the accused had really aimed the blow at PW-9 Ram Gopal but as Ram Goal moved away, it hit Kesar Lal on his stomach. This version in the FIR is also supported by PW-9 Ram Gopal. Except this improvement, the evidence of the injured witnesses does not suffer from any infirmity.
Merely because no blood was found near the house of the respondent, it cannot be said that no incident took place there. The fact that Kesar Lal had received a knife blow near his house was admitted by the accused though according to him the knife was with PW 2 Satyanarayan and not with him. As the trial Court has pointed out, the place was a public road and there was lot of traffic on that road. That could have been the reason why no blood was found when the spot panchnama was made after few hours. However, the evidence discloses that intestines of Kesar Lal had come out and that could have blocked the flow of much blood. Some blood was absorbed by the clothes. Therefore, the circumstances that not sufficient blood was noticed when the spot panchnama was made should not have been utilised by the High Court for holding that the prosecution version was not correct and that the defence version was more probable.
In our opinion, the prosecution had established beyond doubt that the respondent had given a knife blow to Kesar Lal and that he died as a result of the injuries caused by that blow. Though the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the evidence discloses that the respondent had not aimed the blow on any vital part of Ram Gopal or Kesar Lal. The blow was aimed at Ram Gopal but as he moved aside, it landed on the stomach of Kesar Lal. The dispute was not such which would have prompted the accused to cause the death of Kesar Lal, particularly when he had no dispute with Kesar Lal. The dispute was with Bhima, the brother of Kesar Lal. This aspect was not at all considered by the trial Court or by the High Court. In our opinion, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant should have been convicted under Section 304, Part I, IPC and not under Section 302.
State of Rajasthan v. Satyanarayan, 1998 CrLJ 2911 : 1998 AIR (SC) 2060 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 1539 : 1998(1) Curr CrR 280 : 1998(2) BLJR 1115 : 1998 CrLR (SC) 183
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention to cause injury—Knife stabbing at vital parts of body—Location of injury is not always relevant—The intention of accused has to be gathered from the manner of inflicting the injury.
The nature of the offence does not depend merely on the location of the injury caused by the accused. The intention of the person causing the injury has to be gathered from a careful examination of all the facts and circumstances of each given case. The present is not a case where the appellant merely swung his knife towards the leg of the deceased during some struggle and it happened by sheer misfortune to cut an artery. That the appellant had intended to cause injury to vital parts of the deceased is clear from the fact that he had administered a stab wound on the chest of the deceased on back side. It is also significant that the knife blow dealt by the appellant in the groin of the deceased had caused a wound 8 cm deep piercing both the femoral blood vessels. Moreover when PW 6 tried to intervene, the appellant inflicted two stab wounds on him, which were of identical pattern namely, one on the back of the chest and one in the groin region but fortunately those injuries did not prove fatal. Taking into account all these circumstances, we have no hesitation to agree with the Courts below that the appellant was clearly guilty of the offence charged against him under Section 302, I.P.C.
Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986 CrLJ 488 : 1986 AIR (SC) 683 : 1986 SCC (Cr) 119 : 1986 CAR 57 : 1986 CrLR (SC) 111 : 1986 BLJR 439 : 1986(1) Crimes 435
Homicide—Intention to cause injury—Prosecution must prove that the accused had actually intended the injury proved to be fatal—No premeditated intention to cause the particular injury—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II.
In order to bring the case within Para III of Section 300, I.P.C., it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. We find it difficult to hold in the circumstances herein set out that such was the intention of the appellant.
In our opinion, having regard to the totality of circumstances, viz. there is only one injury, that the weapon was not carried by the appellant in advance that there was no premeditation that he was a young college going boy, that there was some altercation between the deceased and his father and that the death occurred nearly after six days, one can only say that the appellant must be attributed the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the appellant is shown to have committed an offence under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code and he must be convicted for the same and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years.
Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 CrLJ 195 : 1982 AIR (SC) 55 : 1981 CrLR (SC) 543 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 856 : 1981 CAR 356 : 1981 Guj LH 500 : 1982 Bihar Cr C 26
Homicide—Intention to cause injury—Single blow—Incident occurring in spur of moment over sudden quarrel—Knife blow on chest resulting in death—Absence of pre-meditation and malice— Knowledge on the part of accused cannot be inferred that the injury was likely to cause death—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II and sentence reduced to RI for five years.
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 CrLJ 852 : 1983 AIR (SC) 463 : 1983 CAR 240 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 228 : 1983 SCC(Cr) 459 : 1983(1) Crimes 976
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention to kill—Cause of death by bullet injury not established —Firing by accused established—Conviction modified to Section 307 IPC.
The evidence only established that the first appellant shot at the deceased but it is not known where the bullet hit and whether that injury caused by the said bullet shot caused the death. Even in the case of shooting by a rifle unless the evidence show the particular injury caused by the same and that injury is sufficient to cause death, the offence under Section 302, I.P.C. could not be said to have been made out. In the circumstances, therefore, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the first appellant is guilty of offence under Section 302, I.P.C. of causing the death of Gajendra Singh. However, we are of the view that while the first appellant shot at the deceased there could be no doubt the either he had the intention to kill him or at least he had the knowledge that the act could cause the death.
All the witnesses also say that the shot by A-1 brought down the deceased to the ground. There could, therefore, be no doubt that the shot had caused some hurt or injury though we could not predicate what was the nature of the injury and whether that injury could have caused the death. In the circumstances we consider that the offence would come under the second limb or second part of Section 307, I.P.C. Though imprisonment for life also could be awarded as sentence for such an offence on the facts and circumstances we impose a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Accordingly, we alter the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. as one under Section 307, I.P.C. and sentence him to a term of 10 years rigorous imprisonment.
Bhupendra Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1991 CrLJ 1337 : 1991 AIR (SC) 1083 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 571 : 1991 CAR 143 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 296 : 1991(2) Crimes 221
Homicide—Intention to kill—Cross fight over quarrel between two sides—No intention to kill can be attributed— Conviction modified to Section 304, Part II.
State of U.P. v. Jodha Singh and others, 1989 CrLJ 2113 : 1989 AIR (SC) 1822 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 591 : 1989 CAR 269 : 1989 CrLR (SC) 561 : 1989 (3) Crimes 7
Homicide—Intention to kill—Fire injury—Accused a police constable firing with his rifle on another constable—Five shots fired one after another—Use of dangerous weapons—Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
Having regard to the fact that the appellant had used a dangerous weapon like a rifle (being a police constable he must have known that it was a dangerous weapon) and having regard to the fact that he had fired at Kaptan Singh as many as five shots, one of which was fired after Kaptan Singh was hit by a bullet and collapsed on the ground, it is impossible to accept the contention that the appellant had not done the act with the intention of causing his death. It is naive to argue that the intention was merely to frighten him or to cause grievous hurt for it overlooks the two salient features viz. (1) as many as five shots were fired from his 303 rifle and (2) that he fired a shot even after Kaptan Singh had collapsed on the ground having been hit by one of the shots. A bare glance at Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code would show that if the act is done with the intention of causing death, culpable homicide would be murder. Under Clause 2ndly of Section 300 if the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused it would amount to murder. When the appellant, a police constable fired from his 303 rifle (he must have known that it was a deadly weapon) no other inference is possible but that he intended to cause such bodily injury as he knew to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm was caused. Clause 3rdly of Section 300 provides that if the act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it would amount to murder. Again having regard to the facts narrated hereinabove no other conclusion is possible except that the appellant intended to inflict such bodily injuries to the deceased which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In any view of the matter it would fall under Clause 4thly, which provides that if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid it would amount to murder.
Sehaj Ram v. State of Haryana, 1983 CrLJ 993 : 1983 AIR (SC) 614 : 1983 CAR 366 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 621 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 240 : 1983 (1) Crimes 1080
Homicide—Intention to kill—Innumerable injuries—Deceased dying on the spot—Intention to murder is established.
The deceased was belaboured mercilessly. There were innumerable contusions on the entire body of the deceased from head to toe. The wrist, humerus, etc. were fractured and the whole body was full of rod-marks. There were several contused lacerated wounds on the entire face and the left eye was bleeding. The totality of the injuries caused to the victim clearly supports the finding of both the Courts below that the appellants went on belabouring the deceased till he died on the spot. In the circumstances, we do not think that we can uphold the contention that the appellants did not intend to cause the murder of the deceased.
Prabhu & others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1991 CrLJ 1373 : 1991 AIR (SC) 1069 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 56 : 1992 CrLR (SC) 50
Homicide—Intention to kill—Single injury—Accused assaulted the deceased in the sudden fight and after giving one blow took to his heals—He did not cause any other injury to the deceased—Held that Exception 4 to Section 300 clearly attracted—Guilt of accused would squarely fall under Section 304 (Part I) IPC.
When the appellant arrived along with the cattle at the field there was no pre-meditation for the assault. At the spot, there was an altercation between the parties and in the sudden fight, after the deceased objected to the grazing of the cattle, when possibly hot words or even abuses were exchanged between the parties, the appellant gave a single blow with the pharsa on the head of the deceased. The statement of the appellant and the suggestions given on his behalf to the prosecution witnesses that there was an attempt to assault the deceased with a Parena, which was with the deceased, does not appear to be improbable. Thus, placed as the appellant and the deceased were at the time of the occurrence. It appears to us that the appellant assaulted the deceased in that sudden fight and after giving him one blow took to his heals. He did not cause any other injury to the deceased and therefore it cannot be said that he acted in any cruel or unusual manner. Admittedly, he did not assault PW-2 or PW-6 who were also present along with the deceased and who had also requested the appellant not allow his cattle to graze in the field of PW-1. This fortifies our belief that the assault without any pre-meditation. In this fact situation, we are of the opinion that Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is clearly attracted to the case of the appellant and the offence of which the appellant can be said to be guilty would squarely fall under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The trial Court, under the circumstances, was justified in convicting him for the said offence and the High Court, in our opinion, fell in error in interfering with it and that too without dispelling any of the reasons given by the trial Court. The judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant for an offence under Section 302, IPC cannot be sustained and we accordingly set it aside and instead convict the appellant for the offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC.
Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996 CrLJ 4142
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Intention to kill is not necessary in every case.
An intention to kill is not required in every case. A knowledge that the natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice for a conviction under Section 302, I.P.C.
Santosh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 CrLJ 602 : 1975 AIR (SC) 654 : 1975(3) SCR 463 : 1975 CAR 92 : 1975 Mad LW (Cr) 78
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Knowledge of death—Lack of intention to cause death but knowledge that act in question was likely to cause death—Accused is liable for conviction under Section 304 Part II.
S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat, 1991 CrLJ 330 : 1991 AIR (SC) 917 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 331 : 1991 CAR 102 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 114 : 1991(2) Crimes 4
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Knowledge of injury—Accused gave single blow on the head of the deceased—Accused can be clothed with the knowledge that such injury likely to cause death of the deceased though without any intention to cause death—The offence would therefore squarely fall under Section 304, Part II of the IPC—Accused convicted and sentenced accordingly.
Keeping in view this medical evidence and the established facts and circumstances of the case on the record, we are of the opinion, that the appellant can be clothed with the knowledge that the injury that he was causing to Jai Karan, with a hammer, on his head, a vital part of the body, was likely to cause his death, though without any intention to cause death or such injury as was likely to cause his death. He gave a single blow on the head of the deceased. The offence would, therefore, squarely fall under Section 304, Part-II, IPC. We, accordingly hold him guilty of the said offence and convict him accordingly.
Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana, represented by the Home Secretary, 1995 CrLJ 4168 : 1995 AIR (SC) 2452
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Lathi blows—Accused dealt two blows with a lathi on the head of the deceased—Absence of intention to cause death—Offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The whole occurrence was a result of a trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient at the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict the appellant under Section 304, Part II, IPC and sentence him to five years' R.I.
Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1994 CrLJ 21 : 1994 AIR (SC) 34 : 1995 SCC (Cr) 165 : 1993 (2) Rec.Cr.R 106
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Mens rea—Failure of accused to prove exercise of right of private defence—Yet the circumstances may give rise to a reasonable doubt about intention to cause death so as to be entitled to benefit of doubt.
Notwithstanding the failure of the accused to establish positively the existence of circumstances which would bring his case within an Exception, the circumstances proved by him may raise a reasonable doubt with regard to one or more of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself with which the accused stands charged. Thus, there may be cases where, despite the failure of the accused to discharge his burden under Section 105, the material brought on the record may, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, be enough to induce in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt with regard to the mens rea requisite for an offence under Section 299 of the Code.
