interpretation
saurabh kaushik
(Querist) 06 June 2009
This query is : Resolved
how do court interpretate the law embeeded in decision of court themself and through which method do court develop such law?
Swami Sadashiva Brahmendra Sar
(Expert) 07 June 2009
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 141 AND LAW OF PRECEDENTS:
There can be no dispute that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is binding on all Courts of the country in view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India but the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court is to be read with reference to and in the contest of the peculiar statutory provisions interpreted by the Court and taking into consideration the facts of the case where the law had been laid down.
It is settled proposition of law that an issue, which has not been considered by the Court while delivering a judgment, cannot be said to be binding as a decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Court must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of the Court. The Court should not place reliance upon a discussion without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analyzing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. The judgment has to be read with reference to and in context with a particular statutory provisions interpreted by the Court as the Court has to examine as what principle of law has been decided and the decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide (Vide H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530; M/s. Amar Nath Om Parkash & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 218; Rajpur Ruda Meha & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707; C.I.T. Vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363; Sarva Shramik Sangh, Bombay Vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. & Anr., (1993) 2 SCC 386; Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. M/s. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 834; Mehboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of Maharastra, (2004) 2 SCC 362; ICICI Bank & Anr. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3315; M/s. MaKhija Construction and Enggr. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Indore Development Authority & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2499; and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. Vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. & Anr., (2005) 7 SCC 234).
In Jawahar Lal Sazawal & Ors. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1187, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features.
In Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 511, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a decision is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. While deciding the said case the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Delhi Administration Vs. Manohar Lal, AIR 2002 SC 3088.
In Union of India Vs. Chajju Ram, AIR 2003 SC 2339, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"It is now well settled that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is equally well settled that a little difference in facts may lead to a different conclusion."
In Ashwani Kumar Singh Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2661, the Apex court held that a judgment of the Court is not to be read as a statute as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have been made in setting of the facts of a particular case. Substantial flexibility; one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper.
Not only that, in Nand Kishore Vs. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"Their Lordships' decisions declare the existing law but do not enact any fre
Swami Sadashiva Brahmendra Sar
(Expert) 07 June 2009
As held in Bharat Petrolieum Corporation Ltd. & another vs. N.R. Vairamani & another (AIR 2004 SC 4778), a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court also observed:-
"Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision of which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's Theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgment. They interpret words of statutes: their words are not to be interpreted as statutes".
In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. vs. Horton (1951 AC 737 at page 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:-
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge".
In Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid Said, "Lord Atkin's speech................ is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition: it will require qualification in new circumstances, Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062, observed:
"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell,J. as if it were an Act of Parliament".
And in Herringion vs. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lords Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which said of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the said branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it".
(Emphasis supplied)
The same view was taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (K.V.), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 946 and in Government of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Gowramma & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 863.
