Partial fir quashing allowed or not ?

2010(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 256

For the Petitioner :- Mr. Dinesh Goyal, Advocate.

For the Respondent :- Mr. Paraminder Singh Sekhon, Advocate.

Non Compoundable offence - Of the seven accused, complainant entering into compromise with one accused - Proceedings qua one accused only quashed by High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code.

A Police Officer (Public servant) showing negligence in duty and taking no action on Complaint of a Scheduled person - Complaint under Section 4 of Scheduled Castes Act, against Police Officer - Complaint not maintainable - It was not shown that accused wilfully neglected his duty.

A. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 320 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Sections 3 and 4 - Non Compoundable offence - Of the seven accused, complainant entering into compromise with one accused - Proceedings qua one accused only quashed by High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code.

ON FACTS :-

Complaint against seven accused persons under provision of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, 1989 - Offence not compoundable, but it would not preclude High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code to quash the complaint which is personal in nature between the parties - In this case Complainant entering into compromise with one accused who was DSP of Police - Proceedings qua DSP quashed - Proceedings qua other accused would continue. 2008(2) RCR(Criminal) 429 : 2008(2) RAJ 529 (SC), 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 1052 (P&H) and 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 479 (P&H) relied.

[Para 7]

B. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Sections 3 and 4 - A Police Officer (Public servant) showing negligence in duty and taking no action on Complaint of a Scheduled person - Complaint filed under Section 4 of Scheduled Caste Act, against Police Officer - Complaint not maintainable - It was not shown that accused wilfully neglected his duty.

ON FACTS :-

Complaint submitted to Police by a Scheduled Caste person - DSP (Public servant) used derogatory language against the Complainant - Complaint under Section 4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 filed against DSP for neglecting his duty - Complaint quashed - No offence under Section 4 made out - Held :-

Section 4 of the Act provides that a Public servant who wilfully neglects his duty shall be guilty of offence under Section 4 - It was not shown that DSP who is a Public servant has wilfully neglected his duties.

[Para 8]

C. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 320 - Compounding of offence which was not compoundable - Where the question involved is of a purely personal in nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings. 2008(2) RCR(Criminal) 429 : 2008(2) RAJ 529 (SC) and 2007(3) RCR (Crl.) 1052 relied.

[Para 10]

D. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Sections 3 and 4 - Scope and object of Act explained - Serious crimes are committed against members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes for various historical, social and economic reasons - The existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code, it were found to be inadequate to check the various crimes committed on the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - A special Legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes had become necessary - The Act, therefore is for the advancement of the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes to lead their life with dignity, honour and decency.

[Para 7]

Cases referred :

Hawa Singh v. Bishamber Dayal, 2007(1) RCR(Crl.) 325 (P&H).

Usha Gupta v. Amir Chand, 2001(1) RCR(Crl.) 788 (P&H).

Shankuntla Sahni v. Kaushalya Sahni, (1980)1 SCC 63.

Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, 2008(2) RCR(Criminal) 429 : 2008(2) RAJ 529 : (20084 SCC 582.

Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 1052 (P&H).

Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 479 (P&H).