Yogendra Morarji v. The State of Gujarat, 1980 CrLJ 459 : 1980 AIR (SC) 660 : 1980 Cr LR (SC) 219 : 1980 SCC (Cr) 394 : 1980 Bihar CrC 68
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Mistake of fact—The mistake must be in good faith based on reasonable belief.
Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law, in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. Under this section, although an act may not be justified by law, yet if it is done under a mistake of fact, in the belief in good faith that it is justified by law it will not be an offence.
As laid down in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code, nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the position of the accused and the circumstances under which he acted. `Good faith' requires not logical infallibility but due care and attention. The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be determined in accordance with the proved facts and circumstances of each case.
There was complete absence of good faith on the part of the respondent. It cannot be doubted that the deceased and the respondent were having strained relations and the respondent knew full well that the deceased had come for the recital of Bhagbat at the house of PW 2 which he attended alongwith others. From the dying declaration as well as the extra-judicial confession it is apparent that the deceased after the recital of Bhagbat had gone near the pond to take the bell-metal utensil. Apparently, the respondent was waiting for an opportunity to settle the account when he struck the deceased with the lathi blow and there was no occasion for him in the circumstances proved to have believed that he was striking at a thief. This is not a case where a person being ignorant of the existence of the relevant facts or mistaken as to them is guilty of conduct which may produce harmful result which he never intended. Even if he was a thief, that fact by itself would not justify the respondent dealing a lathi blow on the head of the deceased. The deceased had not effected an entry into the house nor was he anywhere near it. He had gone to the pond to fetch his bell-metal utensil. It appears that the respondent stealthily to settle score by dealing him with a lathi with great force on a vulnerable part of the body like the head which resulted in his death. There is no suggestion that he weilded the lathi in the right of self-defence. The respondent therefore must face the consequence. Although it cannot be said from the circumstances appearing that the respondent had any intention to kill the deceased, he must in the circumstances be attributed with knowledge when he struck the deceased on the head with a lathi that it was likely to cause his death. The respondent was therefore guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code.
State of Orissa v. Bhagaban Barik, 1987 CrLJ 1115 : 1987 AIR (SC) 1265 : 1987 SCC (Cr) 396 : 1987 CrLR (SC) 353 : 1987 (2) Rec CrR 181
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Motive—Absence—Circum- stantial evidence—Deceased aunt of the accused in same age group living in the house for 8/10 days prior to occurrence—No attempt to molest or outrage the modesty of the deceased was made—No motive on part of accused to murder the deceased—Witnesses reaching the spot found the accused standing nearby the dead body though ample opportunity to run away—Prosecution not able to prove charge against accused beyond doubt—Accused acquitted.
Witness who reached the spot thereafter found the appellant standing nearby the dead body and crying. It may, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the appellant was present at the time and place of occurrence but this circumstance alone is not sufficient to conclude that it was the appellant who fired the gun- shot and he did so with the intention of killing the deceased. The appellant and the deceased were living in the house for about 8/10 days prior to the occurrence. There is no evidence to show that he ever made any sexual advances towards the deceased. It is no body's case that before the gun-shot was fired any attempt to molest or outrage the modesty of the deceased was made. The appellant did not run away from the place of occurrence though he had ample opportunity to do so. There is nothing on the record to show that he could handle the gun. His telling Mahadeo while crying "run uncle what has happened" shows that the happening was beyond his comprehension. It could be an accident while fiddling with the gun.
There is absolutely no motive on the part of the appellant to murder the deceased. Absence of motive may not be relevant in a case where the evidence is overwhelming but it is a plus point for the accused in a case where the evidence against him is only circumstantial.
The appellant, on the date of occurrence, was a young boy and the deceased was his aunt in the same age group. Both were children as defined under the Children Act, 1960.
When presumption of juvenile innocence is sought to be displaced by the prosecution on the basis of circumstantial evidence the circumstances must unmistakably prove the guilt beyond doubt.
We have not been able to dispel our doubts. We are satisfied that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the appellant beyond doubt. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant and acquit him.
Sakharam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1992 CrLJ 861 : 1992 AIR (SC) 758 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 383 : 1992 CAR 139 : 1992 Cr LR (SC) 266 : 1992 (1) CCR 886
Homicide—Motive—Doubt about the motive to murder—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I.
The materials available create considerable doubt in our mind as to whether the appellants really intended to kill Kishore Singh or whether his misconduct pushed them to wreak revenge against the deceased and in this pursuit attacked him. We are not unmindful of the fact that the 7th injury noted in the post- mortem certificate is in the ordinary course sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. But we are not fully satisfied that the appellants intended to kill the deceased. The correct approach on the evidence and other circumstances in this case would, according to us, be to find the accused guilty under Section 304, Part I, and to sentence them under that section.
Gurdip Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1987 CrLJ 987 : 1987 AIR (SC) 1151 : 1987 CrLR (SC) 182 : 1987 CAR 143 : 1987 SCC (Cr) 267
Homicide—Motive—Necessity of proof—Murder of wife—In such case there can be many considerations which have to be looked into—Exact motive can be difficult to know even in a given case.
Nanak v. State of U.P., 1983 CrLJ 1444 : 1983 AIR (SC) 1091 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 173 : 1983 CAR 186 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 317
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Murder—Accused initially abused deceased by holding his collar and brandishing a knife—When deceased overpowered the accused, co-accused injured the deceased—Accused after release from grip of deceased gave severe knife blow on the stomach of deceased resulting in his death—Concurrent finding of the courts below that accused was guilty of murder, affirmed.
Both the Courts below had a concurrent finding that the accused/appellant was guilty of murder and was liable to be punished under Section 302, IPC and not under Section 304.
The appellant initially abused the deceased by hold ing his collar and brandishing the knife. When the deceased could over- power the appellant, the co-accused at the call of the appellant, injured the deceased and when the deceased had to release the grip, the appellant without any provocation dealt a very severe knife blow on the stomach of the appellant who was unarmed. Such knife blow caused severe injuries to vital parts of the body of the deceased resulting his death in a very short time.
It cannot therefore, be held that the appellant had no intention to cause a murderous assault on the deceased without any intention whatsoever to cause death as sought to be contended before us. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.
Nashik v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 CrLJ 2619 : 1993 AIR (SC) 1485 : 1993 CrLR (SC) 271 : 1993(1) Crimes 1197 : 1993(2) CCR 142
Homicide—Murder—Accused persons in protection of their property causing fatal injury with dangerous weapons to trespasser who was unarmed—Accused persons exceeded the right of private defence—Conviction for murder modified to homicide.
At about mid-night when tension was running high, the accused bent upon erecting the wall and Viran Wali and Kashmiri Lal equally determined not to allow the wall to be raised, it is not possible to say that when Kashmiri Lal entered the shop he was not committing criminal trespass. In the circumstances, the accused would be entitled to throw Kashmiri Lal out of the shop. But as we have found that Kashmiri Lal was not armed and that he had no intention of causing any injury to the appellant or Sunder Dass, the appellant far exceeded his right by using the dangerous weapon, Chhura, with deadly effect and causing two injuries which cut the heart and the lung. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we feel it is very likely that he appellant caused the injuries when the deceased Kashmiri Lal trespassed into the shop. But there could have been no apprehension that death or grievous hurt was likely to be caused to the accused. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the appellant exceeded his right of private defence of property. In the circumstances, we feel that the conviction under Section 302 and the sentence for imprisonment for five years.
Ghansham Dass v. The State (Delhi Administration), 1979 CrLJ 28 : 1979 AIR (SC) 44 : 1978 CAR 300 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 335 : 1978(3) SCC 391
Homicide—Murder—Death of wife by asphyxia due to drowning—Suspicion against husband cannot substitute proof—Probable explanation of accused about this conduct—Conviction set aside.
The appellant comes with an explanation stating that the deceased left his company with a broken heart while both of them were at the Railway Station; that he did not know as to what had happened afterwards; that he stayed overnight in a Dharmashala and then returned back and informed his brother and that, thereafter, coming to know that a dead body was in the hospital, he went there and saw the dead body of the deceased, but after having become panicky returned to the village. Whether this explanation is totally acceptable or not, it cannot be completely ruled out from consideration. However, the prosecution case, in our view, suffers for want of adequate and sufficient evidence to substantiate the charge of murder.
Mahavir Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 CrLJ 368 : 1991 AIR (SC) 272
Homicide—Murder—Eye-witnesses consistently deposed that accused first came forward and attacked the deceased—Accused dealt only one blow on the head resulting in death of deceased—Offence committed by him amounting to culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC—Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside.
All the three eye-witness have spoken that the appellant dealt only one blow with the implement. Having regard to the time and the surrounding circumstances it is difficult to hold that he intended to cause the death of the deceased particularly, when he was not armed with any deadly weapon as such. As an agriculturist he must have been having a tabbal in his hands and if in those circumstances he dealt a single blow it is difficult to convict him by invoking clause (1) or (3) of Section 300, I.P.C. It cannot be said that he intended to cause that particular injury which unfortunately resulted in the fracture of bones. Therefore, the offence committed by him would be one amounting to culpable homicide punishable under Section 304, Part-II, I.P.C.
Pularu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 CrLJ 1809 : 1993 AIR (SC) 1487
Homicide—Murder—Incident taking place at the spur of moment without any motive for committing the offence—Single blow reflected in sudden quarrel—Conviction under Section 304 Part I instead of 302 of IPC, affirmed.
State of Punjab v. Gurcharan Singh, 1998 CrLJ 4560 : 1998 AIR (SC) 3115 : 1998(3) Crimes 229 : 1998(3) Curr CrR 249 : 1998(37) All CrC 636
Homicide—Murder—Intention to cause death is not essential if knowledge of likelihood of such injury resulting in death can be inferred.
Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the `intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.
In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words `likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction in fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadily, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of `probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words `bodily injury...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, 1977 CrLJ 1 : 1977 AIR (SC) 45 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 485 : 1976 CAR 320 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 659 : 1977 Chad LR 65
Homicide—Murder—Nature of injury—Intentional causing of injuries which were found to be sufficient to result in death—Conviction for murder affirmed.
Very serious injuries were inflicted on a highly vulnerable part of the body like the skull, and the intensity of the blows can be easily appreciated from the fact that as a result of the fracture over the left temporal and parietal region, a big piece of bone measuring 4 prime prime ~times~ 2 1/2 prime prime was depressed under the temporal muscle.
It is nobody's case, and has not even been urged before us, that the injuries which were influcted on him were unintentional or accidental. The prosecution has therefore proved the facts that severe bodily injuries were present on the body of the deceased, and that those injuries were not unintentional or accidental. Then, as has been stated, it has also been proved that those injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
All the necessary elements have been proved to bring the case under Section 300, thirdly, of the Penal Code.
Mahadeo Ganpat Badawans and others v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 CrLJ 1148 : 1977 AIR (SC) 1756 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 303 : 1977 CAR 392 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 470
Homicide—Murder—No sudden flare up or quarrel—Dispute over property continuing for long time—Conviction and sentence life imprisonment affirmed.
Ram Kishan v. The State of Punjab, 1977 CrLJ 603 : 1977 AIR (SC) 820 : 1976 (4) SCC 337
Homicide—Murder—Poison—Possi- bility of procurement by accused—Administration of Potassium Cyanide —Eye- witness, a goldsmith, deposing that the accused obtained poison from him—The evidence cannot be discarded merely because the witness had no licence to possess the Cyanide and that he did not disclose to any person that he had given the cyanide.
Ammini and others v. State of Kerala, 1998 CrLJ 481 : 1998 AIR (SC) 260 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 618 : 1997 (4) Crimes 131 : 1998(1) Rec CrR 429 : 1998 CrLR (SC) 61
Homicide—Murder—Poisoning—Child witness stating that accused gave him tea which was consumed by the deceased without any biscuit—No evidence to prove that tea contained poison—Chain of circumstance not complete—Conviction set aside.
