Suspension period regularised as regular period
Guest
(Querist) 08 August 2014
This query is : Resolved
Great folks!!
Need your Professional directions.
I was under suspension for 7 years for 2days of judicial custody arising out of False 498a.
Details -:
1. Judicial custody for 2 days,for 498a
2.Suspended from NTPC JOB.
3.Getting substantial amount during suspension period
4. FIR was quashed based on Jurisdication ground after 7 years
5.Joined NTPC: Suspension revoked and I am Regularised now.
Information requested for :
1. How can I get my full salary for whole period i.e 7 years
2. NTPC taking stand as your Fir was quashed based on Jurisdication not on merit of the case.They can't regularise this as full duty.: Please advice for this
Awiting for Early response
Thanks All Gr8 Folks of this community
With regards
Guest
(Expert) 08 August 2014
(1) You are entitled to full salary for the entire period, as the whole of the suspension period is to be treated as duty for all purposes.
2) NTPC's stand is wrong. Quashing of FIR means no FIR stands, for whatsoever reason the FIR was quashed thereby making the deemed suspension as irrelevant.
Fight your case with full confidence and zeal.
R.S.BANERJEE
(Expert) 08 August 2014
Your case is a good one. File Writ Petition before High Court.
Devajyoti Barman
(Expert) 08 August 2014
NTPC is wrong. File Writ in the high court. you have indeed a good case.
ABDUL RAZIQUE
(Expert) 09 August 2014
absolutely you have one good case. file Writ petition in High Court. Take an expert lawyer regarding this matter.
Advocate. Arunagiri
(Expert) 09 August 2014
The FIR quashed, on any grounds, means there is no case pending against you.
You have joined back in NTPC. They have to treat the suspension period as regular period.
Is there any departmental enquiry pending based on that FIR?
Dr J C Vashista
(Expert) 09 August 2014
I fully agree with the experts and appreciate their analytical approach, guidence and advise.
For the duration of suspension you will be treated on duty and entitled for full pay with consequential benefits (promotion, perquisites, bonus etc.).
If the PSU is not providing any amount/ facility for the suspension period, issue demand notice through local lawyer and proceed as per circumstances.
malipeddi jaggarao
(Expert) 09 August 2014
I too join in the unanimoous advice. Apprise the NTPC Personnel (HR) Department that their stand is wrong. If they do not pay the full salary, file a Writ in High Court as suggested by all the experts.
Guest
(Querist) 09 August 2014
Thanks Everybody for valuable information
Guest
(Expert) 09 August 2014
You are welcome.
Anirudh
(Expert) 09 August 2014
I have a different take on this issue.
The grant of back wages cannot be claimed as a matter of automatic right. It is the disciplinary authority, who has to decide the matter.
I think, the following few SC Decisions will be relevant.
In Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC 109 The Supreme observed:
“26. … … there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee, etc. In such circumstances, the authorities concerned must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests.”
The rationale is that during the period of suspension an employee does not work and, therefore, he is not entitled to any pay unless after the termination of the disciplinary proceedings or the criminal proceedings the competent authority is of the opinion that the suspension of the employee was wholly unjustified.
In Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corpn. v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155
The facts are that the Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, CIU and City Range Hyderabad, had reported that the respondent had taken Rs 2000 from the complainant, M.R. Srinivas, for assessment of his house and had accepted Rs 2000 from him on 14-5-1997 at his house and that the bribe amount was recovered from the possession of the respondent and that the test of right hand fingers and shirt pocket of the respondent was positive and that he was arrested and released on bail and on such report, the respondent was placed under suspension with immediate effect by an order dated 19-5-1997. The trial court, however, acquitted the respondent of the charges and in the criminal appeal of the State, the High Court sustained the acquittal of the respondent and dismissed the criminal appeal.
On these materials, the competent authority has formed the opinion in its order dated 17-11-2008 that the suspension of the respondent cannot be regarded as wholly unjustified and has declined to grant any salary and allowance to the respondent during the period of suspension. This opinion of the competent authority was a possible view on the materials which the competent authority could form in the facts and circumstances of the case while passing an order in exercise of its powers under the Rules, declining to allow the salary and allowances of the respondent for the period of suspension.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Authority.
In Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha, (2011) 5 SCC 142 the SC held as under:
49. The issue of entitlement of back wages has been considered by this Court time and again and consistently held that even after punishment imposed upon the employee is quashed by the court or tribunal, the payment of back wages still remains discretionary. Power to grant back wages is to be exercised by the court/tribunal keeping in view the facts in their entirety as no straitjacket formula can be evolved, nor a rule of universal application can be laid for such cases. Even if the delinquent is reinstated, it would not automatically make him entitled to back wages as entitlement to get back wages is independent of reinstatement. The factual scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience have to be kept in view by an appropriate authority/court or tribunal. In such matters, the approach of the court or the tribunal should not be rigid or mechanical but flexible and realistic. (Vide U.P. SRTC v. Mitthu Singh [(2006) 7 SCC 180 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1590 : AIR 2006 SC 3018] , Akola Taluka Education Society v. Shivaji [(2007) 9 SCC 564 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 679] and Balasaheb Desai Sahakari S.K. Ltd. v. Kashinath Ganapati Kambale [(2009) 2 SCC 288 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 372] .)
50. In view of the above, the relief sought by the delinquent that the appellants be directed to pay the arrears of back wages from the date of first termination order till date, cannot be entertained and is hereby rejected. In case the appellants choose to hold a fresh enquiry, they are bound to reinstate the delinquent and, in case, he is put under suspension, he shall be entitled to subsistence allowance till the conclusion of the enquiry. All other entitlements would be determined by the disciplinary authority as explained hereinabove after the conclusion of the enquiry.
P. Venu
(Expert) 09 August 2014
Has the decision to deny full wages has been conveyed to you in writing? If so, you may make an Appeal to the Competent Authority; if not successful, you may approach the Judicial Forum.
Guest
(Expert) 09 August 2014
Anirudh ji,
Your observation is right in the case of acquittal in cases of benefit of doubt on account of delay in the proceedings attributable on the delinquent, suspension being not wholy unjustified in corruption cases, in penalty case of departmental inquiry keeping in pace with the scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, but 498a case cannot be equated with any of such three types of cases.
In 498a case even discretion to suspend the employee or not does not lie with the disciplinary case. The suspension is of mandatory and statutory nature, but not on account of misconduct in office for treatment of suspension in which case the disciplinary authority can weigh pros & cons of the scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good conscience at his own discretionary powers.
In this particular case the suspension was deemed suspension on account of the employee having been kept under the police/ judicial custody for 48 hours or more. He was also not acquited on benefit of doubt. The original charge sheet having been quashed nullifies his deemed suspension in principle and in such suspension case the disciplinary authority cannot enjoy any discretion to treat the suspension as justified.
Thus, none of the conditions of the aforesaid three case laws become applicable in this particular case.
It has to be noted that the department did not start any departmental proceedings against the official. So, it was not the right of the departmental authorities to exercise any discretion to treat the suspension justified, as the suspension was as a result of a criminal court case and depended solely on the outcome of the case on judgment of the case by the court.
Even if the department would have launched a disciplinary proceedings for major penalty (as anticipated in such cases) and the employee would have been awarded only a minor penalty, in that case also, as per the Government of India/ states rules, suspension has to be treated as duty for all purposes, the suspension being treated as wholy unjustified, for which the employee has to be paid permissible full pay & allowances.
However, if you have any more latest ruling on the issue that can help me also to enhance my knowledge further.
Dr J C Vashista
(Expert) 10 August 2014
I fully agree with the expert opinion and advise of Sh. P S Dhingra and have nothing more to add.
Guest
(Expert) 10 August 2014
Dr. Vashista,
Thanks for agreeing with my view points.
Guest
(Querist) 10 August 2014
Thanks Everybody for valuable information .
Thanks Anirudh for providing information from different dimensions.
Once again a Big hand to Mr P S Dhingra,
for providing highest degree of professional advices in a step by step manner.
More detailed information-:
1. NTPC did not initiated any departmental proceedings as it is a 498a case not relate to NTPC
2 We had send many letters/application(regd psot/speed post/official diaries) for 7 years of payment but they had not responded it,
hence we thought to ask them through RTI what is the status of our letters/cases.
As per verbal communication HR department told us " we are not elligible to get the amount" and motivating us to fight against NTPC in appropriate court.
Once we go to court ,NTPC will take the plea of matter is subjudice and it will take years togeather to arrive at end of justice.
Our stand -:
Once we got all information (elligible/not elligible to get amount for 7 years ) through RTI, we will plan accordingly
Information requested -:
1. What professional approach we should apply.
2. Request you to please share some Supreme court judgement/case no which will helpful for this case.
T. Kalaiselvan, Advocate
(Expert) 10 August 2014
I too fully agree with the views of expert Mr. Dhingra on the subject issue though the views expressed by expert Mr.Anirudh also carries great significance in criminal cases but it appears not to be relevant to this issue.