S.S. Saron, J. - This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Cr.PC" - for short) seeking quashing of a criminal complaint No. 10 dated 13.2.2006 (Annexure P1) titled Malkiat Kaur v. Nirmal Singh and Others qua the petitioner for the offences under Sections 323, 341, 506, 148/149 Indian Penal Code ("Indian Penal Code" - for short) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ("Act" - for short) pending in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur, the summoning order dated 16.5.2006 (Annexure P2) and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The complainant Malkiat Kaur (respondent) filed a criminal complaint (Annexure P1) titled Malkiat Kaur v. Nirmal Singh and Others in the Court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhuri alleging the commission of the offences as mentioned above. It has been alleged in the said complaint that on 8.2.2006 at about 8.30 am, the complainant along with her nephew Gurjant Singh was returning from their cattle field after tethering their cattle. The complainant was ahead of her nephew Gurjant Singh by about 5-7 karams. Accused No. 1 to 6 (not the petitioner) as per their plan were waiting for the complainant to cross from near their house. When the complainant reached near their house, accused No. 1 to 6, some of them were armed, had used derogatory and offending language with respect to the caste of the complainant. Besides, she was beaten and she suffered some injuries. The husband of the complainant namely Baghel Singh took her to the Civil Hospital, Dhuri for her medical examination. The complainant was medically examined. On the same day, after medical examination, the complainant along with her husband Baghel Singh and three advocates of Civil Court, Dhuri and one Nahar singh reported the matter to the Police Station Dhuri. They also made a written complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ("DSP" - for short) Dhuri for registration of a case against accused No. 1 to 6. The petitioner at the relevant time was posted as DSP, Dhuri and is accused No. 7 in the criminal complaint (Annexure P1). It is alleged that the petitioner used derogatory language against the complainant in the presence of Baghel Singh Nahar Singh and the advocates and he refused to take any action against accused No. 1 to 6. Rather the petitioner asked the police of Police Station Dhuri not to take any action against accused No. 1 to 6. Besides, a false case i.e. FIR No. 30 dated 8.2.2006 for the offences under Sections 452, 427 and 506 Indian Penal Code was registered against the family members of the complainant. It is alleged that the accused in the criminal complaint (Annexure P1) had caused injuries and used derogatory words against the modesty and reputation of the complainant and against the community in general as also against the complainant and her family members in particular who are members of the Scheduled Castes Community. It is alleged that the petitioner was pressing the family of the complainant to withdraw the case that had been registered against accused No. 1 and 2 for the offences under Sections 323 and 326 Indian Penal Code. The offending words attributed to the petitioner were, it is alleged, uttered at the time of submitting the representation for taking action against accused No. 1 to 6 in the complaint (Annexure P1). The petitioner is alleged to have used derogatory language against the complainant and at that time, the accused Nirmal Singh, Satgur Singh and Gurmukh Singh were present. The petitioner, it is alleged, had tried to lower the reputation, dignity and modesty of the complainant in the eyes of the general public arid others in connivance with accused No. 1 to 6. The complainant also made a written representation to the higher officers, however, no action was taken. The complaint in her preliminary evidence examined Dr. Ramesh Kumar Sharma (CW1), complainant Malkiat Kaur (CW2), Gurjant. Singh (CW3), AMHC Gian Singh (CW4) and Baghel Singh (CW5). The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dhuri after considering the same summoned the accused including the petitioner for the commission of offences finder Sections 323, 341, 506, 148 and 149 Indian Penal Code; and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act vide order dated 16.5.2006 (Annexure P2). Thereafter a compromise was effected between the petitioner and the complainant and a compromise deed dated 1.3.2008 (Annexure P3) was recorded between the parties to the present petition. It is recorded that the respectable persons of the city had got the matter compromised with the petitioner and according to the compromise, the complainant does not want to take any action against the petitioner and that she would continue the complaint (Annexure P1) against the remaining accused persons.

3. On the last date of hearing i.e. 8.5.2009 the respondent Malkiat Kaur was present in Court and was identified by her counsel. It was stated by her that she had compromise the matter with the petitioner only and he had no objection if the complaint qua him was cancelled.

4. Mr. Dinesh Goyal, Advocate learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contend that a reading of the complaint (Annexure P1) would show that the offences attributed to the petitioner are under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner intentionally insulted or intimidated the complainant with an intention to humiliate her in any place within the public view which can be said to be an evidence of committing atrocities in terms of clause (x) of Section 3 of the Act. Besides, it is submitted that there is nothing to show that the petitioner wilfully neglected his duties required to be performed under the Act so as to make an offence under Section 4 of the Act. In any case, it is submitted that the offending words as attributed to the petitioner would make out an offence which is personal in nature between the complainant and the petitioner and the same having been compromised and the feeling of the complainant assuaged, besides, a compromise (Annexure P3) having been entered into between them, the impugned complaint (Annexure P1), the summoning order (Annexure P2) and all consequential proceedings are liable to be quashed qua the petitioner.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the matter between the parties has been compromised. In terms of the Compromise (Annexure P3), the complainant (respondent) has no objection to the quashing of the complaint (Annexure P1) and she has also stated so when she appeared on the last date of hearing.

6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act inter alia records that despite various measures to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. The existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code, it were found to be inadequate to check the various crimes committed on the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. A special Legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes had become necessary. The Act, therefore, is for the advancement of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to lead their life with dignity, honour and decency. The offences under the provisions of the Act even if are not compoundable, the same would not preclude this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code to quash the complaint which is personal in nature between the parties.