In the first instance it is difficult to hold that the deceased died because of drinking of the tea which was served to her by P.W. 12 at the instance of the appellant. Even assuming that version to be true, P.W. 12 does not say anything about the deceased having developed any symptoms after taking the tea. The possibility of her having consumed something later i.e. after P.W. 12 left cannot definitely be ruled out. P.W. 1 the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem found that the stomach of the deceased contained 6 ozs. of milky fluid. He opined that if a fatal dose is given, the death will occur between 30 minutes to 3 hours. He also admitted that organic phosphorus is an irritant one and gives mild to strong odour of garlic. If that is so, the deceased could not have swallowed the tea without any signs of distaste. P.W. 12 does not say anything about having noticed any such gestures from her mother. As a matter of fact he stated that while her mother was taking tea, he started taking his food and thereafter he left. However, he added that his mother asked him to bring a glass of water as her throat was getting dried. He took the glass and filled it with some water and gave the same to her. One other suspicious feature about his evidence is that it is only after 2-3 days that he has come forward with this version. No doubt, it can be said that at the earlier stages, he being a young boy, would not have suspected any foul play. But when the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence the Court must be fully satisfied about the veracity of the witnesses and truthfulness of the version. In the cross-examination he admitted that his maternal uncle informed him that his mother died as a result of giving tea to her by him. To a Court question, P.W. 12 answered that he had seen his mother taking tea from the glass and he had not heard her declaring that the tea was bitter. There is yet another big gap in the prosecution case. Admittedly both A-1 and A-2 were in the kitchen. There is no evidence as to who prepared the tea. It could as well be that A-2 prepared the tea and A-1 innocently put the same in a glass and handed it over to P.W. 12. We are only pointing out these possibilities since this is a case of circumstantial evidence. The Courts have held that all the circumstances in the chain should be independently established and when taken together they must form a complete chain without giving room to any other hypothesis and should be consistent with the guilt and inconsistent with the innocence.
The version as spoken to by P.W. 12, even if accepted, namely that the appellant handed over a glass of tea to him to be given to the deceased and that the deceased took the same, it is difficult to conclude that a deadly dose of poison was mixed in the tea. The deceased would not have consumed the entire tea if poison was present in the same since it would have been bitter and emitting unpleasant smell. That gives scope for a possibility of the deceased having consumed something later. Therefore the cause of death cannot directly be the result of consuming the tea. Thus there are many missing links in the prosecution case seeking to establish that it was a case of murder.
Jasbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1992 CrLJ 4043 : 1993 AIR (SC) 151 : Cr LR (SC) 797 : 1992 (3) Crimes 561 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 654
Homicide—Murder—Repeated blows with sharp edged weapon inflicted on the vital parts of the body—Accused is liable for committing the murder.
Narendra Singh v. State of U.P., 1987 CrLJ 1070 : 1987 AIR (SC) 337 : 1987 CrLR (SC) 234 : 1987 CAR 144 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 350 : 1987(1) Crimes 705 : 1987 All WC 868
Homicide—Murder—Unprovoked stabbing—Deceased suffered 40 injuries—Brutal attack and merciless beating—Conviction for murder affirmed.
Jangeer Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 CrLJ 4087 : 1998(3) Crimes 209 : 1998(3) Curr CrR 229 : 1998 CrLR (SC) 684
Homicide—Murder exceeding the right of self defence of property—Intention to cause the injuries, proved—Conviction, affirmed.
A-1 and A-3 on the land were armed with deadly weapons. On the exhortation given by their mother, both of them, one after the other, murderously assaulted the deceased with the weapons with which they were already armed. It was not a case of free fight and it cannot be said that they did not intend to cause the injuries inflicted by them. They intended to cause injuries and did inflict the said injuries which caused the death of Prithvi, the deceased. Therefore, they are not entitled to protection of Section 104, IPC. But for the fact that they exceeded the right of self defence of property under Section 104, IPC, the offence committed by them would have been one under Section 302, IPC.
Jai Bhagwan and others v. State of Haryana, 1999 CrLJ 1634 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1083 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 388 : 1999(2) Pat LJR 19 : 1999(38) All CrC 475 : 1999 Mad LJ (Cr) 350
Homicide—Murder of husband of paramour—Acquittal of paramour/accused causing murder—The wife of deceased is also entitled to acquittal.
Smt. Tara Devi v. State of U.P., 1991 CrLJ 434 : 1991 AIR (SC) 342 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 561 : 1991 CAR 254 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 526
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Nature of injuries—Accused causing injuries on head and the leg resulting in extensive haematoma and fracture—Injuries even if insufficient in ordinary course of nature, act of accused resulting in injuries caused with the knowledge that death may result—Accused liable for conviction u/s 304 Part II of IPC.
Jayappa Datta Rajage and others v. State of Maharashtra, 1982 CrLJ 1394 : 1982 AIR (SC) 1183 : 1982 CrLR (SC) 282 : 1982 CAR 182 : 1982 SCC (Cr) 476 : 198 Mah LR 192
Homicide—Nature of injuries—Death occurred after 24 hours of inflicting injuries and weapon used for causing injuries—Alteration of conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II—High Court was justified in altering conviction.
The High Court was right in altering the conviction from one under Section 302 to Section 304, Part II having regard to the fact that the death occurred after 24 hours of inflicting injury and also the type of weapon used for causing the injury. We do not think that there is any case for further enhancing the sentence.
Rakesh Singha v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1996 CrLJ 2311 : 1996 AIR (SC) 3173 : 1996 SCC (Cr) 930 : 1996 (2) Crimes 45 (SC) : 1996 (2) CCR 58
Homicide—Nature of injuries—Evi-dence of eye-witnesses that accused was beating the deceased with lathi—Fracture of ribs which caused death— Accused can be attributed to have knowledge that by dealing with such blows he was likely to cause death of deceased—Offence of accused punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC—Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside.
P.W. 2 and his brother, another witness, were present in their house. They heard an alarm of his brother, Nahar Singh, the deceased, who was being attacked. They rushed to the spot and they saw that the appellant was beating the deceased with lathi.
The contusions on the chest and Injuries Nos. 5 to 7 resulted in the fracture of the ribs which caused his death. The doctor in his evidence has admitted that the fracture of the ribs could have in turn caused the rupture of the liver and the spleen. Under these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the appellant intended to cause the injuries to the liver and the spleen which unfortunately proved to be fatal. Having regard to the nature of the weapon used and the parts of the body on which blows were dealt, it is difficult to hold that he intended to cause the death or intended to cause that particular injuries to the liver and the spleen. However, under the circumstances he must be attributed to have the knowledge that by dealing such blows he was likely to cause the death of the deceased in which case the offence is one punishable under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. In the result the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. and the sentence of life imprisonment awarded against the appellant by the High Court are set aside.
Karam Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 CrLJ 3673
Homicide—Nature of injuries—Medical opinion that injuries could have been fatal independently but not necessarily—Absence of conclusiveness in opinion—Conviction modified from murder to homicide.
Kaliappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1977 CrLJ 341 : 1977 AIR (SC) 699 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 348 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 608
Homicide—Nature of injury—Absence of serious provocation—Injury caused on chest and heart in a most cruel manner with great force—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
There is nothing to show that the altercation was of such a serious nature which could cause sudden provocation. The nature of injury, namely, the stab on the chest which resulted in the fracture of the 6th rib and injured the heart and the lung and which according to the doctor was given with great force showed that it was most cruel and therefore the case squarely falls under Section 302, I.P.C. We are in complete agreement with the High Court that the offence falls under Section 302, I.P.C. and the appellant was therefore, rightly convicted by the High Court.
Vasanta v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 CrLJ 693 : 1983 AIR (SC) 361(1) : 1983 CAR 134 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 174 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 535 : 1983 (1) Crimes 728
Homicide—Nature of injury—Accused gave a blow with blunt portion of axe on the head causing a depression only—Injury on head discovered in X-ray—No conflict between direct evidence and medical evidence—Accused should have inflicted more injuries if their intention was to cause death—Deceased died six days later—Conviction under Section 302/34 IPC substituted with Section 304 Part II/34 IPC.
All the eye-witnesses have stated that Babu Lal (A-1) gave a blow with the blunt portion of axe on the head, which caused only a depression. It is quite possible that first two Doctors, who examined the deceased, did not notice this depression. Only after X-ray examination was taken, the head injury was found and after death during the post-mortem examination, the Doctor clearly found that there was a fracture of the parietal bone and there was haemotoma. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any conflict between the direct evidence and the medical evidence. According to the eye-witnesses the three accused came together armed with sharp-edged weapons and inflicted injuries which resulted in the fracture of the skull bones. The fracture of the tibia, fracture of the metacarpal bone and some other injuries were also caused. However, if their intention was to cause death, they should have inflicted some more injuries on any vital part of the body but they have given one blow only with the blunt side of the axe and the deceased died only six days later. Therefore, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that they had a common intention for causing the death. But they must be attributed that by inflicting such injuries they were likely to cause the death of the deceased, in which case the offence will amount only to culpable homicide and not murder.
In the result, the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/34, IPC, and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded by the High Court are set aside. Instead all three of them are convicted under Sections 304, Part II/34, IPC.
Babulal and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 CrLJ 2667 : 1993 AIR (SC) 1941
Homicide—Nature of injury—Accused persons armed with sharp-edged weapons—Stick portion of those weapons were used in dealing the blow—Medical evidence shows that injuries were not caused by sharp edged weapons—Almost all the injuries were on non-vital parts—Manner in which blows were dealt, the parts of the body on which they were dealt and manner in which weapons used, accused could be attributed with knowledge that by causing such injuries they were likely to cause death of the deceased—Conviction of accused under Section 302 modified to Section 304 Part I IPC.
According to the eye-witnesses two of the accused at least were armed with sharp-edged weapons but the medical evidence shows that the injuries were not caused by sharp-edged weapons. The evidence of the eye-witnesses is also to the effect that stick portions of those weapons were used in dealing the blows. Almost all the injuries were on non-vital parts namely on the legs or on the arms. Out of these injuries only one injury appears to be serious and that could have been caused with a stick. What is more, even according to the prosecution, the injured deceased was left unattended for nearly 20 hours at the site itself. No doubt the explanation is that the witnesses were afraid but in judging the intention, the main requirements of Clause I or Clause III of Section 300, IPC of these aspects become relevant. Having given our earnest consideration to the manner in which the blows were dealt and the parts of body on which they were dealt and the manner in which the weapons were used, we find it difficult to conclude that the intention of the appellants was to cause death or to cause such injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But they can be attributed the knowledge that by causing such injuries they were likely to cause death of the deceased. Accordingly the conviction of the appellants under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment of life awarded thereunder are set aside. Instead they are convicted under Section 304, Part II, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five years. Their conviction under Section 325, IPC and the sentence of three Years' R.I. are, however, confirmed.
Chuttan and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 CrLJ 2097 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1398 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 1801 : 1994(1) Crimes 230 : 1994 Jab LJ 562
Homicide—Nature of injury—As per medical evidence only one injury on the head proved to be fatal—Weapons used not deadly but accused had knowledge that injuries inflicted by them were likely to cause death—Conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC altered to under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence reduced.
The High Court convicted these accused under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. read with Section 34, I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo 6 years R.I. The medical evidence shows that there is only one injury on the head that proved to be fatal. The other injuries were found to be simple. Weapons used also were not deadly. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to hold that the appellants had only knowledge that the injuries inflicted by them were likely to cause death. In this view of the matter we alter the conviction from Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. to one punishable under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. and we reduce the sentence of each of the appellants from 6 years R.I. to 3 years R.I.
Madhusudan Satpathy and others v. State of Orissa, 1994 CrLJ 144 : 1994 AIR (SC) 474 : 1995 SCC (Cr) 155 : 1994 AP LJ (Cr) 100
Homicide—Nature of injury—Attack by sharp instrument on the head resulting in fracture of skull—Injury proved fatal and found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
Bharwad Bhikha Natha and others v. The State of Gujarat, 1977 CrLJ 1160 : 1960 AIR (SC) 1768 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 492 : 1977 CAR 317 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 307
Homicide—Nature of injury—Difficulty in co-relating blow given by the accused and the internal injury—Conviction modified to Section 325 of IPC.
The evidence as given in the case is indeed of a general type and it is difficult to correlate the blow of Mohinder Singh with the internal injury which according to medical evidence led to death.
We are of the view that the appellant should appropriately be convicted under Section 325, I.P.C. We accordingly set aside the conviction under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. as given by the High Court and in lieu thereof we convict the appellant under Section 325, I.P.C.
Mohinder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), 1985 CrLJ 1903 : 1986 AIR (SC) 309 : 1985 CrLR (SC) 488 : 1985 SCC (Cr) 488 : 1985 CAR 343
Homicide—Nature of injury—Grievous hurt or Murder—Prosecution case that accused kicked the deceased on the testicles accepted by both the Courts below—As per medical evidence injury on the testicles was not the direct cause of death—No medical treatment given to deceased for two days development of gangrene—Deceased died due to gangrene—Offence of accused is punishable under Section 323 IPC.
