Summary: This is an interesting judgment. read the complete judgment. Specially the part where it says “The respondent is a young up coming doctor. There is nothing strange in his asking his wife to give him money when he is in need of it.”
Complete judgment
upreme Court of India
PETITIONER:SHOBHA RANIVs.RESPONDENT:MADHUKAR REDDI
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1987
SHETTY, K.J. (J)RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:1988 AIR 121 1988 SCR (1)10101988 SCC (1) 105 JT 1987 (4) 4331987 SCALE (2)1008
ACT:Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Section 13(1)(i−a)−‘Cruelty’− Demand for dowry−Whether cruelty−Whether wife entitled to decree for dissolution of marriage−‘Intention’−Whether necessary to constitute and prove cruelty in matrimonial cases.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: ‘Dowry’−Demand of−Whether amounts to cruelty entitling wife to decree for dissolution of marriage.Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 498A−‘Cruelty’−What is−Demand for dowry−Whether amounts to cruelty−Whether wife entitled to decree for dissolution of marriage.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant−wife, a post−graduate in biological sciences, married therespondent−husband, a medical doctor on December 19, 1982. Soon after, relationsbetween them became bitter. Ultimately, the appellant−wife moved the court fordivorce on the ground of cruelty. Her main complaint was about the dowrydemanded by the husband or his parents.
The trial court rejected the appellant’s case on the ground that there wasno satisfactory evidence that the demands were such as to border on harassment.The High Court also rejected her case and held that the appellant appeared to behypersensitive and imagined too much and too unnatural things, that the demandfor money had to be viewed from a proper angle, and that there was nothing wrongin the respondent, who was a doctor, asking his rich wife to spare some money.Allowing the appeal by special leave,
HELD: 1.1 In order to curb the evil practice of dowry, the Parliamentenacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 prohibiting the giving or taking ofdowry. But, as the pernicious practice continued in some communities, the DowryProhibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enac− 1011ted with considerable changes in the parent Act. Likewise, the Indian PenalCode, 1860 was amended by introducing an entirely new offence with regard tocriminal jurisdiction. Section 498A was introduced providing for punishment tothe husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjecting her tocruelty.new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty. Explanation to s.498A of the Indian Penal Code provides that any wilful conduct which is of sucha nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or likely to causegrave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical ofthe woman), and harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or anyperson related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuablesecurity would constitute cruelty. [1016E−F] 1.2 Cruelty simpliciter is a groundfor divorce under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, the word‘cruelty’ has not been defined. Indeed, it could not have been defined. It hasbeen used in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Itis a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. Thecruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it isphysical, the Court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question offact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature ofcruel treatment and the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse,whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injuriousto live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn bytaking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complainingspouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself isbad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effecton the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, thecruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.
1.3 The matrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty as a ground fordissolution of marriage, if not admitted, requires to be proved on thepreponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonabledoubt as in criminal cases.1.4 Evidence as to harassment to the wife to meet any unlawful demand formoney is necessary to constitute cruelty in criminal law. This is therequirement of the offence of cruelty defined under s. 498A of the Indian PenalCode. It is not so under s. 13(1)(i−a) of the HinduMarriage Act, 1955. The cruelty need not be only intentional, wilful ordeliberate. It is not necessary to prove the intention in matrimonial offence.From the context and the set up in which the words ‘cruelty’ has been used in s.13(1)(i−a), intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to beunderstood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If theintention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conductor brutal act complained or, cruelty could be easily established. But theabsence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinarysense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded ascruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there hasbeen deliberate or wilful ill−treatment. 1.5 The matrimonialduties and responsibilities are of varying degrees from house to house or personto person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment ofcruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for
standard in life. In matrimonial cases, the Court is not concerned with the ideals in family life. It has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance.Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] 2 ALL E.R. 257, 259, Gollins v. Gollins, [1963]2 All E.R. 966 1972 and Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane,[1975] 3 SCR 967 1978, referred to.
JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3013 of 1987.From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.1986 of the Andhra Pradesh HighCourt in A.A.O. No. 1491 of 1985. S. Madhusudan Rao, K.K. Gupta and Rakesh KumarGupta for the Appellant.K.V. Sreekumar and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent. The Judgment of theCourt was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. We grant special leave and proceedto dispose of the appeal.Shobha Rani is the appellant. Her husband is Madhukar Reddi who isrespondent before us. The wife is post−graduate in biological
sciences. The husband is a medical doctor. They were happily married on December19, 1982. But their happiness did not last longer. They started exchangingletters with bitter feelings. Then they began to accuse each other. At onestage, they thought of winding up by mutual consent. It was perhaps out ofdisgust. it would have been better, if it had happened. But unfortunately, itdid not materialise. Ultimately they landed themselves in the Court. The wifemoved the Court for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Before referring tofurther facts, let us consider the law. The cruelty simpliciter is now a groundfor divorce under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (Act 25 of 1955). Section 13provides, so far as it is material: “13 Divorce (1) Any marriage solemnizedwhether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petitionpresented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorceon the ground that the other party …..(i) …….(i−a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitionerwith cruelty, or xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxSection 13(1)(i−a) uses the words “treated the petitioner with cruelty”.The word “cruelty” has not been defined. Indeed it could not have been defined.It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is theconduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Itis a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. Thecruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it isphysical the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question offact and degree. If it is mental the problem presents difficulty. First, theenquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impactof such treatment in the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonableapprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other.Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account thenature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may,however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and perse unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the otherspouse need not be enquired into or
considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itselfis proved or admitted. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has beenmarked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilitiesin particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house tohouse or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about thetreatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should notsearch for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one casemay not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon thetype of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and socialconditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which theyattach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import ourown notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be ageneration gap between us and the parties. It would be better if we keep asideour customs and manners. It would be also better if we less depend uponprecedents. Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] 2 AllE.R. 257 (259) “the categories of cruelty are not closed.” Each case may bedifferent. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generallysimilar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct whichmay constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case dependingupon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conductcomplained of. Such is the wonderful/realm of cruelty.These preliminary observations are intended to emphasize that the Court inmatrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The Court hasonly to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider theirparticular grievance. As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All.E.R. 966 (1972): “In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objectivestandards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of thereasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or thiswoman.”Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta NarayanDastane, [1975] 3 SCR 967 (978) said: “The Court has to deal, not with an idealhusband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with parti−cular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near−ideal one willprobably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court, for, even if they maynot be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help themoverlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures.”
With these principles in mind, we may now unfold the story with which thewife came to the Court seeking dissolution of her marriage. She made severalgrievances. We may ignore all but one. The one and the only one with which weare concerned is her complaint about the dowry demand by the husband or hisparents. The dowry is a deep rooted evil in the society. It started as customarypresents with love and affection. In olden days, it was customary to give somepresents to the bride and bridegroom and his family at the time of marriage. Theparents of the bride or their relations out of affection and good intention usedto provide the couple something to fall back upon in case of need. The systemstarted at a time when girls were generally not very much educated and even ifthey were educated they were unwilling to take up gainful employment. There wasalso less opportunity for them either to supplement the family income or tobecome financially independent. There was yet another reason for such customarygifts. The daughter then was not entitled to a share in the joint familyproperties when she had a brother. Hence the father out of affection or otherconsideration used to give some cash or kind to the daughter at the time ofmarriage. The right of the father to give a small portion of even the familyproperty as a gift to the daughter at the time of her marriage was recognised.But unfortunately over the years new practice developed. The boy or his family
members started demanding cash or kind from the brides parents. They starteddemanding dowry as a matter of right. The demand more often extended even afterthe marriage. There were instance of harassment of the wife, if the demand wasnot complied with. In order to curb this evil practice, the Parliament enactedthe Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act No. 28 of 1961). The Act prohibited thegiving or taking of dowry. But in spite of this enactment, the perniciouspractice continued in some communities. The Joint Committee of Parliamentappointed to examine the working of the Dowry Prohibition Act remarked “the evilsought to be done away with by the Act, on the other hand, increased by leapsand bounds and has now assumed grotesque and alarming proportions.” Again theParliament intervened. The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enactedwith considerable changes in the parent Act. Likewise the Indian Penal Code wasamended by introducing of an entirely new offence hitherto unknown to criminaljurisprudence. Section 498 A has been introduced in the following terms: “498 A. Husband orrelative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty; whoever, being thehusband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman tocruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to threeyears and shall also be liable to fine.Explanation−For the purposes of this section “cruelty” means:(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drivethe woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb orhealth (whether mental or physical) of the woman or(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view tocoercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for anyproperty or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any personrelated to her to meet such demand.”A new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty. Explanation toSec. 498 A provides that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as islikely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute cruelty. Such wilfulconduct which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health(whether mental or physical of the woman) would also amount to cruelty.Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her orany person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property orvaluable security would also constitute cruelty.We are, however, not concerned with criminal offence either under the DowryProhibition Act or under the Indian Penal Code. We are concerned with amatrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty as a ground for dissolution ofmarriage. Such cruelty if not admitted requires to be proved on thepreponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonabledoubt as in criminal cases. This Court has not accepted the test of proof beyonda reasonable doubt. As said by Chandrachud, J. in Dastane case (Ibid at p. 976):“Neither section 10 of the Act which enumerates the
grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented norsection 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in anyproceedings under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his casebeyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass adecree if it is “satisfied” on matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of thesection. Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civilnature, the word “satisfied” must mean “satisfied” on a preponderance of“probabilities” and not “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt”. Section 23 doesnot alter the standard of proof in civil cases.”