To the author: you have already been advised by experts to approach high court with writ petition in case you do not get relief or justice from NTPC.
Anirudh
(Expert) 11 August 2014
I would have been happier, if only some legal backup had been cited.
malipeddi jaggarao
(Expert) 11 August 2014
I fully endorse the advice/views/explanation provided by expert Shri Dhingra.
@ Shri Anirudh: Mr.Dhingra provided undisputable explanation. Be happy - happier as all we got benefitted by the clarity provided by Mr.Dhingra.
Anirudh
(Expert) 11 August 2014
Dear Mr. Jaggarao,
I have great respect for the views of Mr. Dhingra.
Please appreciate, it is not the number of endorsements that one gets for ones views that will stand up in the legal fora. It is the precedents! That's why I was eagerly looking for legal back up. I am honest when I said that legal back up must have made me happier.
Please appreciate, in this case, no one is saying that the 'suspension' itself is either malafide or illegal. Nor did the querist appears to have challenged the 'suspension' on any ground whatsoever. If that be so, to turn around and say after 7 years, that just because the FIR stands quashed, the period of suspension has to be automatically treated as duty, and he is automatically entitled for back wages, promotions etc., does not appear to be any legal backing. That is in that precise context, that as a legal person, I said that I would have been happier if there has been some legal backing to the views.
Instead of sentiments and emotions, I would have also been happy, if any one of you could have given some legal back up. I will lap up the legal back up, from whichever quarter it comes from.
Regards.
Advocate. Arunagiri
(Expert) 11 August 2014
I am just producing a judgement in the similar case. I think this will be food for thought and discussion on our current discussion.
Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Het Ram S/O Shri Sita Ram vs Delhi Jal Board on 26 April, 2011
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A.No.1416/2011
This the 26th day of April 2011
Honble Shri M.L. Chauhan, Member (J)
Honble Shri Shailendra Pandey, Member (A)
Shri Het Ram s/o Shri Sita Ram
r/o 89, Water Water Works No.2
Civil Lines, Delhi
..Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri R K Shukla)
Versus
1. Delhi Jal Board
Through its Chairman
Varunalya Building
Phase II, Karol Bagh
New Delhi-5
2. The Director
Admn. & Personal
Varunalya Building
Phase II, Karol Bagh
New Delhi-5
3. Member Administration
Delhi Jal Board
Varunalya Building
Shri Het Ram S/O Shri Sita Ram vs Delhi Jal Board on 26 April, 2011
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/57247550/ 1
Phase II, Karol Bagh
New Delhi-5
..Respondents
O R D E R
Shri M.L. Chauhan:
The applicant has filed this OA thereby praying for the following reliefs:
(a) To quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06.07.2009, thereby directing the respondents to treat
the period of suspension as spent on duty for all purposes including pay and allowances. (b) To set aside the
statement of respondents dated 06.07.2009 which says the suspension be adjusted against all types of leave of
the kind due and admissible including extraordinary leave with a limit that if any recovery of subsistence
allowance has to be made the corresponding period be treated with full pay and allowance with nullified
recovery if any. (c) To direct the respondents to pay the salary for the period of suspension i.e. from
15.02.2000 to 26.09.2003.
(d) To award the cost of proceedings.
(e) Any other relief which this Honble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be passed in the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of the applicant.
2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the applicant while working as PCAMR with AE (Central Control
Room) was involved in a criminal case vide FIR No.31/2000 under Sections 406/498-A IPC registered in PS
Kalkaji, New Delhi and remained in police/judicial custody for a period exceeding forty eight hours, i.e. from
15.2.2000 to 6.4.2000. Accordingly, in terms of Rule 10 (2) (a) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, he was placed
under deemed suspension w.e.f. 15.2.2000, i.e. the date of his arrest vide order dated 30.5.2000. Later, he was
reinstated vide order dated 26.9.2003. Subsequently, the said FIR was quashed by the Honble High Court of
Delhi vide order dated 17.1.2008 in Criminal M.C. No.149/2008 on the basis of settlement between the parties
and dissolution of their marriage with mutual consent with the submissions of wife of the applicant, as she
was not desirous of prosecuting the complaint. On that basis, the FIR was quashed and the applicant was
acquitted vide order dated 3.3.2008. After acquittal, the applicant was issued a memorandum dated 1.4.2009
proposing thereby that period of suspension of the applicant be treated as spent on duty and for pay and
allowances this period be adjusted against all types of leave of the kind due and admissible including
extraordinary leave with a limit that if any recovery of subsistence allowance has to be made the
corresponding period may be treated with full pay and allowances which nullifies recovery, if any. The
applicant submitted his reply to the said memorandum on 18.5.2009. The appropriate authority vide the
impugned order dated 6.7.2009 (Annexure A-1) held that taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances of the case in totality, the period of suspension of the applicant for a period w.e.f. 15.2.2000 to
26.9.2003 shall be treated as spent on duty and for pay and allowances this period be adjusted against all types
of leave of the kind due and admissible including extraordinary leaver with a limit that if any recovery of
subsistence allowance has to be made the corresponding period may be treated with full pay and allowances,
which nullifies recovery, if any. It is this order, which is under challenge before this Tribunal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the applicant at the admission stage itself and perused the material
placed on record.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that he has been acquitted by the trial court on merits. As such,
he is entitled to full pay and allowances for the aforesaid period of suspension and further the said period be
Shri Het Ram S/O Shri Sita Ram vs Delhi Jal Board on 26 April, 2011
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/57247550/ 2
treated as spent on duty for all purposes, including pay and allowances, with all consequential benefits.