Dr. Naveen Sabharwal, P.W. 8 conducted the post-mortem and he opined that the death was due to Toximia because of the gangrene which could be the result of the injury to the testicles. P.W. 6, another Doctor again gave a medical opinion that the duration between injury and the death could not be given because the cause of death was Toximia due to gangrene. The Doctor also admitted that because of the lack of immediate medical help, the gangrene developed.
Both the Courts below have accepted the prosecution case that the appellant kicked the deceased on the testicles. The High Court held that by giving such kicks, the appellant had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death and accordingly convicted him under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
Having regard to the medical opinion, admittedly the injury to the testicles was not the direct cause of death. No treatment was given for two days and it is only on 4-4-86 that the deceased was admitted in the hospital. But, unfortunately, in the meanwhile gangrene developed. Under the circumstances the offence only amounts to one punishable under Section 323, I.P.C. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. and the sentence of four years' R.I. awarded thereunder are set aside. Instead he is convicted under Section 323, I.P.C. and sentence to undergo seven months' R.I.
Pirthi v. State of Haryana, 1994 CrLJ 2187 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1582 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 402 : 1993 CrLR (SC) 730 : 1993 (3) Crimes 605
Homicide—Nature of injury—Injuries in the nature of punctured wounds which were chest cavity deep—Left Pleura and left lung found to be punctured—Injury on lung found to be in the entire thickness of lower lobe—Conviction for murder, restored.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babboo and others, 1978 CrLJ 997 : 1978 AIR (SC) 1084 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 179 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 112 : 1978 CAR 152
Homicide—Nature of injury—Injuries on dead body of deceased found to be simple and inflicted on non-vital parts except one fatal injury—Conviction of accused altered to Section 304 (Part II) IPC.
From the injuries found on the person of deceased except one abraded contusion on the back of the lower part of the chest beneath which three ribs were found fractured. All other injuries were simple and most of them were inflicted on non vital parts of the body. If really the three accused persons intended to cause death of the deceased it was likely that they would have caused much more grevious injuries on the vital parts of the body more so when they were armed with deadly weapons. Considering this part of the matter and the nature of injuries sustained by deceased we feel that the offence committed by the two accused persons in causing death of the deceased comes under Section 304 Part II I.P.C. We therefore set aside conviction and sentence of accused persons under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. and instead thereof we convict them under Sections 304 (Part II)/34 I.P.C.
Karam Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1996 CrLJ 3994 : 1996 AIR (SC) 3480 : 1996 SCC (Cr) 1186 : 1996(3) Crimes 76 (SC) : 1996 (4) CCR 1
Homicide—Nature of injury—Injury on the spinal region which proved fatal—Accused inflicted injuries on two witnesses also—Circumstances would attract Clause III of Section 300 IPC—Offence under Section 302 clearly made out—Accused person convicted and sentenced accordingly.
The evidence of P.Ws. 2, 4 and 5 established beyond all reasonable doubt that A-1 inflicted injury on the spinal region which proved fatal. The description of the injury itself would show that the same was inflicted with force with a knife. The injury passed through peritoneum and penetrating through the interior surface of right lobe of liver. There cannot be any doubt that he intended to inflict that injury which is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Even if there was a sudden quarrel that cannot be a ground to hold that he had only the knowledge. The intention for the purpose of Clause III of Section 300, IPC has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances in each case. One can understand if there had been some grappling or struggle between A-1 and the deceased and in the course of which if he came to inflict an injury perhaps a doubt may arise whether he aimed and intended to cause that particular injury during that grappling or struggle. But in this case the evidence is that he straight went and attacked the deceased with a knife inflicting such a serious injury and not only that he also inflicted injuries on the two witnesses with the weapon. These circumstances would attract Clause III of Section 300, IPC. Therefore an offence under Section 302, IPC is clearly made out against him.
In the result the conviction of A-1 Bhabubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC is altered to one under Section 302, IPC simpliciter but the sentence of imprisonment for life is confirmed. So far as A-2 Mohanbhai Bhagwanbhai Patel is concerned, his conviction under Section 302/34, IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder are set aside. Instead he is convicted under Section 326, IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for five years.
Babubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and another v. State of Gujarat, 1994 CrLJ 2099 : 1994 AIR (SC) : 1994 SCC (Cr) 265 : 1994 All CrC 98 : 1994(1) Rec Cr R 641
Homicide—Nature of injury—Lathi blow—Injuries opined to have caused by hard blunt object only on the hands and feet of deceased—Conviction modified to causing grievous hurt.
Rattan Singh and Ran Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1989 CrLJ 287 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2147 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 708 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 776 : 1988 BLJR 459
Homicide—Nature of injury—Lathi blow delivered at the head of deceased resulting in injury on the top of head—Medical opinion that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction u/s 302 for murder, affirmed.
State of U.P. v. Hem Raj and others, 1999 CrLJ 3489 : 1999 AIR (SC) 2147 : 1999 All LJ 1636 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 1147 : 1999(3) Crimes 79 : 1999 CAR 266
Homicide—Nature of injury—Left lung pierced by injury on chest—Injury given with great force on most vital part—Both the ventricles punctured—Injury sufficient to cause death—Conviction for murder affirmed.
Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1978 CrLJ 1413 : 1978 AIR (SC) 1420 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 1576 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 150
Homicide—Nature of injury—Medical opinion that death was caused on account of heavy pressure on pancreatic or splenic region—The accused husband alone could have caused the injury—Accused convicted for homicide not amounting to murder.
The medical evidence reveals that her life should have been put to an end on account of some external pressure on the anterior part of the stomach on the region of pancreas and spleen. External injury No. 3—namely haematoma, surrounding the peritonium—measuring about 4 cm times 4 cm. corresponded to internal injury Nos. 2 and 3 and the posture of the dead body on the cot as noticed by PW 23 unerringly lead to a conclusion that some heavy pressure was used on the pancreatic and splenic region by some other human agency. In our considered view, that agency, in the circumstances of the case, was only the appellant.
S.D. Soni v. State of Gujarat, 1991 CrLJ 330 : 1991 AIR (SC) 917 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 331 : 1991 CAR 102 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 114 : 1991(2) Crimes 4
Homicide—Nature of injury—Murder—Injury on the head resulted in the fracture of skull causing the death—Deceased died on the next day—Accused must be attributed the knowledge that they were likely to cause death—Offence committed by accused persons would be punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
It is the injury on the head that resulted in the fracture of the skull causing the death. No doubt the Doctor had stated that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He opined that the external injuries Nos. 2 and 3 could have resulted in the fracture. One is attributed to Jagpati and another is attributed to Ram Krishna. From the facts stated above it is clear that Ram Krishna had absolutely no immediate motive and even the appellant, Jagpati also because of the trivial quarrel that took place went and beat the deceased. Under these circumstances, we find it difficult to hold that these two accused intended to cause that particular injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It can also be seen that each one of the accused is attributed one blow and the injury that is said to have been caused by Ram Krishna is only a swelling. The other fact is that the deceased died on the next day.
Having given our earnest consideration, we think that it is not a case where Section 302, IPC is attracted. However, in causing those two injuries, one swelling and one skin deep injury the accused must be attributed the knowledge that they were likely to cause death. In such an event, the offence committed by them would be one punishable under Section 304, Part II read with Section 34, IPC.
Jagpati v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 CrLJ 1058 : 1993 AIR (SC) 1360 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 460
Homicide—Nature of injury—Nature of offence committed by accused—Accused inflicted injury by piercing sharp edged weapon into the heart of deceased—As a result he died instantly—Accused uttered before commission of Crime "doing away with the deceased"—Offence is clearly one of murder— Conviction held proper.
Notice is confined only to the nature of the offence committed by the appellant and, therefore, we have to proceed on the basis of the evidence on record as accepted by the Courts below and then to consider whether the facts bring out the offence of murder punishable under Section 302, I.P.C.
In the light of the aforestated facts and in view of the nature of injury inflicted upon the deceased, it is axiomatic that when the appellant had inflicted injury by piercing sharp edged weapon into the heart of the deceased as consequence of which the deceased died instantly, the necessary inference would be that he inflicted the injury with intention to do away with the deceased. In the light of the PW-15, doctor's evidence and material prosecution evidence spoken to by the witnesses and the words of "doing away with the deceased" as uttered before the commission of the crime, the offence is clearly one of the murder. Accordingly, we do not think that the High Court has committed any error in confirming the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.
Katta Ramudu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 CrLJ 2979 : 1997 AIR (SC) 2428 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 573 : 1997 CrLR (SC) 240 : 1997(1) Crimes 302
Homicide—Nature of injury—No proof that fatal injury was caused to the accused—Accused armed with kirpan which was used in assaulting the deceased—Conviction modified to Section 326 for causing grievous hurt.
In view of the acquittal of Zora Singh there is no evidence to show as to what particular injury was caused on the deceased by the appellant although he was armed with Kirpan. In these circumstances, it is not possible to convict the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. simpliciter. As however it is indisputable that the accused was armed with Kirpan and used the same in assaulting the deceased, the accused must be held to have committed an offence under Section 326, viz., the offence of grievous hurt, because an injury which is caused was dangerous to life, which ultimately resulted in the death of the deceased.
Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, 1977 CrLJ 550 : 1977 AIR (SC) 893 : 1976(4) SCC 816 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 90
Homicide—Nature of injury—Not a premeditated murder—Scuffle between accused and deceased—Injury caused by accused was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death not objectively proved—Knowledge could be attributed to accused that by inflicting such an injury he was likely to cause death—Offence committed by accused punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The surrounding circumstances would also show that this is not a premeditated murder. The appellant was armed with only a torch and during the quarrel it happened that A-2 gave a dagger and the version given by the defence shows that there was a scuffle among the accused and the deceased and it is also difficult to hold that the appellant intended to cause that particular injury. At any rate that the injury caused by the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death has not been objectively proved, in the absence of such a proof clause (3) of Section 300, I.P.C. is not attracted. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302, IPC cannot be sustained. However, the appellant must be attributed knowledge that by inflicting such an injury on the neck he was likely to cause the death. Doctor's general opinion was that all the injuries cumulatively caused the death. In that view of the matter the offence committed by the appellant is one which is punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC. Accordingly we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304, Part II, IPC and sentence him to undergo seven years' Rigorous Imprisonment.
Abdul Mazid v. State of Assam, 1994 CrLJ 2169 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1487
Homicide—Nature of injury—Only one injury in the abdomen—Doctor opined that it cannot be said that person receiving such injury would necessarily die—Offence of accused would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC—Evidence Act, 1872—Section 45—Expert evidence—Medical opinion.
The Doctor noticed one injury in the abdomen but he opined that the complications may set in some cases. There may be complications but from that it cannot be said that the persons who received such injury would necessarily die. The Doctor further opined that the complications may be after the injured is admitted in the hospital. In these circumstances we find it difficult to hold that the accused intended to cause that particular injury. It is not a case where clause (3) of Section 300 is attracted. Therefore, the offence committed would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Accordingly we convict him under Section 304 Part II, IPC.
Ramaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 CrLJ 3253
Homicide—Nature of injury—Prosecution failing to establish that the injuries were sufficient to cause death or any other ingredient, the accused cannot be convicted for murder.
Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300, I.P.C. But even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300, I.P.C. to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300, I.P.C., namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299, I.P.C.
In judging whether the injuries inflicted are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.
Having regard to the entire evidence and the circumstances of the case and in view of the somewhat hesitant medical opinion with regard to the cause of death given by the three doctors and the further fact that the deceased died a month after the occurrence, we think that clause "3rdly" of Section 300, I.P.C. has not been established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The evidence fulfils one of the ingredients of Section 299, namely, that the appellants caused the death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Kishore Singh and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 CrLJ 1937 : 1977 AIR (SC) 2267 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 436 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 656 : 1977 CAR 363
Homicide—Nature of injury—Single blow—The accused striking only one blow in the heat of moment—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II.
Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, 1983 CrLJ 346 : 1983 AIR (SC) 185 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 122 : 1983 CAR 60 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 159
Homicide—Nature of injury—Single blow inflicted with sharp edged weapon—Deceased dying six days after the injury on account of penetrating wound—Dispute over trade rivalry resulting in incident—Conviction for murder modified to homicide.
Gulshan and others v. State of Punjab, 1989 CrLJ 120 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2110 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 218 : 1989 CrLR (SC) 629 : 1988 All CrC 219
Homicide—Nature of injury—Single blow with knife after trivial quarrel—Blow fell on chest and proved fatal—No intention can be attributed to the accused for causing the particular injury—Conviction for murder not permissible.