Let us now turn to the evidence in this case. It consists of that of wifeas P.W. 1 as against the evidence of husband as R.W. 1. The parties have alsoproduced the letters exchanged between them. There appears to be no doubt thatthe husband or his parents were demanding dowry from the appellant. The husbandin his letter Ex. Al dated August 28, 1983 wrote to the wife:“Now regarding Dowry point, I still feel that there is nothing wrong inmy parents asking for few thousand rupees. It is quite a common thing for whichmy parents are being blamed, as harassment.”
The wife in her evidence before the Court has stated: “My Mother−in−lawalways used to make demand for money from my parents. I used to tell my parentsabout what was happening to me in that house. I used to keep silent when mymother−in−law made demands for money. The respondent also sometimes used to makedemands for money. I used to tell him as to why should I ask money from myparents, and I also used to tell him that I would not ask my parents. But heused to reply that such things were only there in olden times and not now andthat therefore, I should ask money from my parents. There were fixed depositsreceipts in my name in the Bank upto one and a half to two lakhs. Besides thisthere was house plot in my name at Jubilee Hills. I was afraid of telling myhusband and my parents in law that I would not ask my parents for money.
This I was afraid because I had an apprehension that something would be doneto me either physically or mentally if I told them so. I entertained thisapprehension because this went on regularly every day, that is their demands formoney.
I was afraid to go back again to the respondent’s house because I felt thatthe pestering for money will go on like this. I, therefore, developed aversionfor going back to the respondent. For that reason, I joined as a schoolteacher.” The trial court or the High Court did not state that there was nodemand for money. The case of the wife was, however, rejected on the ground thatthere was no satisfactoy evidence that the demands were such as to border onharassment. The trial court said:“Though one would not justify demands for money, it has to be viewed inthis perspective. The respondent is a young up coming doctor. There is nothingstrange in his asking his wife to give him money when he is in need of it. Thereis no satisfactory evidence that the demands were such as to border onharassment.”In regard to the admission by the husband in his letter dated August 28,1983 as to the dowry demanded by his parents, the trial court observed:“The letter should be read as a whole. The respondent has an explanationto make and has made one in the cross−examination. He is trying to confess. Itis clear from the attitude of the petitioner that she is prone to exaggeratethings. That is evident from her complaint of food and the habit of drinking.”
“Either because of her over sensitivity or because of her habit ofexaggeration, she has made a mountain of mole−hill. Further, for the reasonsbest known to her, the petitioner
has not examined her father. There is no explanation why he has not beenexamined in support of her contention that the respondent and his parents wereharassing her for money.” The High Court also went on the same lines. The HighCourt said that the wife appears to be hypersensitive and she imagines too muchand too unnatural things. The High Court then observed:“Though one would not justify demands for money it has to be viewed inthe circumstances from a proper angle. The respondent is a doctor, if he askshis rich wife to spare some money, there is nothing wrong or unusual.”This is not a case where the husband requested his wife to give some moneyfor his personal expenses. The High Court appears to have misunderstood thecase. It has evidently proceeded on a wrong basis. It proceeded on the groundthat the husband wanted some money from his wife for his personal expenses. Ifthe demand was only of such nature we would have thrown this appeal away. Thewife must extend all help to husband and so too the husband to wife. They arepartners in life. They must equally share happiness and sorrow. They must helpeach other. One cannot take pleasure at the cost of the other. But the case onhand is not of a failure on that front. It has been admitted by the husbandhimself in his letter dated August 28, 1983 addressed to the wife that hisparents demanded dowry. But he wrote to the wife that there was nothing wrong inthat demand of his parents. This is indeed curious. He would not have stated sounless he was party to the demand. The wife has stated in her evidence thatthere were repeated demands for money from her monther− in−law. Her evidencecannot be brushed aside on the ground that she has not examined her father. Itwas not the case of the wife that the dowry was demanded directly from herfather. The evidence of the father was therefore not material. It is also notproper to discredit the wife as hypersensitive or prone to exaggeration. Thatwould be judging the wife by our style of manners and our standard of life. Thatwe cannot apply. We must try to understand her feelings and then search for thenugget of truth in the entire evidence.The contents of Ex. Al should not be read in isolation. It must be viewedagainst the background of accusations in the letter dated December 26, 1983written by advocate for the wife to his counter−part. The relevant portion ofthe letter reads:
“In the background of these, the worst form of ill trestment that ismeted out to our client was constant harassment for monies. It may be brought toyour notice that prior to marriage on demand by your client’s father a sum ofRs. 17,000 was given and also a Scooter thereafter. It may be brought to yournotice that one other main reason for your client to dowry deaths which are veryfrequently seen now−a−days in papers. It may be pointed out that your clientsphilosophy is that since our client’s are financially sound, there is no wrongfor your client’s parent to ask for few more thousands. It may be pointed outand brought to your notice that it appears your client’s sole object of marriagewas to get the monies standing in the name of our client transferred to hisname. It would be better to understand that money that stand in our client’sname are somwhere about two lakhs. It is not out of place to mention that yourclient’s behaviour and treatment with our client could only be said to be apointer for seeking these monies alone and marriage was a device………..”The cumulative effect of all the circumstances and the evidence of partieslead to the conclusion that the demand of dowry went on with the support of thehusband. The High Court while dealing with this part of the case has observedthat there is no evidence to show that the demands were such as to causeharassment to the wife. The High Court appears to have misconstrued the scope ofcruelty in matrimonial affairs. The evidence as to harassment to the wife to
meet any unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute cruelty incriminal law. It is the requirement of the offence of ‘cruelty’ defined undersec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Sec. 13(1)(i−a) of the Hindu Marriage Actprovides that the party has after solemanization of the marriage treated thepetitioner with cruelty. What do these words mean? What should be the nature ofcruelty? Should it be only intentional, wilful or deliberate? Is it necessary toprove the intention in matrimonial offence? we think not. We have earlier saidthat cruelty may be of any kind and any variety. It may be different indifferent cases. It is in relation to the conduct of parties to a marriage. Thatconduct which is complained of as cruelty by one spouse may not be so for theother spouse. There may be instance of cruelty by the unintentional butinexcusable conduct of any party. The cruel treatment may also result by thecultural conflict of the spouses. In such cases, even if the act of cruelty isestablished, the intention to commit cannot beestablished. The aggrieved party may not get relief. We do not think that thatwas the intention with which the Parliament enacted sec. 13(1)(i−a) of the HinduMarriage Act. The context and the set up in which the word ’cruelty’ has beenused in the section, seems to us, that intention is not a necessary element incruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term inmatrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferredby the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could beeasily established. But the absence of intention should not make any differencein the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of couldotherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied onthe ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill−treatment. The sameis also the line of reasoning adopted by the House of Lords in Gollins v.Gollins, [1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976 where Lord Evershed said:
“I am unable to accept the premise that “cruelty” in matrimonialproceedings requires or involves of necessity the element of malignity− though Ido not of course doubt that if malignity be in fact established it would behighly relevant to a charge of cruelty. In my opinion, however, the questionwhether one party to a marriage has been guilty of cruelty to the other or hastreated the other with cruelty does not, according to the ordinary sense of thelanguage used by Parliament, involve the presence of malignity (or itsequivalent); and if this view be right it follows, as I venture to think, thatthe presence of intention to injure on the part of the spouse charged or (whichis, as I think, the same thing) proof that the conduct of the party charged was“aimed at” the other spouse is not an essential requisite for cruelty. Thequestion in all such cases is, to my mind, whether the acts or conduct of theparty charged were “cruel” according to the ordinary sense of that word, ratherthan whether the party charged was himself or herself a cruel man or woman………….
Bearing in mind the proper approach to matrimonial offence, we aresatisfied that the facts and circumstances brought out by the appellant in thiscase do justify an inference that there was demand for dowry. The demand fordowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is bad enough. That, in ouropinion, amounts to cruely entitling the wife to get a decree for dissolution ofmarriage. 1022
In the result, we allow the appeal and in reversal of the judgments of thecourts below, we grant a decree for dissolution of the marriage. In thecircumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. N.P.V. Appeal allowed.