According to the learned counsel, the order passed by the authority is in violation of the provisions contained
in FR 54-B (3).
5. From the perusal of material placed on record, we are of the view that the applicant is not entitled to any
relief for the reason stated hereinafter. At this stage, it will be relevant to reproduce the relevant portion of the
order dated 17.1.2008 (Annexure A-2) passed by the Single Bench of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal
M.C. No.149/2008 whereby the FIR lodged against the applicant under Sections 406/498A of IPC and all
proceedings in pursuance thereto were quashed, which thus read: The Marriage between petitioner
no.1/husband and respondent no.2/wife was solemnized as per Hindu rites on 21.06.1999. However, soon
after, the respondent No.2/wife left the matrimonial home on 24.06.1999 and a complaint was lodged with the
police on 18.07.1999 resulting in registration of FIR No.31/2000 under Sections 406/498A of IPC. The charge
sheet was subsequently filed but the charges are yet to be framed. The parties, in the meanwhile, have settled
their disputes and the marriage between petitioner no.1/husband and the respondent no.2/wife stands dissolved
by mutual consent in pursuance to the Orders of the matrimonial court dated 03.12.2007. It is in view thereof
that the present petition has been filed stating that the respondent No.2/wife is not desirous of prosecuting the
complaint. The respondent no.2/wife, who is present in Court, has been identified by her counsel and, on
being asked, has confirmed that the matter has been settled with the petitioner no.1/husband.
6. Then the Honble High Court relying upon the judgments of the Honble Apex Court in B.S. Joshi &
others v. State of Haryana & another, AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1386 and G.V. Rao v. LHV Prasad & others,
(2000) 3 SCC 693 has held that no useful purpose would be served by continuing with the criminal
proceedings when the parties have re-conciled their disputes, dissolved their marriage and have agreed to go
their separate ways. Thus, from the portion, as quoted above and finding recorded by the High Court, learned
Single Judge of the High Court quashed the FIR. It is evident that the acquittal of the applicant was not on
merit but the FIR was quashed solely on the ground that it will serve no purpose to continue the criminal
proceedings when the parties have re-conciled their disputes, dissolved their marriage and have agreed to go
their separate ways. It may be stated that the person is entitled to full pay and allowances for the suspension
period and to regularize the said period of suspension as spent on duty only when the suspension is wholly
unjustified. As already stated above, it is not a case of such nature where the suspension of the applicant can
be said to be wholly unjustified so as to attract the provisions of FR 54-B (3). It may also be stated that the
applicant was placed under deemed suspension because he was in custody for a period of more than 48 hours.
Thus, the suspension of the applicant was by virtue of the operation of law. For that purpose, the authorities
cannot be blamed. Such suspension was revoked when the applicant was reinstated on 26.9.2003 during the
pendency of the criminal case. As already stated above, the FIR against the applicant was not quashed on
merit but it was quashed on the ground that once the parties have separated their way and dissolved marriage,
it will serve no useful purpose to keep the criminal case pending. Thus, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court has not given any finding on the merits of the case.
7. Under these circumstances, we are of the firm view that the applicant was not entitled to full pay and
allowances for the period of his deemed suspension till the said was revoked and we are not inclined to
interfere with the order passed by the authorities. Accordingly, the OA dismissed in limine with no order as to
costs. ( Shailendra Pandey ) ( M. L. Chauhan )
Member (A) Member (J)
Advocate. Arunagiri
(Expert) 11 August 2014
In the above case also FIR was quashed based on the compromise.
This court had held only if the suspension is unjustified, he can get the back wages.