Jawahar Lal and another v. State of Punjab, 1983 CrLJ 429 : 1983 AIR (SC) 284 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 168 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 805
Homicide—Nature of injury—Single knife blow—Incident after spur of moment without premeditation—Absence of intention to commit murder but wielding a weapon like knife, knowledge could be attributed to the accused that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to result in death—Conviction modified from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II.
Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1984 CrLJ 478 : 1984 (2) SCC 133 : 1984 CAR 121 : 1984 SCC (Cr) 164 : 1984 All CrC 93
Homicide—Nature of injury—Stab injury on vital region viz. lung and heart—Accused acting with pre-meditation and not in sudden impulse—Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction for murder affirmed.
It is true that the appellant inflicted only one stab wound on the deceased but the facts established in the case viz. that the appellant did not act under any sudden impulse but pursued the deceased after arming himself with a dagger which is a dangerous weapon in execution of a premeditated plan motivated by ill feelings nurtured for a number of days and inflicted a severe stab injury on the vital region of the body of the deceased which perforated not only his left lung but also penetrated into and impaired the left ventrical of his heart clearly show that the appellant had the intention of causing the death of the deceased and pursuant thereto acted in a manner which brings his offence within the mischief of Section 302 of the Penal Code.
Taking into consideration the deadly character of the weapon used, the dastardly assault made by the accused and the vital organs of the body on which the injury was caused as also the categorical statement of Dr. V.K. Jayapalan, Professor of Forensic Medicine, who conducted the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased that the injury No. 1 was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death of the deceased, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant deliberately caused the fatal wound on the person of the deceased and in maintaining the conviction under Section 302 of the Indian penal Code.
The prosecution having successed in establishing that the stab injury inflicted on the person of the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death the offence committed by the accused squarely falls within the purview of clause `thirdly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code according to which culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the deceased.
Narayanan Satheesan v. State of Kerala, 1977 CrLJ 1946 : 1977 AIR (SC) 2308 : 1977 SCC (Cr) 578 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 460 : 1977 CAR 337
Homicide—Nature of injury—Sufficient to cause death—Injuries cumulatively sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction of accused upheld.
The injuries on the hands and legs are quite serious and the doctor opined that cumulatively they were sufficient in the ordinary course of the nature to cause death. Therefore, a clear case of murder is made out. We do not find any merit in the appeal.
Nonappa Poojari v. State of Karnataka, 1994 CrLJ 2185 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1581
Homicide—Nature of injury—The deceased intervening in the dispute—Blow given by accused with Barchha which landed on the deceased—Accused could not have intended to cause particular bodily injury which proved to be fatal—Conviction for murder not called for.
Gurmail Singh and others v. State of Punjab, 1982 CrLJ 1946 : 1982 AIR (SC) 1466 : 1982 CAR 318 : 1982 SCC (Cr) 680 : 1982 BBCJ 174
Homicide—Nature of injury—Two injuries sufficient to cause death— Intention is irrelevant—Clause thirdly applies—Accused is liable to conviction for murder.
Injuries Nos. 11 and 12 were grievous and were sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. For the commission of the offence of murder it is not necessary that the accused should have he intention to cause death. It is now well settled that if it is proved that the accused had the intention to inflict the injuries actually suffered by the victim and such injuries are found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the ingredients of clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the Indian penal Code are fulfilled and the accused must be held guilty of murder punishable under Section 302 of the Code.
Bakhtwar and another v. The State of Haryana, 1979 CrLJ 883 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1006 : 1980 SCC (Cr) 150 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 613 : 81 PunLR 499
Homicide—Nature of injury—Use of sharp edge weapon—Difference in punctured wound and incised wound.
Normally a sharp pointed weapon would cause a punctured wound but the weapon like banka or ballam can cause incised wounds provided instead of the pointed end the surface of the weapon is used. In the melee that followed it would have been difficult for the witnesses to say with exactitude that in-injuries were caused by the surface or by the pointed end. The injuries found on the deceased persons would therefore, be sufficient evidence of the nature of the assault.
Sone Lal and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 CrLJ 1122 : 1978 AIR (SC) 1142 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 285 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 587 : 1978 All CrR 273
Homicide—Nature of injury—Use of spear and stick to cause injuries—Each of the injuries opined by Doctor to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Conviction for murder affirmed.
On the Doctor's evidence, therefore, the injuries caused by accused number 1 with a spear and accused number 9 with a bana- stick were such that each of them was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The conviction of accused numbers 1 and 9, therefore, under Section 302 of the Penal Code simpliciter was justified.
Chilamakur Nagireddy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1977 CrLJ 1602 : 1977 AIR (SC) 1998 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 313 : 1977 CAR 329 : 1977 (3) SCC 560
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Negligent and rash driving—Motor vehicle running over the deceased—No intention to cause death—Accused cannot be convicted under Section 304 Part II for culpable homicide.
Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299, I.P.C. or murder under Section 300, I.P.C. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Each case will, therefore, depend upon the particular facts established against the accused.
Section 304A by its own definition totally excludes the ingredients of Section 299 or Section 300, I.P.C. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing of an act was likely to cause a person's death are ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide.
The tangential track of the speeding truck coming in contract with the corner of the steel cot throwing it over the wooden cot and thereby throwing the deceased out of it resulting in fatal injuries, would not reveal the accused's intention or any deliberate act with the requisite knowledge for an offence of culpable homicide. The facts and circumstances disclosed in this case fit in more reasonably with the theory of loss of control by the accused of the vehicle in high speed trying to take a turn for the kutcha road.
There is, therefore, no error committed by the High Court in holding that the case falls under Section 304A, I.P.C. and not under 304 Part II, I.P.C.
State of Gujarat v. Haidarali Kalubhai, 1976 CrLJ 732 : 1976 AIR (SC) 1012 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 114 : 1976 CAR 101 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 211
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Not amounting to murder—Death caused by single lathi blow—The accused hit the deceased on his head with lathi—Deceased survived for three weeks and died thereafter—Despite medical evidence that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, conviction of accused modified for homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I of IPC.
Inder Singh Bagga Singh v. State of Pepsu, 1955 AIR (SC) 439 : 1955 CrLJ 1014
Homicide—Not amounting to murder—Injuries caused on the head by Lathi blow—Conviction modified to Pt. II of the provision.
The High Court was in error in convicting them under Section 304, Part I instead of under Section 304, Part II, whereunder whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder without an intention to cause death, is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both. The findings of the High Court bring the offence of the appellants squarely under the terms of the above provision.
Chand and others v. The State of U.P., 1972 CrLJ 590 : 1972 AIR (SC) 955 : 1972 (1) SCC 642 : 1972 Mad LJ (Cr) 605
Homicide—Not amounting to murder—Rash and negligent act—Accidental firing of gun resulting in death of another person—The deliberate attempt of prosecution to make out a case of deliberate murder as an improvement upon the circumstances stated in FIR has complete departure of prosecution from original case—Conviction for murder substituted with conviction for causing death by negligence.
An act which on the facts stated in the first information report and on the statements made to the police may well be regarded either accidental or rash and negligent, has been deliberately made to look like an act of deliberate murder. If such a difference does not go to the root of the case it is difficult to conceive what else can fall within that class of cases. We are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the accused was guilty of the offence of murder under Section 302, I.P.C. On the materials placed on the record it could not be held proved that he had any intention of firing at the Mahant. He seems to have pulled the trigger without aiming at the Mahant, in a state of intoxication in order to see that by the gun fire the Mahant was prevented from leaving his place. It was a wholly rash and negligent act on his part or at the worst was an act which would amount to manslaughter. It could not be held to constitute an offence of murder. No intention of causing death or an intention of causing such bodily injury as being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death could be ascribed to the accused or readily inferred to the circumstances of this case.
Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v. The State of Pepsu, 1954 AIR (SC) 271 : 1954 CrLJ 727
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Poison—No proof of forcible administration of poison to the deceased —Guilt of accused not proved decisively—Suspicion cannot take place of proof.
The presence of the injuries namely semi-circular abrasions resembling that of human nail marks over the upper parts of her lip, nose and chin, the contusions over the front of neck, the congestion of the protruding eye balls and the presence of bluish, black discolouration form the right angle of the mouth extending to right side of neck unequivocally lead to a decisive conclusion that the deceased had been over-powered by the assailants and the poison was administered to her by forcibly opening her mouth and closing the nose and pressing the neck so as to make the victim to gulp the poison and in that process more than one person should have participated. This view is fortified by the final opinion given by the doctors stating that the death might have been caused due to the combined effect of asphexia due to smothering and poisoning democran.
The explanation given by the accused that they were at the marriage house of P.W. 1 throughout the night is nothing but a false explanation and that the culprits whoever they might have been should have administered the poison to the victim and thereby caused her death and that there is very strong suspicion against the accused persons but the prosecution cannot be said to have established the guilt of the accused decisively since the suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof.
There is no evidence that the accused ill-treated the deceased, which observation we have extracted above. Hence, we hold that there is no sufficient material to warrant a conclusion that the accused had any motive to snatch away the life thread of deceased. There is no denying the fact that the deceased did not accompany her husband and in-laws to attend the marriage celebrated in the house of PW-1 and remained in the scene house and that she has been done away with on the intervening night of 6th/7th September, 1985. From this circumstance, the Court will not be justified in drawing any conclusion that the deceased was not leading a happy marital life. As observed by the appellate Court, the explanation offered by accused 1 to 3 that they remained in the house of PW-1 throughout the night is too big a pill to be swallowed. But at the same time, in our view, this unacceptable explanation would not lead to any irresistible inference that the accused alone should have committed this murder and have come forward with this false explanation. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is a case of murder but not a suicide as we have pointed out supra. The placing of the tin container with the inscription `Democran' by the side of the dead body is nothing but a planted one so as to give a misleading impression that the deceased had consumed poison and committed suicide. But there is no evidence as to who had placed the tin container by the side of the dead body. Even if we hold that the perpetrators of the crime whoever might have been had placed the tin, that in the absence of any satisfactory evidence against the accused would not lead to any inference that these accused or any of them should have done it.
No one can be convicted on the basis of mere suspicion, however, strong it may be.
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1990 CrLJ 605 : 1990 AIR (SC) 79 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 407 : 1990 CAR 36 : 1990 CrLR (SC) 1
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Poisoning—Accused administering sweets by way of prasad containing poisonous substance to the persons on relay fast—No motive for or intention to kill any person—Conviction modified to causing grievous hurt u/s 326.
State of Bihar v. Ramnath Prasad and others, 1998 CrLJ 679 : 1998 AIR (SC) 466 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 972 : 1997(4) Crimes 424 : 1998(2) BLJ 144 : 1998(1) Curr CrR 39
Homicide—Poisoning—Circumstantial evidence—Proof of murder by poisoning is not beyond realm of circumstantial evidence.
Murder by poison is invariably committed under the cover and cloak of secrecy. No body will adminiser poison to another in the presence of others. The person who administers poison to another in secrecy will not keep a portion of it for the investigating officer to come and collect it. The person who commits such murder would naturally take care to eliminate and destroy the evidence against him. In such cases, it would be impossible for the prosecution to prove possession of poison with the accused. The prosecution may, however, establish other circumstances consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The Court then would not be justified in acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of the poison with the accused.
The poison murder cases are not to be put outside the rule of circumstantial evidence. There may be obvious very many facts and circumstances out of which the Court may be justified in drawing permissible inference that the accused was in possession of the poison in question. There may be very many facts and circumstances proved against the accused which may call for tacit assumption of the factum of possession of poison with the accused. The insistence on proof of possession of poison with the accused invariably in every case is neither desirable nor practicable. It would mean to introduce an extraneous ingredient to the offence of murder by poisoning. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The accused in a case of murder by poisoning cannot have a better chance of being exempted from sanctions than in other kinds of murders. Murder by poisoning is run like any other murder. In cases where dependence is wholly on circumstantial evidence, and direct evidence not being available, the Court can legitimately draw from the circumstances an inference on any matter one way or the other.
The evidence of the Doctor and the report of the chemical examiner has established beyond doubt that Gian Kaur died of organo phosphorus compound poisoning. Bhupinder Singh had an opportunity to administer that poison. There was nobody else in the house. All the inmates had their common food in the night. All of them slept in the same place. Both the Courts have ruled out the theory of suicide by Gian Kaur. We entirely agree with that finding. She could not have thrown her child to the mercy of others by committing suicide and indeed no mother would venture to do that. The post-mortem report giving the description of injuries found on the body of the deceased would also defy all doubts about the theory of suicide. She had contusion on the front of right leg. Abrasion on the front of the left leg just below the knee joint. Linear abrasion on the back of the right hand. Linear abrasion on the back of the right hand. Linear abrasion on the antero-lateral aspect of left fore-arm in its middle. And contusion on the back of right elbow joint. These injuries, as the Courts below have observed could have been caused while Gian Kaur resisted the poison being administered to her.