7. In the present case, the complainant in her complaint has alleged that when she had gone to represent for registration of case against the other accused, the petitioner used the offending and derogatory language and he refused to take any action against the accused. As regards the language that was used in order to make out an offence of atrocities in terms of Section 3(x) of the Act, it is to be shown that a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe has intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Section 4 of the Act provides for punishment for neglect of duties. It is envisaged that whoever, being a public servant but not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, wilfully neglects his duties required to be performed by him under the Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to one year. The petitioner is a public servant. To establish that an offence under Section 4 of the Act has been committed, it is required to be shown that the public servant concerned has wilfully neglected his duties. A mere neglect in the performance of the duty even though it may be an erroneous one is not to be taken or branded as a wilful neglect to perform duty. The allegations against the petitioner in the complaint (Annexure P1) are that a criminal case for the offences under Sections 323 and 326 was registered against accused Nos. 1 and 2 at Police Station Dhuri and the police of Police Station Dhuri in connivance with the said accused Nos. 1 and 2 and at the instance of the petitioner, presented the challan under Sections 323, 324/34 Indian Penal Code instead of Sections 324, 323, 326/34 Indian Penal Code. In the said complaint, the petitioner was pressing for withdrawing the case and due to this reason, it is alleged that FIR No. 30 had been registered against one of the eye-witness namely Gurjant Single in the said case. It is alleged that due to the said reason, no action had been taken by the petitioner on the complaint of the complainant which she had made against accused Nos. 1 to 6. In fact it is due to the intimacy of the petitioner with accused Nos. 1 and 2 of the complaint (Annexure P1) that at the time of submission of written representation by the complainant, the petitioner used derogatory language against the complaint, Therefore, it is not a case wherein it has been alleged that the petitioner wilfully neglected his duties. In any case, the allegation that the petitioner did not perform his duty would not survive as the matter has been compounded.

8. In Hawa Singh and others v. Bishamber Dayal, 2007(1) RCR(Crl.) 325 (P&H), the parties in the said case were employees of the Haryana Roadways. The complainant therein had filed a complaint under Section 3(ix) and (x) of the Act. With the intervention of other employees of the department, a compromise was effected between the parties which was reduced into writing. It was stated in the compromise that there were temperamental differences between complainant and the accused, due to which the complainant had filed the complaint. The complainant had agreed to withdraw the complaint and had specifically stated that he had compromised the matter without any pressure. Keeping in view the fact that the parties were serving in the same department and had compromised the matter besides, the complainant did not want to pursue the complaint, the complaint as well as the summoning order were quashed. In Usha Gupta v. Amir Chand, 2001(1) RCR(Crl.) 788 (P&H), the petition was filed for quashing the complaint that had been filed under Sections 298/504 Indian Penal Code and Section 3(x) of the Act as the entire matter had been settled between the parties by way of compromise. This Court observed that since both the petitioner and respondent were working in the same department/hospital, both the parties had amicably settled their dispute. The complainant had given an affidavit to the effect that he had reached a compromise with the petitioner. The compromise was accepted and the complaint was quashed. A reference was made to the decision in the case of Shankuntla Sahni v. Kaushalya Sahni, (1980)1 SCC 63 which was cited in support of the submission that a compromise ought to be encouraged by the Court.

9. The object of the Act is to provide for prevention and punitive measures to protect the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from being victimised and where atrocities are committed, to provide adequate relief and assistance to rehabilitate them. Besides, it is a measure to preserve their self respect and honour. The fact that the matter has been compromised, does assuage the feelings of the members of the Scheduled Castes and provides for protection of their self respect and honour. The compromise indeed is a measure to provide adequate relief and assistance to members of the Scheduled Castes for their rehabilitation and to live with dignity. Therefore, it is personal in nature. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, 2008(2) RCR(Criminal) 429 : 2008(2) RAJ 529 : (2008)4 SCC 582 it was emphasised that dispute where the question involved is of a purely personal in nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings. Besides, in Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 1052 a larger Bench of five Judges of this Court observed as follows :-

"The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Criminal Procedure Code or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section of the Criminal Procedure Code

The Compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section of the Criminal Procedure Code is sued to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is 'finest hour of justice'. Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section of the Criminal Procedure Code in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation".

10. Therefore, in view of the compromise that has been entered into between the petitioner and the complainant, the complaint (Annexure P1) is liable to be quashed qua the petitioner. The incident in respect of the other accused in the complaint (Annexure P1) is different and separate from that with the petitioner. As such the complaint against the other accused is to be tried in accordance with law. In Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007(3) RCR(Crl.) 479 (P&H), money was taken by the accused in the said case for sending the son of the complainant abroad, but the son of the complainant was sent to some other destination. The complainant had settled the dispute with the petitioner in the said case but not with the other accused who had also filed the petitioner in this Court for quashing of the complaint. This Court quashed the complaint qua the petitioner in the said case by making it clear that the proceedings against the other accused would continue.

11. Accordingly, in view of the compromise, the complaint (Annexure P1), the summoning order (Annexure P2) and all consequential proceedings in pursuance thereof qua the petitioner alone are quashed and the proceedings would continue in accordance with law against the other accused. Nothing stated herein shall, however, be constructed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the learned trial Court shall consider the case on the basis of evidence and material as adduced before it.

Order accordingly.