But in the case of Mr.Rajesh the FIR was quashed for non jurisdiction not on compromise.
So, Mr.Rajesh is eligible for regularizing the suspension period.
T. Kalaiselvan, Advocate
(Expert) 11 August 2014
I believe expert Mr. Anirudh is satisfied that atleast there is one response to his desire/request for legal back to dispute his opinion on the subject issue.(I refer to expert Mr. Arunagiri's response).
Anirudh
(Expert) 11 August 2014
Dear Mr. Kalaiselvan,
In fact the citation and the detailed decision posted by Mr. Arunagiri supports my view.
The legal back up for the proposition by other Experts is yet to come.
T. Kalaiselvan, Advocate
(Expert) 12 August 2014
Dear Mr. Anirudh,
In fact after posting my reply I have been searching for a suitable citation relevant to the topic, am not able to lay hand on it properly, shall come back if I find one at the earliest. Our Bar association library is rather ill equipped lacking e-library facilities, hence have sought details from my friends else where. Thanks for your understanding and shall look forward for much more valuable information from your side on different topics too.
Sudhir Kumar, Advocate
(Expert) 12 August 2014
NTPC has decided leniently not to take disciplinary action because acquittal is not on merit rather on procedural ground.
Sudhir Kumar, Advocate
(Expert) 12 August 2014
repeated
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/experts/Suspension-period-to-be-treated-as-duty-period--490046.asp#.U-lWg6NvdG1
Anirudh
(Expert) 12 August 2014
Dear Mr. Kalaiselvan,
Thanks.
Advocate. Arunagiri
(Expert) 12 August 2014
Another decision of the SC says that, even if the employee is acquitted, even if the employee is reinstated, he is not entitled for the back wages, holding that no work no pay.
But, the SC is silent on service period.
Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs The Superintendent Engineer, ... on 28 October, 1996
Bench: K. Ramaswamy, G.B. Pattanaik.
PETITIONER:
RANCHHODJI CHATURJI THAKORE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE SUPERINTENDENT ENGINEER, GUJARATELECTRICITY BOARD, HIMMA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/10/1996
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK.
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Delay condoned.
This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on October 1, 1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basic the respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service since he was working as Junior Clerk in the respondent-Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated October 14,1992 acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned single judge directed the respondent to reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but denied back wages. The petitioner then filed letters Patent Appeal No.319/93 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated August 26,1993. Thus, this special leave petition.
The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is: whether he is entitled to back wages? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basic of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant, Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference.
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
Sudhir Kumar, Advocate
(Expert) 13 August 2014
when accused Govt servant is acquitted on procedural grounds that too in dowry case, the employer is well equipped by law to take disciplinary action against him (on same charge of dowry demand. The standard of evidence is different in case of disciplinary proceedings. Even custodial statement is evidence in disciplinary proceedings.
Le the author annoy the employer so that they wake up from their lenience.
P. Venu
(Expert) 13 August 2014
The answer to the question involved in the query, whether the queriest is entitled to receive full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It is unsafe to give definite answer on the basis of the known principles and judicial precedents. The answer could only be provided by the Disciplinary Authority. And this decision is subject, of course, to judicial review.
The Disciplinary Authority is required under the rules to issue appropriate orders on the question of pay and allowances once the suspension is revoked and the cause for placing the employee has ceased to exist.
It appears that, in this case, no such orders have been issued. The queriest can make an appeal if such an order, as and when issued, appears to be unfair and he can approach the Judicial forums too.
The immediate action required on his part s to urge the Disciplinary Authority to issue orders regulating the pay and allowances during the period of suspension.
Sudhir Kumar, Advocate
(Expert) 13 August 2014
@ P Venu.
Author is dpreading facts on tow threads
refer
http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/experts/Suspension-period-to-be-treated-as-duty-period--490046.asp#.U-t58qNvdG0
on this thread he revealed that orders have been passed as under:-
"As disiplinary authority, I am of the opinion that your suspension subsequent to your being in judicial custody was
not wholly unjustified. I have therefore decided that your suspension period shall be treated as " Not on Duty" and you will not be entitled to get any benefit beyond the subsistence allowance already paid to you."
Sudhir Kumar, Advocate
(Expert) 13 August 2014
I believe that CDA rules of NTPC may not be different than Govt conduct rules.
Ruke 13A of CCS(Conduct) rules reads that:-
No Government servant shall-
(i) give or take or abet the giving or taking of dowry; or
(ii) demand directly or indirectly, from the parent or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this rule, ‘dowry’ has the same meaning as in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961(28 of 1961).