The behaviour of Bhupinder Singh in the early hours of that fateful day by going to his field as if nothing had happened to his wife is apparently inconsistent with the normal human behavior. There was no attempt made by him or other inmates of the house to look out for any Doctor to give medical attention to the victim. The movement and disposition of Bhupinder Singh towards the victim and situations are incompatible with his innocence. On the contrary, it gives sustenance to his guilt.
Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 CrLJ 1097 : 1988 AIR (SC) 1011 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 694 : 1988 CAR 159 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 485 : 1988(2) Crimes 665
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Presence of injury in the shape of bruises and swelling—Death due to asphyxia—Cause of death not proved beyond doubt—Date and time of death not ascertained—The husband and father-in-law of deceased not present in the house at the probable time of death could not be accused for conspiracy to murder.
The medical evidence simply states that the death could have taken place 4 to 8 days prior to post-mortem. D.W. 2, the daughter is categorical that her mother, the deceased, was alive till 16th March, 1982.
The medical evidence does not at all support that the murder, assuming it to be one, could have taken place on 11th March itself as conjectured by the High Court. If the murder has taken place some time after 11th March, then A1 and A2 cannot directly be connected with the murder. That being so unless conspiracy as such is established, they cannot be held liable. Then the other inmates in the house are only the mother-in-law and the children of the deceased. None of them was suspected and at any rate no one of them was charge-sheeted or tried. Therefore the question of any one of them being held responsible for the death does not arise. No doubt a grave suspicion does arise namely that some of the inmates of the house must have been responsible and an accusing finger can be pointed against A1 and A2 but from 11th March onward they were not in the house. D.W. 2's evidence clinches the issue that the death must have taken place only after 16th and before 18th March. It is in this situation the High Court surmised on mere suspicion that A1 and A2 conspired and also committed the murder on 11-3-82 itself. If the murder has been committed on 11th March itself the body would have been highly decomposed by 18th March, 1982 and would have been emitting very bad smell. One cannot imagine that the other remaining inmates of the house would have simply and silently suffered in the house without informing anybody. On the other hand D.W. 2's evidence is different and she categorically stated that the deceased was alive up to 16th March. That appears to be natural and there is no person whatsoever to doubt the same.
The evidence of D.W. 2 who is none other than the daughter of the deceased and was very much in the house throughout categorically stated that her mother was alise on 15th March also. Apart from D.W. 2 the only other inmate of the house during the crucial period was the mother-in-law of the deceased who was not even charge-sheeted. The letter Ex. P. 15 written by the first accused does not in any manner incriminate them and the High Court has grossly erred in holding that A1 and A2; entered into conspiracy merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises drawn from the letter P.Ws. 4, 9 and 10 have not supported the prosecution case and the remaining evidence does not in any manner implicate A1 and A2 and the other remaining inmate of the house, the mother-in-law of the deceased, was not even suspected. Therefore, having given our anxious and careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case we feel that the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the guilt of the appellants and consequently we are inclined to allow the appeal
Bhagwan Swarup and another v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 CrLJ 3123 : 1991 AIR (SC) 2062 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 27 : 1991 CAR 381 : 1991 CrLR (SC) 808 : 1991(3) Crimes
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Private defence—Deceased trespassing the land of accused and assaulting one of the accused persons— Accused persons killing the deceased in retaliation, exceeding the right of private defence—Conviction modified to culpable homicide.
Keshoram Bora v. The State of Assam, 1978 CrLJ 1089 : 1978 AIR (SC) 1096 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 109 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 219 : 1978 CAR 124 : 1978(2) APLJ 12
Homicide—Private defence—Exceeding of—Accused continuing to assault deceased even after he fell down—No justification for pleading the right of private defence.
The manner of the assault, the consequence of which was the death of three persons cannot for a moment give rise to a justification for pleading a right of private defence. Moreover Exception (ii) of Section 300 clearly enjoins that there cannot be any question of exceeding the right of private defence where the accused causes more harm than it is necessary for the purpose of his defence. The clear evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 in this case is that even after Bhika Bhimji and Kadu Kala had fallen down on the ground and were rendered harmless and were not in a position to offer any resistance, the accused continued to assault them until they had inflicted all the injuries mentioned above. In these circumstances, therefore, the plea of the right of private defence could not be accepted for moment.
Patil Hari Meghji and another v. State of Gujarat, 1983 CrLJ 826 : 1983 AIR (SC) 488 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 398 : 1983 CAR 229 : 1983 CrLR (SC) 264 : 1983(1) Crimes 980
Homicide—Private defence—Injury caused on vital part of body viz. the chest resulting in death—Conviction u/s 304 Pt. I for homicide, affirmed.
Prabhu Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, 1977 CrLJ 346 : 1977 AIR (SC) 704 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 597 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 48
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Proof of—No evidence as to how deceased met his end—Recovery of empty cartridge near the dead body alone is not sufficient to infer that he was murdered by shooting.
Kedar Nath etc. v. State of M.P., 1991 CrLJ 989 : 1991 AIR (SC) 1224
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Protection of possession of land—Deceased persons attempting to forcibly obtain possession of land—Accused persons acting in right of private defence but exceedings the same by causing a number of injuries—Conviction under Section 304 Part I affirmed.
State of Karnataka v. Shivappa Gurusiddappa and others, 1998 CrLJ 1253 : 1998 AIR (SC) 1536 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 401 : 1998 (1) Rec CrR 660 : 1998 CAR 93 : 1998(1) Curr CrR 184
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Provocation—Accused on being suddenly and gravely provoked by deceased was deprived of her self control and attacked the deceased with gandasi causing fracture of skull—Conviction of accused under Section 302 IPC set aside and conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC, ordered.
It was the deceased who came to the field where the appellants/accused were carrying on their agricultural operation and tried to demarcate the boundary line and caused provocation. On such grave and sudden provocation caused by prosecution party, the appellant attacked the deceased. Further the evidence also disclosed that the appellant on being suddenly and gravely proviked by the deceased was deprived of her self-control. It was only under such circumstances the appellant who was armed with a gandasi, which is said to be an ordinary weapon used for cultivation purposes, attacked the deceased. It is very unfortunate that the injury, namely, injury No. 5 had caused fracture on the skull.
Having regard to the totality of the evidence and the circumstances appearing in this case, we are of the view that the present appellant would be guilty of offence punishable only under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. not under Section 302, I.P.C. Hence, we set aside the conviction recorded under Section 302 and the sentence of imprisonment of life. Instead we convict her under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C.
Mst. Madani v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 CrLJ 1978 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1713 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 1402
Homicide—Provocation—State of mental imbalance resulting in murder even though the provocation was not sufficient—Contrition on the part of accused by consuming poison after administering the same to the deceased—Conviction affirmed.
Vasant Laxman More v. State of Maharashtra, 1974 CrLJ 1166 : 1974 AIR (SC) 1697 : 1974 CAR 223 : 1974(4) SCC 778
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Quarrel between the accused and deceased—Accused giving fatal blow with stick on vulnerable part of victim's body resulting in death—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II of IPC.
Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, 1981 CrLJ 30 : 1981 AIR (SC) 642 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 1 : 1981 CAR 381 : 1981 CrLR (SC) 725
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Rash and negligent driving—The deceased run over by the car driven by accused who taking steps to bear the expenses of treatment of the victim—No intention to cause murder—Conviction for homicide affirmed.
Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1979 CrLJ 1386 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1708 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 920 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 487 : 1979 CAR 345
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Relationship of complainant with accused sufficient safe-guard against false implication of accused—Delay in lodging F.I.R.—Sufficiently explained as operation on victim lasted for five hours—Evidence of eye-witnesses stood fully corroborated with medical evidence—Conviction and sentence held proper.
Two eye-witnesses have explained that they remained busy in attending to the injured and arranging for blood and medicines. It is a well known fact that the blood is not easily available in the Muffasil towns and it can be obtained after making serious efforts. The operation on the injured lasted about five hours. It can be safely inferred that fairly large amount of blood must have been needed during and after the operation. So the explanation of the witnesses regarding their not lodging the report is acceptable especially as, when the accused to be named were closely related. Sukhdev Raj was already under stress because of the precarious condition of his son. He did not also weigh in his mind the pros and cons of getting a case registered against his near relations. This is more as when there was no previous enmity between the two families. For all these reasons the report was not lodged till 6.15 p.m. The close relationship of the complainant with the accused is a sufficient safeguard against the false implication of any of the accused. If Sanjeev Kumar had not actually caused injuries to Yudhvir, Sukhdev Raj would have been the last person to falsely name him.
Having carefully gone through the entire-evidence we find no reason to interfere with the concurring findings of the Courts below that P.Ws. 5 and 6 had no enmity with the family of Om Parkash to falsely implicate them and, on the contrary, they were related to each other, that despite a searching and detailed cross-examination they could not be discredited and that their evidence stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence.
Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1997 CrLJ 3178 : 1997 AIR (SC) 3717 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 773 : 1997 Cr LR (SC) 488 : 1997 (2) Crimes 65 : 1997 (2) CCR 80 : 1997 (3) All WC 1710
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Self defence—Exceeding the right—Deceased attacking the accused with stick—Retaliation with knife stabbing causing grievous injury in the heart of deceased—Accused exceeded the right of private defence liable for homicide.
Rafiq v. State of Maharashtra, 1979 CrLJ 706 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1179 : 1979 (3) SCC 571
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Sentence—Enhancement of—Without considering the background of the incident or the fact situation that was prevailing at the time of assault, sentence enhanced to life imprisonment, in revision—Enhancement is not proper.
George Thomas and another v. State of Kerala, 1995 CrLJ 3645
Homicide—Sentence—Exercise of right of private defence exceeded by accused—Sentence of 10 years of R.I. reduced to the period of two year already undergone while amount of fine enhanced.
Prabhu Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar, 1977 CrLJ 346 : 1977 AIR (SC) 704 : 1976 SCC (Cr) 597 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 48
Homicide—Sentence—Inadequacy— Sentence of two years R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 304 (Part I) I.P.C. is grossly inadequate and unreasonable—Sentence enhanced to R.I. for a period of six years and fine of Rs. 1000/-
When the appellant arrived along with the cattle at the field there was no pre-meditation for the assault. At the spot, there was an altercation between the parties and in the sudden fight, after the deceased objected to the grazing of the cattle, when possibly hot words or even abuses were exchanged between the parties, the appellant gave a single blow with the pharsa on the head of the deceased. The statement of the appellant and the suggestions given on his behalf to the prosecution witnesses that there was an attempt to assault the deceased with a Parena, which was with the deceased, does not appear to be improbable. Thus, placed as the appellant and the deceased were at the time of the occurrence. It appears to us that the appellant assaulted the deceased in that sudden fight and after giving him one blow took to his heals. He did not cause any other injury to the deceased and therefore it cannot be said that he acted in any cruel or unusual manner. Admittedly, he did not assault PW-2 or PW-6 who were also present along with the deceased and who had also requested the appellant not allow his cattle to graze in the field of PW-1. This fortifies our belief that the assault without any pre-meditation. In this fact situation, we are of the opinion that Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is clearly attracted to the case of the appellant and the offence of which the appellant can be said to be guilty would squarely fall under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The trial Court, under the circumstances, was justified in convicting him for the said offence and the High Court, in our opinion, fell in error in interfering with it and that too without dispelling any of the reasons given by the trial Court. The judgment of the High Court convicting the appellant for an offence under Section 302, IPC cannot be sustained and we accordingly set it aside and instead convict the appellant for the offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC.
We, however, find that the sentence of two years RI, and fine of Rs. 500/-for the offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC, as recorded by the trial Court, was grossly inadequate and unreasonable. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion proper sentence in the case would be for the appellant to suffer RI for a period of six years, besides payment of Rs. 1,000/-as fine for the offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. In default of payment of fine, the appellant shall further undergo RI for four months.
Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996 CrLJ 4142
Homicide—Sentence—Murder exceeding the right of self defence of property—Sentence of imprisonment reduced to five years from seven years.
Jai Bhagwan and others v. State of Haryana, 1999 CrLJ 1634 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1083 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 388 : 1999(2) Pat LJR 19 : 1999(38) All CrC 475 : 1999 Mad LJ (Cr) 350
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Single blow—Accused inflicted single blow with an iron pipe on the head of the deceased—Deceased died after 18 days due to some complication set in after operation—Conviction of accused altered from Section 302 to Section 304, Part II of IPC
The occurrence took place on 18-11-88 and the deceased died 18 days later on 5-12-88 due to septicaemia and other complications. The Doctor found only one enjury on the head and that was due to single blow inflicted with an iron pipe not with any sharp-edged weapon. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the appellant intended to cause death nor it can be said that he intended to cause that particular injury. In any event the medical evidence shows that the injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died because of cardio failure etc. Under these circumstances, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo six years' R.I.
Ganga Das alias Godha v. State of Haryana, 1994 CrLJ 237 : 1994 SCC (Cr) 592 : 1993 CrLR (SC) 685 : 1993(3) Crimes 1100
Homicide—Single blow—Motive of obstructing marriage of the sister of accused—Deceased dying within two hours of suffering the knife blow in abdomen—Absence of intention to cause death—Injury likely to cause death—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I of IPC.
Guljar Hussain v. State of U.P., 1992 CrLJ 3659 : 1992 AIR (SC) 2027 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 554
Homicide—Single blow—Provocation—Sudden quarrel resulting in death— Incident beginning from the kitchen and ending on the road was one continuous sequence—Guilt of accused culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II, IPC.
The whole incident beginning from the kitchen and ending on the road was one continuous sequence. We are of the view that the single dagger blow given by the appellant to Peethambaran was as a result of provocation which he got in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and he is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We, therefore, acquit the appellant of the offence under Section 302, I.P.C. and instead convict him under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C.
V. Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, 1992 CrLJ 701 : 1992 AIR (SC) 754 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 952
Homicide—Single blow—Scuffle between appellant and deceased on account of refusal by appellant to give a lighted petromax to deceased—Accused picked up a pair of scissors and caused a stab injury on the right side of the chest of deceased and again tried to inflict one more blow which landed on the right cheek of deceased who thereafter fell down and died—Six eye-wit- nesses established the case beyond doubt—Corroboration by medical evidence—Plea of self defence, held, not tenable in view of the fact that deceased was totally unarmed and when he was held by one of eye-witness to take him away, appellant caused the injury on the vital parts of his body—Conviction of appellant modified from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II as he had given only one blow on the vital parts of the body of deceased.
There were as many as six eye-witnesses (PW-1 to PW-6) who have consistently deposed how the assault on Madhavan took place. Chalil Krishnan (PW-1) who was present in the shop of the appellant and witnessed the entire incident had given a credible version how the assault took place. He was the person who took Madhavan in a truck to the police station for lodging the report and his First Information Report (Ex. P-1) was recorded within one hour from the time of incident. The First Information Report lends corroboration to the evidence of Chalil Krishnan (PW-1) in all material particulars. So is the evidence of other five eye- witnesses. A. Narayanan (PW-6) came to the shop in order to take away Madhavan. He then testified that when he was holding the hands of Madhavan, the appellant picked up a pair of scissors (M.O. 2) and inflicted a stab injury on the right side of the chest of Madhavan. Second blow by the appellant with the pair of scissors fell on Madhavan's right cheek who thereafter fell down on the ground.
The medical evidence of Dr. George Mathew (PW-10) also lends corroboration to the evidence of the eye-witnesses. Dr. George Mathew (PW-10) has proved the post-mortem examination report (Ex. 5) and also proved the cause of death. According to Dr. Mathew, injuries noted in the post-mortem examination report (Ex. 5) were ante-mortem and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
It would be reasonable to infer that he (appellant) had knowledge that any injury with the pair of scissors on the vital part would cause death though he may not have intended to commit the murder. We accordingly alter the conviction of the appellant from Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304, Part II of the IPC.
Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1997 CrLJ 831 : 1997 AIR (SC) 687 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 726 : 1997 Cr LR (SC) 165 : 1997 (1) Crimes 72 : 1997 (1) CCR 156
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Single knife blow—Accused inflicted only one injury on the abdomen—Deceased died after 8 days after undergoing operation—Accused can be attributed knowledge that by inflicting single injury he was likely to cause death—Offence of accused punishable under Section 304 Part II, IPC.
The nature of the offence, the accused inflicted only one injury on the abdomen. The other injury on the left knee would also have been caused in the course of causing the other injury to the abdomen. The occurrence took place on 22-6-78 and the deceased died on 30-6-78. As already noted an operation was also conducted but gangrenous got set in. Therefore, these circumstances would show that the accused would not have intended to cause the death of the deceased by inflicting injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of the nature to cause the death. However, by inflicting this single injury he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death in which case the offence is one punishable under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C.
Rajangam v. State (Tamil Nadu), 1993 CrLJ 3680 : 1993 AIR (SC) 2636
Homicide—Single knife blow—Pre-meditated injury caused on the chest of deceased with a depth of 19 centimetre—It cannot be said that single blow by itself, in every case cannot entail conviction for murder—Conviction for murder affirmed.
Single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction under Section 302, I.P.C., in some cases under Section 304, I.P.C. and in some other cases under Section 326, I.P.C. The question with regard to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injury is caused and the manner in which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the offender and the offence committed by him. In the instant case, the deceased was disabled from saving himself because he was held by the associate of the appellant who inflicted though a single yet a fatal blow of the description noted above. These facts clearly establish that the appellant had intention to kill the deceased. In any event, he can safely attributed knowledge that the knife blow given by him is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Mahesh Balmiki alias Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999 CrLJ 4301 : 1999 AIR (SC) 3338 : 1999(3) Crimes 116 : 1999(4) Rec CrR 91 : 1999(39) All CrC 691 : 1999 CrLR (SC) 686
Homicide—Single knife blow—Stab wound caused on abdomen of accused—Injuries found on the person of accused not explained—Defence of scuffle cannot be ruled out—Conviction for murder modified to homicide.
The circumstances that appear are that there is no clear explanation of the injuries on the accused person. The appellant has set up a defence that the scuffle started and it is only in that situation that he took out the knife and inflicted a blow. It is also not in dispute that it was only one blow which was inflicted by the present appellant. In these circumstances, the evidence of the prosecution does not clearly establish the manner in which the incident took place and, therefore, it could not be held that the incident did not take place in the manner suggested by the present appellant accused, and in that situation it could not be held that he inflicted this injury with an intention to cause death. At best, knowledge could be imputed to him that it may result in death. In view of this the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 could not be maintained. The conviction of the appellant is altered to 304 Part II. he has already been in custody for more than five years and, in our opinion, the sentence undergone would meet the ends of justice.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1989 CrLJ 115 : 1988 AIR (SC) 2122 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 264 : 1988 CAR 39 : 1988 CrLR (SC) 77
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—State of mental imbalance resulting in murder even though the provocation was not sufficient—Contrition on the part of accused by consuming poison after administering the same to the deceased—Sentence of death commuted to imprisonment to life.
The provocation not being grave enough to justify the killing, the act of the appellant is plainly murder. But the sudden quarrel which preceded the murder and the mental distress under which the appellant was smarting would justify the award of a lesser penalty. The crime was evidently committed in a state of mental imbalance. Besides, in genuine contrition the appellant took a dose of poison and nearly killed himself.
We, therefore, confirm the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 and 309 of the Penal Code as also the sentence of six months under Section 309 but we set aside the sentence of death and instead sentence the appellant to imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302.
Vasant Laxman More v. State of Maharashtra, 1974 CrLJ 1166 : 1974 AIR (SC) 1697 : 1974 CAR 223 : 1974(4) SCC 778
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Sudden fight—Deceased giving knife blow and running away chased by accused and inflicted fatal injury—Use of knife of about 9 inches in length—Cruel and unusual manner of act—The occurrence covered by exception 4—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I
This knife was clearly a formidable weapon as it was about 9prime prime in length and in the circumstances, it cannot be said that in chasing the deceased and inflicting the fatal injury on him when he was armed with such a knife, the appellant took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The case of the appellant, therefore, comes clearly within the fourth exception in Section 300, I.P.C. and in the circumstances, the appellant can be held guilty only of the offence under Section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code.
Amrithalinga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1976 CrLJ 848 : 1976 AIR (SC) 1133 : 1976 CAR 13 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 632 : 1975 BBCJ 834 : 1976(2) SCC 194
Homicide—Sudden fight—Deceased giving knife blow and running away chased by accused and inflicted fatal injury—Use of knife of about 9 inches in length—Cruel and unusual manner of act—The occurrence covered by exception 4—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I
This knife was clearly a formidable weapon as it was about 9prime prime in length and in the circumstances, it cannot be said that in chasing the deceased and inflicting the fatal injury on him when he was armed with such a knife, the appellant took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The case of the appellant, therefore, comes clearly within the fourth exception in Section 300, I.P.C. and in the circumstances, the appellant can be held guilty only of the offence under Section 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code.
Amrithalinga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1976 CrLJ 848 : 1976 AIR (SC) 1133 : 1976 CAR 13 : 1976 CrLR (SC) 632 : 1975 BBCJ 834 : 1976(2) SCC 194
Homicide—Sudden fight—Deceased intervening in the fight—No pre-medi- tated injury—Accused giving a blow with iron bar with great force received by deceased on his head—The accused did act in a cruel manner—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
This shows that the appellant must have struck the blow on the head of the deceased with the iron bar with very great force. The deceased was an old man and was an innocent intervener who was asking the parties not to quarrel, and there was no justification for the appellant to have given such a serious injury to him resulting in his death. Moreover before the provisions of Section 304 I.P.C. can apply, it must be shown that the act committed by the accused was not a cruel one. In the instant case we are unable to find from the facts narrated above that the injury caused by the appellant was not a cruel one or that the accused did not act in a cruel manner.
Pandurang Narayana Jawalekar v. The State of Maharashtra, 1978 CrLJ 995 : 1978 AIR (SC) 1082 : 1978 CAR 183 : 1978 CrLR (SC) 151 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 573
Homicide—Sudden fight—No pre-meditation—Conviction for murder modified to conviction for culpable homicide under Section 304 Pt. I of IPC.
Ram Swarup v. The State of Haryana, 1977 CrLJ 252 : 1977 AIR (SC) 664 : 1976 SCc (Cr) 524 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 45 : 79 Pun LR 287
Homicide—Sudden fight—Use of dangerous weapon like knife to cause four injuries—Conviction for murder modified to homicide.
There was a sudden fight upon a sudden quarrel flowing from the earlier incident and in this both sides attacked each other. All the ingredients to attract Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. are established. There is no premeditation. Parshottam Lal left the theatre and came over there. There was a fight that ensued in a sudden quarrel. The previous incident between Om Parkash alias Pashi and accused No. 3 Joginder was the cause and in that heat of passion and sudden quarrel parties grappled and attacked each other and it cannot be said in the circumstances that any undue advantage was taken. It may be recalled here that parshottam Lal was a hefty well built fellow and if accused No. 1 alone was to attack him he could not have escaped with a few abrasions. Therefore, all the ingredients to attract Exception 4 of Section 300, I.P.C. are fully established.
As injury No. 1 was fatal in the ordinary course of nature and accused No. 1 had wielded a dangerous weapon and caused an injury on the vital part of the body and the blows were repeated inasmuch as four injuries were caused, the offence but for the application of Exception 4 would be one under Section 302, I.P.C. but as Exception 4 is attracted, it would be reduced to Section 304, Part I, I.P.C.
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Wazir Chand and others, 1978 CrLJ 347 : 1978 AIR (SC) 315 : 1977 CrLR (SC) 511 : 1978 SCC (Cr) 58 : 1978 CAR 9
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Sudden provocation—Heated argument followed by scuffled and knife wounds caused by accused on his father-in-law who subsequently died—Conviction for homicide under Section 304 Part II restored.
Mathew alias Mathachan v. State of Kerala, 1991 CrLJ 1679 : 1991 AIR (SC) 1376
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Sudden quarral—Evidence of eye-witnesses indicating that there was sudden quarrel—Only one injury on the neck—Intention to cause death not spelled out—For the reasons conviction of accused under Section 302 IPC of imprisonment for life altered to conviction under Section 304 Part I I.P.C. for 10 years R.I.
The doctor found only one stab injury which unfortunately was on the neck because of the blow landing there. Under these circumstances it becomes very difficult to hold that he intended to cause that particular injury which was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death by the doctor. The cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage because of the cut of cartoid and other surrounding arteries. PW-2's evidence namely that there was a quarrel is also supported by the evidence of PW-3. The evidence of these two witnesses indicate that there was sudden quarrel and fight ensued. Therefore, the intention to cause that particular injury cannot be spelt out from the act committed by the appellant. So far as the presence of PW-2 is concerned, we are satisfied that he must have been there and witnessed the occurrence and his injury cannot be held to be self-inflicted. It is only an opinion of the doctor while answering the suggestion made to him. For all the above reasons we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304 Part III I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo ten years' Rigorous Imprisonment.
Ranjitsinh Chandrasinh Atodaria v. State of Gujarat, 1994 CrLJ 1425 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1060
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Absence of premeditation—No intention to cause particular injury with a dagger on vital part of the body viz. neck—Knowledge that death may be caused by this act can be inferred—Conviction modified to Section 304 Part II.
Shankar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1979 CrLJ 1135 : 1979 AIR (SC) 1532 : 1979 SCC (Cr) 632 : 1979 CrLR (SC) 423
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Accused inflicting dagger blow on step mother and sister—Attack on unarmed victims who caused no injury to accused—Offender acting in a cruel manner causing 16 & 11 incised wounds on the deceased victims—Conviction for murder, affirmed.
Sikander alias Mohd. Safiq v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1999 CrLJ 2098 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1406 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 451 : 1999(2) Pat LJR 50 : 1999(2) Rec CrR 379 : 1999(16) Orr CR 608
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Accused picking up a weapon which was handy and causing injury which proved fatal—Accused not acting cruelly is entitled to benefit of exception.
To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was as sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.
It clearly emerges that after P.W. 2 and his deceased brother entered the room of the appellant and uttered filthy abuses in the presence of the latter's sister, tempers ran high and on P.W. 2 taking out a pen knife the appellant picked up the knife from the kitchen, ran towards P.W. 2 and inflicted a simple injury on his neck. It would be reasonable to infer that the deceased must have intervened on the side of his brother P.W. 2 and in the course of the scuffle he received injuries one of which proved fatal. Taking an overall view of the incident we are inclined to think that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the exception relied upon.
Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1989 CrLJ 883 : 1989 AIR (SC) 1094 : 1989 SCC (Cr)348 : 1989 CrLR (SC) 625 : 1989 (1) Crimes 658 : 1989 BBCJ 65
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Deceased rebuked accused which infuriated him—Blow landed on neck of the deceased— No injury caused to vital organ as per medical evidence—Accused attributed knowledge that he was likely to cause death—Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside—Accused convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Suddenly a quarrel took place. The deceased rebuked A-3 which infuriated him and he gave a blow on the deceased but unfortunately it landed on the neck of the deceased. The medical evidence also shows that he did not cause any injury to any vital organ and there is no fracture of the internal bones. The external cartoid artery and external jungular vein got injured and that resulted in profuse bleeding. We do not propose to say that such an injury, if caused, would not attract the provisions of Section 302, I.P.C. but circumstances which are peculiar to the facts of this case would show that there is a reasonable doubt whether the accused intended to cause that particular injury in which case the offence is one punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, since the accused must be attributed knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant (Accused No. 3) under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life. Instead we convict him under Section 304, Part II, IPC.
Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai and others v. State of Gujarat, 1992 CrLJ 2334 : 1992 AIR (SC) 1150 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 217
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Dispute and exchange of words over return of borrowed money—Accused throwing burning kerosene stove over the deceased whose clothes caught fire and ultimately died of burn injuries—Knowledge can be attributed to the accused that his act was likely to cause burns resulting is death—Conviction from Sections 302 to 304 Part II of IPC.
Hari Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 CrLJ 2902 : 1999 AIR (SC) 2629 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 1536 : 1999 CrLR (SC) 20
Homicide—Sudden quarrel—Pending litigation between two parties—Sudden quarrel between the parties resulting in death of one person—No premeditation or undue advantage taken by offender—Accused entitled to benefit of Exception IV—Conviction modified to culpable homicide.
Suddenly on the spur of the moment there ensued a quarrel. Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on the side of the prosecution died and Chhotelal on the side of the accused died and each of them met a homicidal death. On the side of the prosecution Dinesh Chandra was injured, on the side of accused Ram Karan was injured. From this an irresistible inference ensues that Exception 4 to Section 300, I.P.C. would be attracted. The exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder, if it is committed without pre- meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Taking an overall view of the situation, we find no evidence of any intention to kill the two deceased on the part of the accused because the occurrence itself had taken place suddenly when, to begin with, the entire episode started for the particular purpose of partitioning the land by the Commissioners who had visited the village. In these circumstances we are satisfied that Exception 4 of Section 300, I.P.C. is attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of accused Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and, therefore, they would be guilty of committing an offence under Section 304 (Para I)/34 I.P.C. and they should be convicted accordingly. To this extent, therefore, we are unable to agree with Brother Varadarajan, J. that the conviction of the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. should be confirmed.
The main occurrence had taken place in front of the house of both the deceased and P.W. 11. Before the trial Court it was not submitted that the attack by the accused persons on both the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and P.W. 11 was without any premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. Nor is it a case in which it could be said that the offenders had not taken undue advantage or had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. No such argument was putt forward even before the High court to bring the main occurrence under Section 304 (Part I) I.P.C. Since I have found that the occurrence, has taken place in front of the house of the two deceased and P.W. 11 in this case and that the accused persons were the aggressors neither Exception 2 nor Exception 4 to Section 300 I.P.C. would apply to the facts of this case and the offence cannot be brought under Section 304 (Part I) I.P.C. In these circumstances, I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were the aggressors and find that they have been rightly convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of those two persons and under Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C.
Ram Karan and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1982 CrLJ 1253 : 1982 AIR (SC) 1185 : 1982 CAR 104 : 1982 SCC (Cr) 386 : 1982 All LJ 397
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Suicide—Death—Absence of "any cries" by the deceased not possible in a case of suicide—A total burning of face and neck is not possible—Unposted post card found near dead body indicating its planting to show suicidal death—Accused persons watching through window the burning of deceased without any serious attempt to save her—Accused convicted for murder.
There are hardly "any cries" as per the defence also by the deceased. This is not possible even in a case of suicide. Even if the burns are inflicted with suicidal intent the victim is bound to cry out of pain. Admittedly there was no cries and, therefore, it was not a case of suicidal burns but the deceased was put in a condition where she could not cry and yet get burnt by third party. By the time a person could take a bath of kerosene she is likely to get fainted and would not be in a position thereafter to burn herself. A total burning of the face and the neck shows that even at portions where she was not wearing any clothes were got burnt. It could only be possible if she had poured kerosene on her head and face also. It is not understood as to how the unposted post card found near the dead body was not burnt when the whole body had got burnt. It in fact indicates that the planting of the post card was to show that it was a case of suicidal death. It passes all human probabilities that the appellants have satisfied themselves by watching through the window the burning of daughter-in-law without any hue and cry or without any serious attempt to serve her. We are thus satisfied that it was a case of murder and not suicidal death.
Prabhudayal and others v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 CrLJ 2239 : 1993 AIR (SC) 2164 : 1993 CrLR (SC) 411 : 1993(2) Crimes 473 : 1993(3) SCC 573
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Use of excessive force—The right of self- defence is not a right of reprisal of punishment—Exercise of self-defence after the danger ceased to exist is not permissible.
A right of private defence given by the Penal Code is essentially one of defence or self-protection and not a right of reprisal or punishment. It is subject to the restrictions indicated in Section 99, which are as important as the right itself. One of them is that the harm inflicted in self-defence must be no more than is legitimately necessary for the purpose of defence. Further, the right is conterminous with the commencement and existence of a reasonable apprehension of danger to body from an attempt or a threat to commit the offence (see Section 102). It avails only against a danger, real, present and imminent. Such a danger did not exist here. There was no reasonable apprehension of harm, much less of grievous hurt or death—even if at any anterior time there was any—to the appellants from the fleeing complainant party when the latter were attacked by the former. Evidently, this assault with intrinsically dangerous weapons was made by Chhabinath and Onkarnath appellants on the deceased and his brother by way of vendetta to gratify the feeling of revenge that had brust into a blaze within them. The assault on the deceased and his brother was exceedingly vindictive and maliciously excessive. The force used was out of all proportion to the supposed danger, which no longer existed, from the complainant party. Under these circumstances, therefore, the appellants were neither entitled to a right of private defence, nor to the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300, Penal Code, and the offence committed in respect of Deep Narain was nothing short of murder.
Onkarnath Singh and others v. The State of U.P., 1974 CrLJ 1015 : 1974 AIR (SC) 1550 : 1974 Cr LR (SC) 461 : 1975 (1) SCR 80
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Wife alleged killed her husband in presence of eye-witness —Corroboration by three dying declarations—Court of Session recorded conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC instead of conviction under Section 302 IPC—On appeal by State High Court reduced the sentence from seven years to four years—Misplaced compassion as accused was a woman—In the absence of appeal by State to Supreme Court conviction affirmed.
The prosecution case was that there was strife between the parties. The deceased suspected the appellant of infidelity. On the day of the occurrence, the appellant poured kerosene oil on her husband and put him to fire. The crime was witnessed by the daughter of the appellant, P.W. 8, then aged about 11 years and her minor son still younger, who was not produced as a witness. When the deceased was removed to the Government Hospital at Tirupathi with extensive burns, his statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class which is a dying declaration on the record as Ex. P.3. Earlier thereto was an oral dying declaration made to P.W. 1, the Doctor attending on him in the Government Hospital and a later dying declaration before a Police Officer who came to the hospital on information received of the crime. Thus, in sum, we have evidence of an eye-witness, P.W. 8 and three dying declarations made one after the other. In all the dying declarations, the appellant pointedly has been named as the culprit of the crime. Both the Courts below have believed the said evidence and held the appellant guilty. We find no reason to take a different view than the one concurrently taken by the two Courts below.
A sad feature of the case cannot escape our attention. The Court of Session instead of recording conviction under Section 302, IPC did so under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. for reasons which were far from convincing. Strangely, no appeal was preferred by the State against scaling down of the offence from one under Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. The High Court presumably, on compassionate grounds, since the appellant was a woman, reduced the sentence from seven years to four years rigorous imprisonment. Ex-facie nothing is available from the High Court judgment as to why the sentence had been reduced. All the same, when the State seems to be submitting to the verdicts of the Courts below, we on our part, would also put the matter to rest. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
T. Anjanamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1995 CrLJ 1462 : 1995 AIR (SC) 946
Gulshan Tanwar
(Expert) 13 April 2011
Homicide—Wife alleged killed her husband in presence of eye-witness —Corroboration by three dying declarations—Court of Session recorded conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC instead of conviction under Section 302 IPC—On appeal by State High Court reduced the sentence from seven years to four years—Misplaced compassion as accused was a woman—In the absence of appeal by State to Supreme Court conviction affirmed.
The prosecution case was that there was strife between the parties. The deceased suspected the appellant of infidelity. On the day of the occurrence, the appellant poured kerosene oil on her husband and put him to fire. The crime was witnessed by the daughter of the appellant, P.W. 8, then aged about 11 years and her minor son still younger, who was not produced as a witness. When the deceased was removed to the Government Hospital at Tirupathi with extensive burns, his statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class which is a dying declaration on the record as Ex. P.3. Earlier thereto was an oral dying declaration made to P.W. 1, the Doctor attending on him in the Government Hospital and a later dying declaration before a Police Officer who came to the hospital on information received of the crime. Thus, in sum, we have evidence of an eye-witness, P.W. 8 and three dying declarations made one after the other. In all the dying declarations, the appellant pointedly has been named as the culprit of the crime. Both the Courts below have believed the said evidence and held the appellant guilty. We find no reason to take a different view than the one concurrently taken by the two Courts below.
A sad feature of the case cannot escape our attention. The Court of Session instead of recording conviction under Section 302, IPC did so under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. for reasons which were far from convincing. Strangely, no appeal was preferred by the State against scaling down of the offence from one under Section 302, IPC to one under Section 304, Part I, I.P.C. The High Court presumably, on compassionate grounds, since the appellant was a woman, reduced the sentence from seven years to four years rigorous imprisonment. Ex-facie nothing is available from the High Court judgment as to why the sentence had been reduced. All the same, when the State seems to be submitting to the verdicts of the Courts below, we on our part, would also put the matter to rest. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
T. Anjanamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1995 CrLJ 1462 : 1995 AIR (SC) 946
Sri Vijayan.A
(Expert) 14 April 2011
A great work by Expert Gulshan on "Homicide"
Good work
Nothing to be & can be added
RAJU O.F.,
(Expert) 14 April 2011
Expert Mr.Gulshan Tanwar deserves all the appreciation for having taken the pains to answer in so detailed and exhaustive manner. Congratulations to him.
